State TV editor goes missing while trying to flee across border into Ethiopia

13 August 2007

State TV editor goes missing while trying to flee across border into Ethiopia

Reporters Without Borders voiced concern today about the fate of Johnny Hisabu, an editor with state-owned Eri-TV, who disappeared in late May after trying to flee across the border into Ethiopia. There are unconfirmed reports that he was arrested and has been held ever since in a detention centre in the southwestern town of Barentu.

“Forced to function as a cog in the official propaganda machine, Johnny was one of the hundreds of Eritreans who each month try to flee the hell on earth created by one of the world’s most authoritarian regimes,” the press freedom organisation said. “The regime’s only reaction to this exodus, which includes journalists and media technicians, is more cruelty and intolerance.”

Reporters Without Borders added: “It is time that President Issaias Afeworki, who portrays himself as a guarantor of national unity, realised that he has turned the country into a gigantic prison.”

Johnny has not been seen at his post in the information ministry-run team of TV editors since his departure in late May. It was around that time that Eyob Kessete, a journalist with the Amharic-language service of the public radio station Dimtsi Hafash, was arrested by border guards as he tried to cross into Ethiopia. Kessete has since been held in a prison in May Srwa, northwest of Asmara.

Johnny decided to flee to neighbouring Ethiopia in part because he is a member of the so-called “Amiche” community of Eritreans who were born or raised in Ethiopia prior to independence and because he therefore still has relatives there.

Attempts by Reporters Without Borders to locate him in the Eritrean refugee camps in Ethiopia have so far been unsuccessful. At the same time, there are unconfirmed reports that he was arrested when border guards intercepted the group of refugees he was travelling with, and that he has since been held at a detention centre in Barentu.

Reporters Without Borders has meanwhile learned that Eri-TV Arabic-language service presenter Fetiha Khaled (whose first name was previously given in error as Fathia), was transferred to a military camp near the Sudanese border following her arrest at the start of this year, and that her salary is now being paid by the defence ministry, suggesting that she was forcibly recruited into the army.

Fetiha was one of nine public media journalists arrested in a crackdown that began last November, after the defection of several prominent journalists. They were held on suspicion of staying in contact with the defectors or planning to flee the country themselves.

This group included Paulos Kidane, a journalist with the Amharic-language service of Eri-TV and radio Dimtsi Hafash, who died in still unclear circumstances in June in an attempt to flee on foot across the border into Sudan.

U.S. Policy in the Horn of Africa

U.S. Policy in the Horn of Africa

James Swan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
4th International Conference on Ethiopian Development Studies
Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan
August 4, 2007

As Delivered

Good afternoon, and thank you, professor for inviting me to join you in Kalamazoo. I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss U.S. policy and engagement in the Horn of Africa. You have assembled an impressive and distinguished group of panelists for this important conference.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

As all of you know, the Horn of Africa is a rough neighborhood. At least one conflict – and frequently more – has raged in the region continuously since 1960. Inter-state conventional wars. Guerrilla-style liberation struggles. Coups. Revolutions. The Horn has seen them all.

It is also a region that has suffered historically from poor governance -- from the brutal excesses of Ethiopia’s Derg, to authoritarian one-party systems in much of the region until the 1990s, to the lawlessness of the failed state of Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre. Winner-take-all politics and violent regime change have been the norm. And this historically unstable political and security climate has been a profound impediment to economic development.

The Horn ranks near the bottom in the world – and indeed below the rest of Africa - on Human Development indicators. The region is ecologically and economically fragile. Its peoples face the challenges of overwhelming dependence on rain-fed agriculture, as regular droughts trigger cyclical famines.

Yet, despite these longstanding challenges, in most of the region we see signs of progress. Djibouti has held peaceful elections; its port has become an economic hub; and the government has become a partner in counterterrorism efforts. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government offers the best hope for peace and stability in the last 20 years. Ethiopia has made progress on democratic governance with the release of political party detainees and parliamentary discussions on electoral and media reform. Kenya, which has been spared the conflicts that have impeded the development of its neighbors, has become an economic powerhouse, has made tremendous strides to consolidate democracy, and plays a lead role in complex regional peace initiatives. Moreover, all of these countries and governments are increasingly close partners of the United States in the Horn of Africa.

The glaring exception to this favorable story is of course Eritrea, which openly abuses its population and serves as a destabilizing force in the region. I’ll come to that later.

While progress is fitful, and additional diplomatic and aid resources will be necessary to sustain success, the overall trajectory of the Horn is positive.

In keeping with Secretary Rice’s concept of Transformational Diplomacy, United States government policy in the region focuses on partnership, while promoting regional stability and security, strengthening democratic processes and institutions, fostering economic growth, expanding the scope and quality of basic services, and responding to the humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations.

The Horn is a region where Muslims and Christians coexist and intermingle, and where the cultures of ancient Ethiopia, of traditional Africa, and of the Arab-influenced coastal regions have combined in different ways to create unique national and regional identities. It is a region in which all of our Embassies and their officers are working to demonstrate our respect for different faith traditions and to promote our commitment to religious tolerance, political rights, and gender equality.

While our Embassies are the U.S. Government’s principal platforms for promoting effective cooperation, governance reform and sustainable development, we also have a great asset in the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa in Djibouti. This U.S. military initiative provides a vehicle for outreach to vulnerable communities in the region and for contributing to the professionalization and effectiveness of armed forces in the Horn.

So let me now discuss current developments and some of the key U.S. interests and policies in each of the countries of the Horn.

DJIBOUTI

I’ll begin with Djibouti – which rarely gets top billing in a discussion of the Horn, but will today -- and then move clockwise through the region. Djibouti, which celebrated the 30th anniversary of its independence in June, in many ways epitomizes both the progress and the challenges we see on the Horn.

With the end of the conflict with the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) in the 1990s, and the return of the Front’s leader to Djibouti in 2000, Djibouti has moved beyond violent conflict. General elections in 1999 and 2003 were orderly and peaceful, despite a boycott by the major opposition coalition. Some opposition members are represented in local and regional councils. More needs to be done to open up political space and ensure that all citizens have a voice in government decisions. But the transition from armed combat to political competition is a positive step.

On the economic front, Djibouti remains a poor country with per capita income below $1000. Yet it has a vision for development of its key assets – its port and strategic location along major sea-transport routes. Port tonnage – which tripled after the 1998 Eritrea-Ethiopia border war which cut access to Assab – has increase 30 percent per year between 2002 and 2004 under new management of Djibouti port. And Djibouti aspires to become an international hub for transit cargo serving not only the horn of Africa hinterland, but a much wider worldwide clientele.

The United States, which has long had good relations with Djibouti, has seen this partnership further deepen in recent years. Since 2002, Djibouti has hosted the only permanent U.S. military base in sub-Saharan Africa, (CJFF-HOA)... We also value Djibouti’s diplomatic role in the region, as a bridge among other countries in the Horn and between African and Arab states.

