(Eritrea and Terrorism) Terrorism: in the Nature of the PFDJ

Terrorism: in the Nature of the PFDJ
05 Sep, 2007
Yosief Ghebrhiwet

(Eritrea and Terrorism)

If one is to understand the nature of terrorism that the Isayas regime sponsors, one has to primarily look at the nature of the PFDJ itself, especially those factors that make it unique among terrorism sponsoring organizations; for, in this case, the nature of the problem recommends its own solution. Two factors are often mentioned as to why the Eritrean state ought to be included in the state sponsors of terrorism list: for conducting domestic terrorism against its own people and for sponsoring regional terrorism. But there is a third one we haven’t looked so far: it is in the nature of PFDJ to conduct its affairs through confrontation only; as a dysfunctional entity, it knows no other way to relate itself to others. In assessing PFDJ’s “personality”, one has to look at its behavioral past, the principle that guides that behavior and the way it translates that principle on the ground.

The brand of terrorism that PFDJ espouses cannot be seen differently from the nature of PFDJ itself. First, the only “ideology” that explains almost every action that this organization has taken since its inception (as Shaebia) – that of “vulgar pragmatism” – also happens to explain best its brand of terrorism. Second, the “terrorism variable” permeates and dominates almost every aspect of decision taken in its domestic, regional and foreign policies as no other variable does; that is, the terrorism policy has attained an overarching status. And third, the terrorism we are witnessing today simply happens to be the logical extension of its confrontational past, where it used to get things done through force only. Although aspects of these three factors are to be found among the terrorism-sponsoring states, it is only in the Eritrean case that they converge in their unadulterated forms. Lets now look at these three factors in detail.

Vulgar pragmatism at work

Shaebia’s overarching “principle,” one that guides it in whatever it does, has been its vulgar pragmatism. The vulgar twist in its pragmatism is explained by the fact that it is guided by NO other higher economic, social, political, ideological or moral principle. The single objective of this pragmatism always remains the same: “Self-preservation of the regime above everything else!” The means of achieving this objective is: “Whatever it takes!” The only inhibiting question that it asks in pursuing its objective is: “Can I get away with it?” And particularly now, at a time when the PFDJ believes that the only “weapon of choice” it has for enforcing its domestic, regional and foreign policies is terrorism, this “pragmatic” choice turns out to be a fait accompli.

Among the terrorism-sponsoring states, what commonly holds true is that they at least share the “cause” of the terrorist groups they sponsor, be it religious fundamentalism, ethnicism or communism. That is not the case with Eritrea. True to its vulgar pragmatism, the Isayas regime’s terrorism policy has no “higher” religious, racial, ethnic, political, humanitarian or ideological principle that guides it. When it supports the Islamic fundamentalists in Somalia, it is not because it shares their religious zealotry. When it supports the South Sudanese, it is not because it sympathizes with them in their racial grievances (against the Arabs in the North). When it supports disgruntled Tigray elements, it is not because of ethnic solidarity. When it supports the Darfur cause, it is not because of the humanitarian disaster that has been unfolding in that region. When it supports many “democratic” elements from Ethiopia, it is not because it shares their concern for democracy. A good evidence that it doesn’t give a damn about the “causes” of these rebel groups is the fact that at the moment anyone of them fails to fit in its calculation of the survival game it pursues ruthlessly, it drops it nonchalantly with no qualms at all; the Sudanese story is a case in point.

The fact that the terrorism policy of the Isayas regime has an enduring pragmatic twist shouldn’t be confused for it being less pernicious than the ideologically driven ones, for it is precisely the lack of a higher guiding principle that makes it an enduring and ubiquitous phenomenon in whatever it does. It is probably instructional to notice that, odd as it may seem, there is something central to what they do that terrorism-sponsoring states and terrorism-fighting states share in common: an appeal to a higher cause. The former appeal to their fundamentalist ideologies for guidance. The latter appeal to liberal democracy for motivation to fight back. In the hands of the principle-less Shaebia though, terrorism becomes an extension of its confrontational past, a pragmatic tool of choice. And as such, while it keeps dropping one “cause” and adopting another, what remains invariable is the tool itself: terrorism. It is a habit instilled in it through decades of confrontation, one that it cannot wean itself out of, short of its final demise. In short, terrorism has become part of what it is, something that it cannot hold apart from itself.