So in Djibouti, we see a country that has ended a protracted violent conflict, begun important steps toward greater political openness, developed a vision for its economic future, and engaged in a close partnership with the United States.

SOMALIA

Now let me turn to Somalia – a country that, for all its problems, has perhaps the best opportunity in nearly two decades to overcome its status as a failed state. Somalia is a priority for the United States in Africa. U.S. policy is designed to promote stability in Somalia – including by preventing Somalia from again becoming a safehaven for terrorists, as it was under the Council of Islamic Courts – to support humanitarian and development needs, and to foster inclusive democratic institutions.

The key to Somalia’s success will be national reconciliation to ensure inclusive representation in the Transitional Federal Institutions and in the organizations that will prepare the way for election of a permanent government in 2009, as called for by the Transitional Federal Charter.

The National Reconciliation Congress, which opened in Mogadishu on July 15 and is still ongoing, provides an opportunity for all Somalis to achieve suitable representation in the TFIs and formulate a roadmap for the remainder of the transitional period, in the run-up to national elections in 2009. In support of the National Reconciliation Congress, the United States has provided financial assistance of $1.25 million, in coordination with other international donors. Our Ambassador in Nairobi and our Special Envoy for Somalia are in frequent contact with congress organizer Ali Mahdi Mohamed, with Transitional Federal Government leaders, with clan elders, with civil society leaders, and a wide array of other stakeholders to encourage support for this process.

We believe it is important for the Somali people to focus on the future, moving forward in the transitional political process as envisioned by the Charter, rather than focusing only on the current composition of the Transitional Federal Government and Institutions. While imperfect, the Transitional Federal Institutions provide a framework for achieving the objectives outlined in the Charter and the formation of representative governance institutions following the transitional process. We are steering clear from Somali politics and focusing on a clear message of inclusion and accommodation to all actors in Somalia.

To help stabilize Somalia and create conditions for national reconciliation, the United States strongly supports the African Union’s peace support mission in Somalia. The mission currently has a lead contingent of approximately 1,600 Ugandan troops deployed as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). At the beginning of the year, the United States identified $19.6 million to assist AMISOM forces. Approximately $10 million was used to provide equipment and airlift to assist the deployment of Uganda’s AMISOM contingent. Congress subsequently appropriated a further $40 million in funding to support AMISOM.

AMISOM is important not only to help create conditions for national reconciliation, but also to permit the reduction in presence of Ethiopian forces and their eventual departure. We, the Somalis, and the Ethiopians themselves recognize that an Ethiopian military presence is not a long-term solution to insecurity in Somalia. For there to be lasting security, there must be political dialogue and accommodation among Somalis, improvements in Somali government capacity, and training and deployment of a competent and respected Somali security force.

The United States is the largest bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, and has provided more than $102 million in humanitarian and development assistance this year. We also coordinate closely with other international partners diplomatically and on our international assistance programs. We were founding members of the International Contact Group on Somalia in June 2006, and also are active in the International Advisory Committee for the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC).

In short, there is an international consensus that we must seize this moment of opportunity in Somalia. The United States is a leader on both the diplomatic front and in our humanitarian and economic response.

KENYA

Next let me say just a few words about Kenya, which is not always discussed as part of the Horn of Africa, but lies on its southern edge and is an important regional player. Nairobi hosts the largest U.S. diplomatic mission in Sub-Saharan Africa, and we cooperate with the Kenyans on a wide array of both bilateral and regional programs. Our bilateral assistance program is more than $500 million in 2007. Total resource flows from the U.S. to Kenya each year from all public and private sources amount to about $1.5 billion.

Kenya’s peaceful, credible democratic elections in 2002 represented an important step on Kenya’s path to becoming a fully functional democracy. The next elections, scheduled for December 2007 offer an opportunity to consolidate those gains. The U.S. is providing election-related training to civil society organizations, political parties, and youth and women candidates, as well as supporting the work of the Electoral Commission of Kenya to ensure that these elections are free, fair, and transparent.

Kenya is beginning to enjoy the fruits of its enviable regional reputation for stability, openness, and tolerance. Economic growth has increased to more than 6 percent in recent years, as Kenya capitalizes on its role as a major regional hub. While important challenges remain – specifically in combating corruption, moving away from tribalism, and promoting gender equity – there is a palpable sense of energy and optimism among the Kenyan people. Kenya is clearly a country on the move in a positive direction.

We have worked closely with the Kenyans diplomatically on the North-South peace agreement in Sudan and on Somalia issues, through the International Contact Group as well as bilaterally. In its capacity as President of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Kenya continues to occupy a leadership role in promoting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. We look forward to continued close partnership.

ETHIOPIA

Now, Ethiopia, which has been the subject of your conference. With more than 70 million people, bordering all of the other Horn countries, Ethiopia is the giant of the region. Ethiopia is an important strategic partner for the United States in the Horn of Africa. We collaborate on a wide range of development objectives and in efforts to promote regional stability. We share a commitment to address threats by transnational extremist groups.

We are also eager to see progress in democratic institutions. As you know, the run-up to the May 2005 national elections was the most open, free, and competitive political campaign period in all of Ethiopian history. Never before had opposition candidates had so much access to coveted constituencies and the ability to convene rallies and openly campaign against ruling party opponents.

Opposition candidates’ access to the press, including state-owned and operated media, was unprecedented. Never before had the electorate seen live, televised debates between government Ministers and their opposition challengers.

Unfortunately, this spirit was lost in the contentious aftermath of the vote, in bloody confrontations in the streets, in detention of political leaders, and in strident and uncompromising positions that for too long dominated the political leadership. As we consider the democratic challenges facing Ethiopia today, we recognize that sentiment has been so bitter precisely because of the heightened expectations prompted by two decades of political reform.

With the release of 38 detainees, and anticipated release of the remaining Coalition for Unity and Democracy leadership, and anticipated release of the remaining CUD leadership, following lengthy mediation by respected elders, Ethiopia’s political leaders have committed themselves to a new collaborative relationship for the good of the country. In Addis Ababa, U.S. foreign assistance programs are bringing together leaders from across the political spectrum to address critical questions of national governance and the future of the country, build the capacity of parliament, and bolster judicial independence.

We are again seeing a cautious, yet engaged host of political parties that are committed to institutionalizing the advances of March and April 2005. That ruling and opposition parties today gather around the negotiating table to debate the relative merits of reforms of democratic institutions is extremely positive.

We must all encourage this process. As stakeholders in Ethiopia's stability, democracy, and prosperity – we urge all parties to remain engaged, so that we can regain the advances of early 2005 and build upon them for the people of Ethiopia.

Meanwhile, we continue a robust program of U.S. humanitarian and development assistance for Ethiopia. We have contributed more than $160 million in humanitarian assistance this year to help the Ethiopian people break the cycle of famine and mitigate the impact of drought and natural disasters. With over $300 million in assistance to the health care system in Ethiopia this year alone, we help ensure that clinics reach into previously underserved regions including Afar and the Ogaden.

With respect to the Ogaden, we are concerned that insecurity and impediments to commercial sales of commodities put the population of this fragile region at further risk. We are currently working with the government to ensure that humanitarian assistance and the more important commercial shipments can flow to the Ogaden. We note that rains have been relatively good this year, which should ease the economic hardship faced by the pastoralist population.

In conflict-prone areas, U.S. programs bring together representatives from diverse communities during periods of calm, in order to build bridges of understanding and prevent potential conflicts from erupting. We are working with local administrations to build their capacity to govern for the people and to promote transparency. We are working with the Ethiopian military to transform that organization into a professional and apolitical defense force for the nation. The challenges are many, but the objectives merit the tremendous scope of the resources, time, and commitment that we have focused on them. We are confident that through partnership with local stakeholders, together we will contribute to making Ethiopia more secure, more democratic, and more prosperous for the next generation.

A STEP BACKWARD: ERITREA

Now, let me turn to Eritrea. While the rest of the Horn of Africa is making political, economic, and social advances and seizing opportunities -- albeit with periodic important setbacks -- the opposite is true for Eritrea.

Eritrea has experienced economic decline and a lack of freedoms, for the press and political expression. There is widespread and arbitrary conscription. The government has worked to destabilize its neighbors, including Ethiopia and Somalia.

Given the American penchant for supporting the underdog, it is disheartening to see what has become of Eritrea in the 14 years since it gained independence and produced a praiseworthy constitution. President Isaias Afwerki has become increasingly tyrannical and megalomaniacal. He has actively sought to destabilize the Horn, fueling regional insurgencies and supporting groups affiliated with terrorists.

Eritrean Government policies have also choked the Eritrean economy and consolidated political power among a small cadre of cronies, who are distinguished only by their unwavering loyalty to the President.

The government has actively blocked humanitarian assistance from international donors. It initiated the border war with Ethiopia that cost tens of thousands of lives.

The Eritrean Government has fabricated a national mythology by demonizing neighboring Ethiopia, for the central purpose of garnering complete compliance with his autocratic domestic policies. By channeling Eritreans' patriotism into hostility toward Ethiopia, the government ensures that [it] can rule as it likes, without public opposition. Democracy and economic opportunity remain purely theoretical concepts for the people of Eritrea.

As you know, the reality is atrocious. Youth are sent to camps for indoctrination. Citizens in the prime of their lives are forced into national service; anyone who refuses is beaten. If you flee, your family is imprisoned. Those who fail to espouse officially sanctioned opinions languish in metal shipping containers.

As in the former Soviet Union, the Eritrean government controls both the message and the medium. There are no opposition political parties, no non-governmental organizations, no private media. Any senior government official who dares to speak out puts himself at risk. The brave individuals known as the G-15, who challenged Eritrea's path back in the spring of 2001, are missing.

Elsewhere in the region, Eritrea has chosen to support extremist elements, including the al-Qaida affiliated al Shabaab militia in Somalia, in an effort to undermine the political process. While the rest of the region and the international community have united behind a common strategy for achieving lasting peace and stability in Somalia, Eritrea has opted to support terrorists and spoilers while encouraging continued violence. There is no justification for such actions. The ruling cabal is – to our great regret -- leading Eritrea along the path toward increased domestic repression and hardship, and regional and international isolation.

BOUNDARY DISPUTE

Since the border dispute with Ethiopia serves as the pretext for Eritrea’s domestic authoritarianism, let me say a final few words about how the U.S. sees this issue. This impasse has been a long-festering flashpoint between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and it is of course symptomatic of deeper divisions between the two countries.

The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) issued its delimitation decision in 2002. Yet, the two parties have still not cooperated on demarcation of the boundary. Both appear comfortable with the status quo. Ethiopia avoids painful domestic political decisions, while Eritrea uses the unresolved issue to goad Ethiopia and deflect attention from a deteriorating domestic situation.

The United States government fully supports the “final and binding” decisions of the EEBC and has consistently called on both parties to cooperate with the EEBC and meet their commitments in the Algiers Agreements. We work closely with the other Witnesses to the Algiers Agreements -- including Algeria, the African Union, the European Union, and the United Nations -- and other interested governments.

The level of urgency has increased, as the situation has recently deteriorated. Both parties remain wedded to their positions and may have hardened them. Eritrea has moved about 4,000 troops along with supporting artillery and armor into the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), a buffer zone between the parties, and restricted the activities of UNMEE, a UN peacekeeping force. Eritrea maintains a further 120,000 troops in the vicinity, while Ethiopia has deployed about 100,000 troops along the border.

We believe it is essential for the parties to discuss directly how to implement a workable boundary regime, consistent with the decisions of the EEBC, and to address the fundamental issues that divide them. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has offered to engage the parties, and we support his initiative. The Ethiopian Government has agreed to participate in this initiative, and we urge the Eritrean government to do so as well. We will continue our efforts and support those of others to resolve this issue and remove one flash point in an already unstable region and bring the parties closer to a normalized relationship.

So, in conclusion, this is a tough neighborhood, economically fragile, with a history of violent conflict and of uncompromising politics. Huge challenges remain. Yet, overall, there is reason to be hopeful about the Horn. Progress may not be uniform, but with the exception of Eritrea, we are working in partnership with local governments toward a more peaceful and prosperous Horn of Africa.

Thank you again for inviting me to join you today, and I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.


Released on August 9, 2007

Regeringens tysta diplomati kritiseras

2 maj 2007
Den tysta diplomatin som den svenska regeringen använt sig av för att få Dawit Isaak frigiven måste överges. Om det tycktes alla deltagare vara överens på det seminarium om yttrandefrihet som Amnesty arrangerade i Göteborg den 2 maj.
- Nu har det gått över två tusen dagar utan att Dawit släppts fri. Regeringens taktik fungerar uppenbarligen inte, sa Dawits bror Esayas Isaak.

Temat på seminariet på Världskulturmuseet i Göteborg var yttrandefrihet. En person fick under hela seminariet agera symbol för kampen för det fria ordet. Ett stort porträtt på Dawit Isaak hängde på väggen bakom seminariedeltagarna, och alla uppmanade till engagemang för journalisten Dawit Isaak som suttit fängslad i Eritrea sedan september 2001.


Representanter från utrikesdepartementet hade blivit inbjudna att tala om sin strategi för att få Dawit Isaak fri, men avböjt.
– De kör tydligen med tyst diplomati hela vägen. Det är ungefär som Eritreas regering brukar göra, sa Johan Karlsson, författare till boken ”Dawit och rättvisan” och en av dagens moderatorer.