The PFDJ’s confrontational past

There is something foolhardy, yet consistent, about PFDJ’s confrontational past in that it fails to discriminate among its “enemies,” irrespective of their weaknesses or strengths. It adopts the same confrontational stance in solving its “problems” against defenseless individuals (the elderly mediators, parents of deserters, handicapped veterans, etc.), influential foreign diplomats (ex: Ambassador Bandini), indispensable NGOs (ex: USAID), international media (BBC, Reuters, etc.) prestigious world institutions (Red Cross, UN, etc.) giant neighboring countries (Yemen, Sudan and Ethiopia) and mighty world powers (US and EU). In enforcing its domestic terrorism policy, it puts helpless elderly mediators and aging parents of deserters and draft dodgers behind bars. In pursuing its regional policy, it picks fights with all the neighboring countries and turns itself into a hub of all types of disgruntled elements. In enforcing its confrontational foreign policy, it bullies the UN (constraining their movement, shutting off their information outlets, selectively expelling their staff, etc.), harasses NGOs (constraining their activity, possessing their vehicles, expelling them out of the country, etc.) and antagonizes foreign diplomats (expels Ambassador Bandini, arrests American embassy employees, constrains the movements of Western diplomats, etc.). There is not a single major case in its past, where this organization (as PFDJ or as Shaebia) has solved its problem through peaceful means only. If this is not a well-established behavior of a dysfunctional entity whose confrontation-oriented worldview drives it to solve all of its perceived problems through confrontation only, nothing is. Thus, the Isayas regime’s excursion into easily identifiable form of terrorism (identifiable by the world body) is simply a logical extension of its confrontational past.

On first impression, it seems that this well established track of confrontational past of the regime goes against the pragmatism we are attributing to it, however vulgar it may be. But this needn’t be so, for Shaebia’s pragmatism has no inbuilt mechanism that warns it of impeding disaster. Its corrective mechanism works only after the fact; the only time it becomes aware of danger is when it is in the midst of it. It doesn’t allow itself any margin of error in whatever it does. It lacks eyes that warn it of an impeding wall ahead of it; the only way it would come to know about it is by bashing its head on it. The history of its mieda past is full of such wailing walls. That is why Shaebia’s history is a history of repeatedly coming back from the edge of disasters. And this phenomenon, instead of instilling caution in its behavior, has created a false sense of invincibility. The belief that it would eventually come out of any danger triumphant is the primary stuff out of which the true believers’ “Book of Miracles” is made. Now, it seems it has jumped into a quicksand where, unlike a wall, no bouncing back is ever possible.

Terrorism as a state policy

As a central policy for its survival, the PFDJ has been using terrorism as its main and only card in pursuing its domestic, regional and foreign policies. This record is unmatched by any other state sponsor of terror. Except for North Korea, none treats its own people the way the PFDJ does. And when it comes to outside its territory, North Korea’s terrorist threats have no bite at all.

In its domestic policy, the PFDJ gets things done through terror only. No consultations or legal proceedings are ever taken. If it wants land, it grabs it without any compensation. If an enterprise suddenly becomes profitable, it monopolizes it by bankrupting the “competing” merchants or businessmen. If it wants recruits for its army, it conducts giffa. If it wants to build a road, it uses slave labor. If it wants to stop desertion, it takes parents hostage. If it doesn’t like a religion, it throws its members into prison. That is how the government “communicates” with its subjects; it doesn’t know any better. That is how it is; violence is in its very nature.