Först ut att tala var representanter från Amnesty, Björn Tunbäck, journalist och styrelsemedlem i Reportrar utan gränser, Björn Linell från Svenska PEN-klubben och Göteborgs-Postens kulturchef Gabriel Byström. Gabriel Byström sa att den svenska diplomatin har misslyckats.
– Carl Bildt verkar tycka om att flyga. Han borde ta ett plan ned till Eritrea istället för att bara jobba med denna fråga hemifrån.


Björn Tunbäck sa att alla inblandade organisationer måste fortsätta kämpa så länge Dawit sitter fängslad och alla fyra uppmanade åhörarna att skapa opinion.
- Det låter gammeldags och romantiserat att den mest effektiva metoden är att väcka opinion, men så är det, sa Björn Linell.


Även då frågan om varför det tog så lång tid för svenska medier att uppmärksamma Dawits fall diskuterades var tonläget kritiskt. Björn Tunbäck menade att Dawit sannolikt inte anses vara svensk i allas ögon och Björn Linell sa kort att det beror på ”rasism och okunnighet”.


Allra mest negativa till UD:s arbete var ändå Dawits bror Esayas Isaak och de två eritreanska exiljournalisterna Khaled Abdu och Semret Seyoum.
– Vi i stödföreningen för Dawit har rätt god kontakt med UD. Men så länge han inte friges måste vi fortsätta att kritisera deras arbete, sa Esayas Isaak.


På frågan vad de önskar att UD ska göra istället för att förhandla i det tysta svarade även Esayas Isaak att Carl Bildt borde arbeta för Dawit på plats i Eritrea. Han sa också att regeringen inte kan vänta alltför länge med detta eftersom Dawit nu är sjuk och inte får den vård han behöver i fängelset. Khaled Abdu sa att man bör använda sig av alla tänkbara kanaler för att få till en frigivning. Han nämnde EU och FN och sa att det överhuvudtaget borde arbetas mycket mer aggressivt.


Esayas Isaak berättade att många regeringsvänliga eritreaner både i Sverige och i Eritrea anklagar Dawit-kampanjens deltagare för att sprida falska rykten.
– Den onda armen räcker ända hit till Göteborg, sa han.

Semret Seyoum sammanfattade seminariedeltagarnas budskap då frågan kring vad gemene man kan göra väcktes.
– Vi ska inte vara tysta. Vi ska höras så mycket det bara går, sa han.
Maria Sonnerby /RUG

Germany's funding of journalism training for Eritrea's state-controlled media

Committee to Protect Journalists

330 Seventh Avenue, New York, NY 10001 USA Phone: (212) 465­1004 Fax: (212) 465­9568 Web: www.cpj.org E-Mail: mkeita@cpj.org

New York, May 14, 2007—In a letter to the German government, the Committee to Protect Journalists today noted with concern Germany's funding of journalism training for Eritrea's state-controlled media while the country's independent press is shut down and more than a dozen publishers and editors are imprisoned. CPJ called on Germany to use its diplomatic influence to ensure that Eritrean journalists are allowed to practice their profession freely within international standards, and to insist that Eritrean authorities account for imprisoned journalists now jailed incommunicado.

May 14, 2007

The Honorable Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul
Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development
C/o German Embassy to the United States
4645 Reservoir Road, NW, Washington DC 20007-1998

Via facsimile: (202) 298-4249

Dear Minister Wieczorek-Zeul:

The Committee to Protect Journalists notes that the German government has decided to fund the training of journalists working for Eritrea’s state-controlled media while the nation’s independent press remains shut down and more than a dozen publishers and editors continue to be held incommunicado, many since September 2001.

We welcome Germany’s interest in media development in Eritrea. However, we are deeply troubled by the Eritrean government’s ongoing repression of independent media. We hope that Germany will use its diplomatic influence to ensure that the Eritrean authorities account for the jailed journalists, including Swedish citizen and Eritrean national Dawit Isaac, co-owner of the defunct private weekly Setit. We are especially concerned because reliable reports indicate that some of these journalists, including Setit’s award-winning editor Fesshaye Yohannes, may have died in prison.

On April 16, the Deutsche-Welle Akademie (DW-Akademie), an agency whose international journalism training program is funded by your ministry, launched a journalism course to train staff of the Eritrean Information Ministry, according to the state Tigrina-language daily Haddas Eritrea. The training is part of a three-year cooperation agreement signed in December 2006 between DW-Akademie and the Eritrean Information Ministry, according to Haddas Eritrea.

While we are convinced that the DW-Akademie trainees are receiving world-class journalism training, we fear that they will not be able to faithfully exercise their profession since the Eritrean government effectively banned independent journalism in September 2001, and continues to subject the remaining state-controlled journalists to arbitrary imprisonment and threats of reprisals against their families.

Eritrea remains the only nation in sub-Saharan Africa without any independent media outlet. One week after September 11, 2001, the government of President Isaias Afewerki closed all privately owned media and arrested 10 independent journalists, according to CPJ research. Authorities accused the journalists of various alleged national security violations, but they have failed to bring identifiable charges in any known court.

The crackdown came shortly after the private press had covered a split in the ruling party and provided a forum for debate on Afewerki’s autocratic rule. Setit published on September 9, 2001, a letter addressed to the government stating that “people can tolerate hunger and other problems for a long time, but they can’t tolerate the absence of good administration and justice.” The crackdown was part of a government drive to eliminate political dissent ahead of elections, scheduled for December 2001 but canceled without explanation by the government.

The jailed journalists initially had limited access to the outside world as they were first held at a police station in the capital, Asmara, where they began a hunger strike on March 31, 2002. In a message smuggled from their jail, the journalists said they would refuse food until they were released or charged and given due process of law. But the government quickly transferred the journalists to secret locations.

Holding the journalists incommunicado, the government—with one exception explained below—has refused to divulge their whereabouts, their health, or even whether they are still alive. Officials at the Eritrean embassy in Washington and at the Information Ministry in Asmara have consistently failed to respond to CPJ’s inquiries seeking information. During a press conference in Brussels on May 4, the day after World Press Freedom Day, in response to a question about freedom of the press in Eritrea, Afewerki asked “what freedoms those living in South African shantytowns enjoyed?” according to Agence France-Presse. In response to another question about the fate of Isaac, Afewerki asked “why Sweden was so interested in handing out passports to Eritreans,” according to AFP. Isaac was released for a medical checkup on November 19, 2005, and allowed to phone his family and a friend in Sweden. Despite hopes that he would be freed, Isaac was returned to jail two days later with no explanation, according to CPJ sources.

In February 2007, in response to news reports that Yohannes had died in prison, presidential spokesman Yemane Gebremeskel was quoted by Voice of America as saying: “In the first place, I don’t know the person you’re talking about.” Yohannes is said to have died in detention, and his death was first reported in January 2006, according to CPJ sources. His family was not formally notified, and they were not able to recover his body for a proper burial.

Other journalists who have been held either without charge or trial or who remain in indefinite state custody as of today are editor Said Abdelkader of Admas, assistant editor Fitzum Wedi Ade, and editor-in-chief Amanuel Asrat of Zemen; journalist Saleh Aljezeeri of Eritrean State Radio, editor-in-chief Yusuf Mohamed Ali of Tsigenay; reporter Selamyinghes Beyene of Meqaleh; columnist Temesken Ghebreyesus of Keste Debena; editor-in-chief Mattewos Habteab and assistant editor Dawit Habtemichael of Meqaleh; assistant editor Medhanie Haile of Keste Debena; founder and manager Zemenfes Haile and reporter Ghebrehiwet Keleta of Tsigenay; Hamid Mohammed Said of the Eritrean State Television; and freelance photographer and former director of the Eritrean State Television Seyoum Tsehaye, according to CPJ research. Credible but unconfirmed reports in September 2006 said that Abdelkader, Ali and Haile had died in prison.

CPJ research shows that Eritrea was the world’s third leading jailer of journalists in 2006; those in custody included at least eight state media journalists who were detained for several weeks in late 2006. The government did not explain the 2006 crackdown, but sources said it was designed to intimidate state media workers after several colleagues had fled the country.

The government’s monopoly on domestic media, the fear of reprisal among prisoners’ families, and tight restrictions on the movement of all foreigners led CPJ in 2006 to name Eritrea as one of the 10 most censored countries in the world.

With freedom of thought and expression brutally suppressed in Eritrea, we are deeply concerned that the local journalists the German government is funding to train will not be able to exercise their profession within international ethical standards. We therefore call on you to use all your diplomatic influence to obtain guarantees from the Eritrean authorities that the journalists will be able to work freely and without fear of reprisal. We also call on you to insist that the Eritrean government lift its ban on the private press, that it fully account for those journalists who have died in prison, and that it to immediately release all journalists who have been jailed without charge or trial simply for exercising their right to free expression.

We thank you for your attention, and we look forward to your response.

Sincerely,



Joel Simon
Executive Director

CC:
H.E. Thomas Matussek, German Ambassador to the United States
H.E. Klaus Scharioth, German Ambassador to the United States
H.E. Gunnar Lund, Ambassador of Sweden to the United States
The Honorable Karin Kortmann, Parliamentary State Secretary
Günter Nooke, Federal Government Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid
The Honorable Dr. Herta Däubler-Gmelin, Chair of the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Assistance of the German Bundestag
The Honorable Thilo Hoppe, Chair of the Committee on Economic Cooperation and Development (AwZ) of the German Bundestag
The Honorable Cecilia Magnusson, Chair of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Parliament
H.E. Alexander Beckman, Ambassador of Germany to Eritrea
Gerda Meuer, Director of the Deutsche-Welle Akademie
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy
Louis Michel, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid
The Honorable Hélène Flautre, Chair of the Subcommittee on Human Rights of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
Faith Pansy Tlakula, African Commission Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression in Africa
Reine Alapini-Gansou, African Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders
Mogens Schmidt, Deputy Assistant Director-General, Freedom of Expression and Democracy Unit, UNESCO
American Society of Newspaper Editors
Amnesty International
Article 19 (United Kingdom)
Artikel 19 (The Netherlands)
Canadian Journalists for Free Expression
Freedom Forum
Freedom House
Human Rights Watch
Index on Censorship
International Center for Journalists
International Federation of Journalists
International PEN
International Press Institute
Michael G. Kozak, United States Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
The Newspaper Guild
The North American Broadcasters Association
Overseas Press Club
Reporters Sans Frontières
The Society of Professional Journalists
World Association of Newspapers
World Press Freedom Committee

European Union’s Double Standard

PIA’s recent visit to Brussels for talks with EU’s development commissioner Louis Michel raises a number of moral and legal responsibilities EU must bear in mind in its pursuit of undefined relations with a repressive regime.

It should be clear from the outset that whatever EU may do to entertain PIA won’t change the fundamental questions occupying Eritrea and the horn in general. Complicated issues can’t be addressed through wishy-washy policies. It can’t be lost with EU and its development commissioner that the Somali issue is being complicated due to the stalemate over Eritrean-Ethiopian border demarcation process. Without EU’s firm position over the border demarcation process, which may bring it into conflict with the US policy in the region, EU’s wishy-washy position over secondary issues won’t yield any results. If EU’s commissioner wants to be seen as ‘doing something’ in the region to justify his job, he must equally examine his and his organization’s legal and moral obligations to take account of the deteriorating human rights and social conditions brought about through unrestrained dictatorship in Eritrea.

We should reject EU’s ‘flavor of the month’ politics. EU can’t say, ‘Oh, it is September so let EU parliamentarians write a letter to the Eritrean leader asking for their release. Oh, it is May so let us invite PIA and pat him on the back. Oh, it is …’ Instead, the issues and questions that should be posed to EU are the followings,

EU parliamentarians are fully aware of the plights of Eritrean parliamentarians and yet have done nothing to secure their release. In fact, by writing their annual ritual one-page protest letter to PIA, inadvertently, EU parliamentarians are exposing their moral and legal obligations over their failures to address the gross human rights violations in Eritrea. By writing these protest letters, EU parliamentarians can no longer claim ignorance over the plight of the Eritrean parliamentarians and the overall human rights situation in Eritrea.

Amnesty International, CPJ, Religious organizations and many other human rights organizations have well documented the systematic and gross human rights violations in Eritrea. The EU commissioner and his colleagues can not possibly claim ignorance over the human rights conditions in Eritrea.

From Mr. Bandini to EU’s current Ambassador to Eritrea, Mr. Geert Heikens, have expressed their unequivocal understanding of the PIA regime as unabashed dictatorship, not only flaunting its disrespect for the rule-of-law in Eritrea but even breaching legal agreements with its donors. At a time when Mr. Geert Heikens and other analysts were expecting EU to ask for redress over this breach, instead EU is proceeding by promising to provide additional humanitarian assistance.

Barely few months ago, Eritrean Anti-tyranny Global Solidarity delivered a petition signed by 5,000 Eritreans asking for help in addressing the gross violations of human rights in Eritrea. Among a number of requests, one request was for banning High Eritrean government officials from traveling to the West. EU and its development commissioner seem oblivious to the requests of Eritrean people.

In reality, EU is playing double standards. The Council of European Union Decision 2002/148/EC imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe because “European Union considers that democratic principles are still not upheld in Zimbabwe and that no significant progress has been achieved by your country’s government in the five fields …” What are the five fields?

End of politically motivated violence,

Free and fair elections,

Freedom of the media

Independence of the judiciary

End of illegal occupations of farms.

The sanctions include “the Council also issued travel bans and a freezing of funds and other financial assets for Mugabe and 19 of his colleagues, who were deemed guilty of serious violations of human rights, freedom of opinion, and freedom of association and peaceful assembly in Zimbabwe. The EU was keen to emphasize that the sanctions imposed are designed to affect only those against whom they are imposed, and should not penalize the “ordinary citizens” of Zimbabwe.”