The terror under which the Eritrean masses have been living is aptly summed up by a commentator by the name of Sereke who describes the nation as “the biggest open prison in the world.” That renders statements like “There are tens of thousands of prisoners in Eritrea” an understatement. To comprehend the labyrinthine prison system in Eritrea, think of a Warsai recently released from a prison, only to end up in “agelglot,” a huge prison in the wilderness, where hundreds of thousands of adults are quarantined for years without end. And if by any chance he succeeds in escaping from this hell-hole of never-ending slavery, he ends up somewhere in Eritrea where he has to remain hidden in fear – sometimes for years – until he either makes it to the neighboring countries or is fetched back by PFDJ authorities to repeat the same cycle of horror (if he is lucky). Probably, it is this state of a “prison within a prison within a prison” that describes the domestic terrorism in Eritrea the most. Imagine this system as being made of three concentric circles, one embedded in the other. In the outermost circle, we find four million inmates (the whole Eritrean population); in the middle circle, we finds the hundreds of thousands inmates (those in the military service); and in the inner most circle, we find the tens of thousands officially recognized prisoners. The misery index of a citizen is measured by how deep into this system of concentric circles he finds himself in.

PFDJ conducts its regional policy with the same ruthlessness and “pragmatism”. Eritrea’s neighbors (for instance, unlike North Korea's neighbors) are very susceptible to terrorism for various reasons. Ethnic, clan, religious, regional, racial and political strife is to be found in the region in abundance. With a willingness to arm, train and amply provide disgruntled elements, it is easy to exploit simmering antagonisms that have been there for decades and turn them into full blown confrontations. And that is what Eritrea has been doing; it has turned itself into a haven for all types of terrorists that are stocking the neighborhood. There is almost no armed movement in the region that at one time or another has not been supported by the regime. The despot’s intrusive hands are to be traced in all the recent terrorist undertakings in the region, including the hostage taking of the British and Ethiopian subjects in Afar and the on-going war in Somalia. Whatever the despot wants to achieve in the region is done through terrorism only; he cannot think of any other peaceful means to conduct his regional policy.

PFDJ’s confrontational foreign policy defines the relationship that it has had with three foreign entities that have been playing essential roles in the nation’s short history: NGOs, the UN and US (and EU). NGOs have played a vital role in staving off one disaster after another, beginning from Shaebia’s days in mieda to the border war; in the process, saving hundreds of thousands of lives from starvation. The UN, with its heavy presence in the TSZ, has been the sole guarantor of peace in the region for seven years; without its presence, we would have undergone many rounds of war by now. And the US and EU are two indispensable world powers who have helped the young nation economically more any other country in the world. Yet, in every single case, confrontation has been the only mode of communication that the dysfunctional government uses. Now there are no NGOs in the country; almost all of them have been expelled. It has also been abusing the UN from day one, as if it is some kind of foreign occupation force. And when it comes to the US, it has been stoking the embassy for years before it turned into a full blown opponent of American policy in the region.

The case of Sudan contains elements from the three terrorism policies mentioned above: domestic, regional and foreign. So lets take a closer look at it.

Blackmailing Sudan

The Sudanese case is a good example of how terrorism has evolved into the sole means through which the Isayas regime conducts its regional policy, one that is inextricably tied with its domestic and foreign policies. And not incidentally, the despot’s vulgar pragmatism seems to inform all the “diplomatic” maneuvers he takes in every turn of events.

Eritrea’s ever-gyrating relation with Sudan is a reflection of how the Isayas regime has been using the terrorism card “pragmatically,” for pragmatism demands that one be in accord with the varying, unfolding events. A few years back, the Asmara regime was the main supporter of all the rebel movements in South, East and West Sudan. With the peace agreement in South Sudan and with the newly found oil-wealth in the country, the Asmara regime realized that its chances of destabilizing Sudan to the extent it had aspired was getting slimmer by the day. Besides, the tension on its Ethiopian border was getting worse. So the despot decided to abruptly switch alliance, and dropped the “Darfur cause” and “convinced” the Eastern rebels to sit down at the peace table. After that, he became an ardent supporter of Sudan in the Darfur case, to the point of officially opposing “the UN interference in Sudan’s internal affair”.