The question that should be posed to EU is whether their diplomatic acts are simply wishy-washy politics or acts based on certain principles. If EU’s acts are guided by certain principles, ‘what is good for the goose is good for the gander’, thus what is good for President Mugabe is good for PIA. In fact, most Eritreans and various international human rights organizations would say that President Mugabe’s treatment of its political opposition is infinitely more humane that PIA’s treatment of its political opposition. Recently, President Mugabe beat up two opposition leaders and yet the opposition leaders were free afterwards to speak to the world media and to seek medical treatment in South Africa and return to Zimbabwe. It can’t be lost with the development commissioner the most inhumane treatment our opposition and prisoners-of-conscious are receiving.

The purpose of this article or any of my other articles isn’t to engage in political debate with those we disagree. If we reduce our discussions to simply political debates, the ones with sticks and money would probably win every time. Political debates are grey areas. As activists, our role is to convert those political debates into moral and legal questions. By doing so, we force the wishy-washy domestic and foreign political players to take unequivocal position on certain fundamental principles.

Thus, our question to the EU development commissioner and EU in general should be,

1. What are the principles applied to deal with different dictators? If EU is leaning hard on those dictators that affect its organizational interests directly and softly on those dictators that don’t affect its organizational interests directly, then EU doesn’t have principles but is playing politics to pursue its own socio-economic and political interests at the expense of certain fundamental principles. The answer to this question has wider ramifications. For instance, the International Criminal Court (ICC) which is the brainchild of the European governments, would lose its credibility if EU is perceived as playing politics to advance its own interests. ICC’s credibility doesn’t emanate from the court itself but the world’s general perceptions towards European governments and EU themselves.

2. According to Mr. Heikens, Eritrea is responsible for restitutions on donated food ‘deemed’ sold to Eritreans. Instead of rectifying this issue, if EU donates more food and PIA continues with his unpunished behavior, who will be ultimately responsible for breach of contract? My fellow readers, you know what wishy-washy donors do, they will continue donating food to the regime although fully aware that the regime is breaching food donation contracts, and then when a democratic government is elected, wishy-washy donors begin flexing their muscles on the democratic government threatening to withhold funding unless the democratic government compensates the donors for breach of contracts under the ousted dictators. This has been donor’s curse for Africa. Instead, EU should withhold any humanitarian assistance until PIA has made restitutions, and then proceed with providing additional humanitarian assistance. If EU fails to enforce its contracts immediately, future Eritrean governments have no moral or legal obligations to compensate for contract breaches committed under previous regimes.

3. If EU decides to resume providing development assistance, the EU development commissioner should be made fully aware that he and his organization are stepping into legal liability. Donors have legal responsibilities to ensure that their project assistances are implemented according to certain human rights codes and worker safety standards. EU can’t extend financial assistance for development projects and pretend or assume that its assistance is being implemented in accordance with EU’s own, and not PFDJ’s, labor and work standards. For instance, if EU provides financial, material or expertise assistance for drinking water project somewhere in Eritrea and if PIA uses slave labor to undertake that project, does EU bear responsibility for the use or condoning the use of slave labor? Absolutely! EU can’t claim ignorance over this issue because the use of slave labor is well documented by international human rights organizations. EU can’t use PIA’s definitions to determine if slave labor is being used in Eritrea. EU has legal obligations to define slave labor according to its own social, legal and political standards. If EU provides as much as one cent for development assistance, EU becomes legally liable for the use of slave labor. We have to make sure that the development commissioner is fully aware of the implications, and more importantly, that we will pursue this issue.

It is not lost with anyone that EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe because white farmers are involved. The British government leaned on the EU, and voila EU imposed a sanction. EU’s indirect statement is that black parliamentarians and tens of thousands of innocent Eritreans in PFDJ Dungeons are expendable. This is condescending attitude. But as black Africans, and especially as Eritreans, we should always remember that our traditional African societies have lived under advanced social standards and harmony, and rule of law for centuries while Gauls, Vikings were jumping around from one tree-to-another, and their Roman kin were slaughtering and enslaving their own and the rest of the world. The various dynasties from China to Russia to Europe created the most miserable conditions for their own people and their subjects for centuries, while we Africans lived in relative peace for centuries. We don’t need any condescending attitude from anyone. EU must address issues based on principles, as it claims, and not simply on politics.

Opposition’s Reply?

What happened to opposition’s non-existent foreign relations? PFDJ’s diplomatic skills is somewhere between weak and belligerent. The opposition camp’s diplomatic skill is non-existent. I don’t know which one is worse. If the development commissioner had an ounce of respect for Eritrean opposition and the Eritrean public, he would have put out a statement saying that he discussed regional issues with PIA and that he raised the issue of gross human rights violations in Eritrea with PIA. This would have been an indirect acknowledgment to the Eritrean people in general and the opposition camp specifically that EU considers human rights violations as a serious issue. The fact that Mr. Louise Michel didn’t bother to raise this issue demonstrates that the organization he leads has no respect for Eritreans. The opposition camp should have quickly replied to such condescending attitude.

EDA should understand that nobody cares whether they amend their article 1 or 10 or 50. These are issues that will be addressed by the vast stakeholders in post-PFDJ Eritrea. Over two years to address a couple of articles, while in the end parting their ways, indicates that we remain severely challenged in tackling today’s issues. If EDA was addressing article 4 or 5 while actively engaged in other opposition campaigns, we would have respected their overall efforts. Whether they agree on a couple of articles on issues that can only be addressed in the future doesn’t excuse their lackluster performance today.

If we evaluate the opposition camp, the overwhelming productive opposition efforts are being exerted by non-political organizations. If we examine opposition news organizations, human rights organizations, rallies, petitions, writing campaigns and every other effort has been organized and delivered by these non-political groups, not the political organizations. It escapes me what the function of the political groups is – to amend article 4 and 5 over 10 years?

EDA’s [former] leader popping up on Al-jazeera when the news network probably had no news to broadcast a couple of years was announced to us as a major achievement. Eritrean opposition shouldn’t become news fillers for news broadcasters. Instead, Eritrean opposition must be able to persuade, and if necessary coerce, news networks to give air time to the opposition. When PIA is on Al-Jazeera one day, opposition must strive to be on Al-Jazeera the following day.

Some will say, ‘easier said than done’. Whether Al-Jazeera agrees to opposition’s request to appear on their news program is secondary. The important thing is for the opposition to do things for the sake of doing by proceeding in the following steps,

1. Soon after PIA’s appearance on Al-jazeera, the opposition should make written request to appear on Al-jazeera.

2. If Al-Jazeera doesn’t reply or give a negative reply, the opposition camp would publicize its efforts to the Eritrean public.

3. Never acquiescing to rejections, from time-to-time, the opposition camp would make persistent request to appear on their program and failing to receive a positive reply then to write articles criticizing Al-Jazeera and making sure that a copy of our request and Al-Jazeera’s replies are posted on Eritrean opposition websites. At the very least we could be nuisance and they should believe that when things change around in Eritrea, that they could be left out. No one should ever think that we are too polite because otherwise everyone will shoo us away. They will only call us when they want us, never the other way around.

The approach with EU or others would follow the same steps. Write letters requesting why Mr. Michele didn’t address the oppositions’ concerns. If the development commissioner fails to reply or gives negative reply, immediately send the same information to Eritrean opposition websites. Don’t tell the development commissioner how bad PFDJ is because he knows that already. Tell him what his moral and legal obligations are in a stern but diplomatic language. Use international rights organizations and possibly diplomats such as Mr. Bandini to personally deliver those letters to the development commissioner. When we make a lot of noise, we give more clouts to people like Mr. Bandini. The critical factor is to continually publicize our efforts.

We shouldn’t judge our efforts by end results only. Instead, our efforts are judged by simply doing something and by remaining active. Never discount the power of being just nuisance. We should learn to do something for the sake of doing something. I assure my readers that results will surely follow. If we simply convince ourselves that EU, Al-Jazeera, etc…won’t respond to us because we are insignificant, then we have failed as opposition and as aspiring leaders without even trying.

Failure is part of life. Failure isn’t about falling down, but about not getting up after falling down. Failure is about not learning from one’s mistakes. Failure is about being afraid to try new ways. The opposition camp is replete with individuals who are so sure about their views and “their truth”, yet they have served us failure after failure because they believe that political leadership is about heaping dirt on the other guy, and yet have not provided one iota of positive activism.

At the risk of deviating from my topic, let me interject one thought about shameful politics on the part of Deqebat.com. This response is partially sparked by part 13 of an interview with an elderly Eritrean politician. But in my last article (‘Back to Tribouli’), i.e. even before part 13 of the interview, I alluded to this series of interviews by complaining that these ‘politicians’ begin by stating their principles and then proceed by engaging in the worst form of rumor-mongering thus negating their principles. I included that portion because deqebat.com’s interviewee was engaged in salacious rumors about PIA’s background although claiming at the beginning of his statement that he isn’t comfortable discussing these type of issues. I find such duplicity as the most dangerous type of politics that weakens democracy. We campaign on principles and values – never on rumor mongering or irrelevant issues. The King’s Court intrigues in an age of internet must be refuted with our every ounce of our energy. It is destructive! PIA is hundred times the man deqebat is. Gen. Mesfin is one thousand times the man deqebat is. PIA is a dictator but we know from which angle he is coming. Even more dangerous are those who strive to scratch more wounds while pretending to possess wisdom and pretending to stand by certain principles. Every Eritrean with one iota of blood is Eritrean. Eritrea belongs to anyone that loves it and wants to nurture it. Eritrea doesn’t need those, even those claiming to be deqebat, who try to sow weeds and the seeds of discord. ‘Deqebat’ itself is a medieval concept. In today’s world, migration has changed the face of the world. The victor of the presidential election in France, possibly the second or third most powerful nation in the world, a couple of days ago is born from a Hungarian father who immigrated to France. Deqebat lives in Europe owning or asking to own European citizenship and yet campaigning to dispossess others of their Eritrean identity. My response to deqebat’s continuous destructive politics – at one time on religious issues, and now back to individual politics – would have been muted if deqebat wasn’t the official website of the League of Eritrean Democratic Forces (LEDF) which includes Tesfa Network and Eritrean Congress Party. If this is what LEDF considers as positive politics, then there is something major amiss in their politics. If deqebat and LEDF believe that they are engaging in ‘smart’ politics, I can assure those who are pursuing this destructive political strategy that the rest of us can be equal to the task. We don’t need to engage in destructive politics to engage deqebat but to reveal to our common readers the dangerous path deqebat is pursuing.

Dissention within EDP

In the last two-and-half years, I have tried to address every issue as I understood them. I have criticized almost every political organization. I make no exception to EDP. In writing this portion of my article, my readers should understand that I am not an insider and do not possess any more information than most of my fellow readers. However, I can’t possibly pass up an opportunity to address organizational challenges.

We have heard and read the dissenters views on certain issues. It is difficult to address issues by listening to one side only and without possessing an organization’s bylaws and resolutions passed during its congresses.

The dissention can be examined at various levels, including the overall handling of the dissent and the question of organizational rule-of-law.

Ø Organizational rule-of-law

I will start with this topic because we need only examine technical issues. Unfortunately, the dissenters haven’t quoted any specific sections in EDP organizational laws in arguing their cases. I can’t neither support nor argue against the dissenters without specific information. But one may discuss from general observations.

Even if leadership violates any of the organizational laws or provisions, there is always a mechanism for calling organizational meetings (i.e. extraordinary meeting) at each level: executive, central committee and congress. Dissenters who make up less than the minimum required to call extraordinary meeting at any level can’t force a meeting without the minimum requirements regardless of how serious the violations are.

It is understandable the frustration in gathering membership petition in Diaspora politics. The only means available to the dissenters is to propagate their views through the public medium in order to reach out to other members and to the public beyond that. Based on the number of open supporters for the dissenting views, it appears that they may not have enough votes to call extraordinary meeting.

The dissenters themselves have responsibilities to abide by the organizational laws. If they can’t garner enough votes to call extraordinary meeting, they have two choices: resign or to wait until the next congress [which I hope there is a requirement to meet on periodic basis and is not left to CC’s discretion only]. The dissenters don’t have rights to declare organizational laws as void just because they felt leadership breached an important issue. The dissenters have equal if not more legal responsibilities to ensure that their accusations are backed by facts. In general, accusers have greater legal responsibility. Failing to state the facts and possibly making false accusations is tantamount to engaging in slanderous and libelous acts. One must differentiate between dissent and slanderous statements.

The other question I have is what are the organization rules for replacing central committee members?

Ø The Subjective Analysis

Again, it is difficult to analyze on the basis of publicly available information only. The dissenters accused the Chairman of ignoring them and even engaging in deriding them. Observing our overall Eritrean attitude and poor communications skills, I may be able to deconstruct what may have led to the foul moods on both sides. The dissenting side felt deliberately excluded from an important decision on travel to Ethiopia. The dissenters may have expressed their views in strong terms to the Chairman and they may have even questioned the integrity of the Chairman and the leadership in general. The Chairman, like every other human, felt offended by the remarks and accusations and refuses to meet with them. In addition, leadership takes one step further and flushes them out.

I fully understand the dissenters’ frustrations and possibly leadership’s harsh response. I can imagine the dynamics that leads to communication breakdowns leading to ill-will. Both sides have responsibilities to engage in positive communication, but failing so, in general, leadership has a higher moral responsibility to reason out with the dissenters regardless of the dissenters’ anger which may stifle communication.