The despot’s peace overtures to Sudan by no means indicate a change of heart in his terrorism policy. To the contrary, his professed eschewal of terrorism against Sudan is meant to pave the way for three other forms of terrorism, all dictated by changing times. First of all, in the case of Sudan itself, the tyrant has not abandoned terrorism as a weapon; he has only SUSPENDED it. It still exists in its potent form as a THREAT. He has left his options open by retaining an amiable relationship with most of the former rebel groups, in case he will need them sometime in the future. Eritrea’s dogged insistence to sit on the peace table – as a primary peace broker – in all the peace settlements that relate to Sudan is designed to keep its contact and influence with the rebel groups alive. The Sudanese government (another rogue state) realizes that it is being blackmailed. But at this point in time, with the ongoing conflict in Darfur and with all the fragile peace agreements still pending, it cannot afford to antagonize the Asmara regime. The Sudanese are no fools; they are only biding their time. And with their newly found wealth, it won’t be long before they turn the tables to their favor. For now though, they cannot but do Isayas’ bidding.

By successfully blackmailing Sudan, the despot has paved the way for two other forms of terrorism. One has to do with the domestic one. The Sudanese government has not only denied all opposition forces a foothold in its territory, it is also making life difficult for the Eritrean refugees; round-ups and threats of deportation have become daily reality to many of the refugees. It also gives a blind eye when the Eritrean army pursues deserters deep into its territory; and consequently, the military feels comfortable in ruthlessly implementing its shoot-at-sight policy on the Sudanese border. One of the main objectives that Isayas had in mind when he made peace with Sudan was to stem the flow of deserters, an alarming phenomenon that has been depleting the army at a fast rate (according to UNCHR, since 2003, more than 20 thousand refugees has made it to Sudan). Since Sudan has been the favorite destination for most of the escapees, that the despot saw a dividend in his rapprochement with the Sudanese government is only understandable. We could then easily see how regional terrorism (in its blackmail form) is used to foster domestic terrorism, which in turn would be used to extend the lifespan of the regime.

The other dividend that Isayas foresaw in the rapprochement was a safe passage to Ethiopia, one that would be used to transport all types of ethnic rebel movements that he has been grooming. With the TSZ spanning all along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border and with heavy militarization on both sides of the border, it has become next to impossible for Eritrea-based rebels to infiltrate Ethiopia through Eritrean territory. As soon as the Asmara regime made peace with Sudan, it began in earnest to transport these rebel elements through the Sudanese route. Given the long ragged borderline that Sudan shares with Ethiopia, this indeed makes strategic sense. The Sudanese are furious, but they have been giving it a blind eye for fear of jeopardizing the fragile peace treaties they had so laboriously clobbered together recently.

And last, we can even see how the tyrant is exploiting the situation in Sudan to conduct his foreign policy. His ambivalent stand on the Darfur conflict, supporting Sudan in its stand against the UN and the US while leaving his options with the rebel groups open, is an effort to make himself indispensable in the region; his message being that without him, the US would find it very difficult to make any peace agreement hold. In other words, he is attempting to blackmail the US into siding with him (at least, in not siding with Ethiopia), foolish as this endeavor may seem.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article has been to show that terrorism is in the nature of PFDJ. To talk about the PFDJ is to talk about its confrontational past, its vulgar pragmatism and its confrontational policy. First, in Shaebia’s past, there isn’t a single case where it has resolved a crisis through peaceful means; that, by itself, talks volumes. Second, the only “ideology” that this organization has been beholden to is that of vulgar pragmatism, where the end – the regime’s survival – justifies the means. And third, its domestic, regional and foreign policies are all conducted through terrorism, be it in its active or latent form.

If the above characterization of the PFDJ is true, the idea that it could be talked into changing its behavior is naïve. It is true when the despot has been cornered with his back on the wall; he is known to have momentarily relented, but only to revert back to his old confrontational habit once the pressure is lifted off him. That is to say, no weight should be given to his word, even if he is willing to suspend his activities in Somalia. He won’t rest until he finds ways of circumventing whatever restrictions are put on him.

We know that the US is currently considering to put Eritrea in the state sponsors of terror list. This article has been written with one single objective in mind: that, in its assessment, the US should pay enough attention to the dysfunctional nature of the PFDJ. It is not for nothing that one’s criminal records are always brought up in matters of importance, be in court or in employment. Similarly, PFDJ’s past, how it conducts its business and the ideology that guides its behavior are as good as anything in predicting its behavior in the future. This is an organization beyond redemption, and it should be treated as such.