In fact, there is a political culture we must change. There is a tendency in Eritrean communities and organizations’ leaderships to believe that the general public or general membership must be kept in the dark until the last minute and only told to accept a fait-accompli. I think this is taking advantage of the good-natured behavior of most people. In the short-run, leadership may avoid internal discord, but in the medium-to- long-run it creates mistrust. Every unpleasant act we attempt to avoid now will come back to hound us in vengeance.

While adherence to organizational rule-of-law remains unequivocal, policies can change with evolving realities. What glues together the rule-of-law on one end and polices at the other end is credibility and integrity. EDP’s leadership may have followed proper procedures to address the dissenters’ issue, but what binds an organization together is not only adherence to legalities but also that efforts be made to make every member feel that he/she is included in the decision making of critical issues. EDP’s credibility would be tarnished by ‘even appearing’ to antagonize any dissenters even if leadership followed proper legal procedures to address issues. The best approach would have been for EDP to allow the dissenters to post on its own website, say, one open letter expressing their dissent over leadership’s decision over the said issue and even allowing them to petition for extraordinary meeting in the same open letter. Even better would be to respond to their dissents both on legal issue and at public relations level. These members shouldn’t be made to feel that they are expendable or that they are troublemakers for dissenting or for trying to petition. They expressed their legitimate concerns. Any dissenter who has strong feelings towards certain issues has a duty to address them. They should not have been made to contact meskerem.net or deqebat.com, which must have been very emotionally difficult for them to do so, but felt they had no other choice. If the dissenters sent their protest letters to asmarino or awate or any other independent opposition news media but they decide to suppress them, then these news organizations have failed to do their jobs. EDP, RC, ENSF or any other political organizations are not immune from criticisms. However, the news websites have to ensure that their posting guidelines are followed and to ensure that the dissenters’ messages aren’t libelous. As for EDP, if it doesn’t want to publish their protests on its own website, EDP should have arranged for asmarino, awate, nharnet or other respectable websites to post their protests. Even if the dissenters have already decided to leave the organization, they should feel that their dissents received fair treatment. Even better would have been if EDP would throw a little reception for the departing members thanking them for their services, giving them certificates of appreciation and for them to keep struggling against the regime in their ways. Deep down, EDP’s leadership may feel angry of what the dissenters may have done to it, as the dissenters feel same towards leadership, but the day we are able to swallow our pride, ego and the need for vindication, if we can overcome that feeling, then we would have won the world. We have to force our mouths to smile even when our stomach is burning. This isn’t insincerity but opening up the way for the healing process. After all, Eritrea has a very small population and everyone counts. This is not necessarily about being nice, but about being fair. We will never agree on all issues, but as long as people feel that they are treated fairly, we can attain our democracy in record time. Human courtesy and respect is above all issues. During these difficult times it won’t be political intrigues that will save Eritrea, but our unequivocal beliefs towards human respect. We can return to political mud-slinging once we have reached political stability in Eritrea. In the meantime, let everyone know that we have unshakeable respect for everyone. If any one believes that our good natured behavior is a weakness, let them cross the line and test our wrath.

EDP carries greater organizational responsibility within the opposition camp than all other opposition parties because it may have the inside track if a sudden change takes place in Eritrea. Other political organizations and individuals may have greater apprehensions towards EDP – thus the continuous political and personal attacks against it. I have supported EDP for its positions on many issues. In the last couple of years, positive developments have allowed the political views of EDP, ENSF, RC and even Mr. Adhanom’s EPM to begin merging which is very encouraging by itself. As important policies are, it is even more important to cultivate trust and credibility. Let the other parties respect your organization even if they disagree with your policies. At the end of the day, on most issues and policies, we rely on trust and credibility we place on our leaders to address many of the issues and policies than each one of us trying to drive from the backseat. In return, leadership should strive to maintain that trust through ‘good-faith’ practices.

Dissent is at the core of our democratic values. The dissenting EDP members have exercised their God-given rights to dissent and have nothing to be concerned about. I respect them for their convictions. My only advice is to be careful in making their public statements and to ensure that they have their legal facts and organizational rules correct. Otherwise they will be committing the same mistakes that they are accusing others of doing. When we dissent, we have to hold ourselves and the people we accuse to higher standards.

Berhan Hagos

May 8, 2007

Här fängslas flest reportrar

I dag, på Internationella press­frihetens dag, sitter 119 journalister i fängelse runt om i världen.
Kina toppar denna svarta lista med flest fängslade, tätt följd av Kuba, Etiopien och Eritrea.
Nr 1 – KINA
För sjunde året i rad har Kina den tvivelaktiga äran att vara det största fängelset för journalister. För tillfället sitter 32 journalister fängslade, enligt Reportrar utan gränser. Därtill kommer 48 som dömts till långa fängelsestraff för vad de skrivit på Internet.
Den vanligaste anklagelsen mot de fängslade journalisterna är att de sysslat med ”antistatlig verksamhet”. Andra brottsrubriker som förekommer är ”subversiv verksamhet”, ”avslöjande av statshemligheter” och att de sysslat med ”verksamhet mot statens intressen”.
En av de fängslade journalisterna är Shi Tao som avtjänar ett tioårigt fängelsestraff för att ha ”läckt statshemligheter till utlandet”. Shi Tao fängslades i november 2004 för att han i ett mejl berättat hur regimen ville att medierna skulle bevaka 15-årsdagen av militärens krossande av demonstrationerna vid Himmelska fridens torg. Shi Tao kunde gripas genom att Internetföretaget Yahoo hjälpte till att spåra hans mejl.
Myndigheterna klassificerade inte instruktionerna till medierna som en statshemlighet förrän efter arresteringen. Det är sådant som gör det svårt att jobba som journalist i Kina. Vad regimen anser är en statshemlighet skiftar, vilket gör kinesiska journalister försiktiga och leder till självcensur.
– Vad som tidigare varit publicerat kan plötsligt bli en statshemlighet om ett ämne av någon anledning blir känsligt, säger Ulrika K Engström, frilansjournalist som bland annat jobbar för Svenska Dagbladet.
Hon tar som exempel att risskördens storlek hösten 2005 plötsligt blev en statshemlighet. Kolleger till henne, som jobbar på tidningar i Shanghai, fick instruktioner att inte skriva om problemen med risskörden eftersom det då skulle avslöjas att Kina inte var självförsörjande.
Ämnen som är tabu är massakern på Himmelska fridens torg och att Taiwan inte tillhör Kina.
– När jag jobbade på en lokal tidning i Shanghai fick vi inte skriva om att det fanns fattiga, om gaykulturen, om prostitution eller nämna ordet sex. Om vi ändå skrivit om dessa ämnen skulle ansvarig utgivare ha strukit dem, vilket skulle ha skapat problem för oss med blanka sidor före tryckning. Reglerna ledde till självcensur, säger Ulrika K Engström.
I ett tioårsperspektiv har det blivit enklare att starta tidningar som inte direkt kontrolleras av staten. Varje år kommer det ut hundratals nya tidningar och tidskrifter. De flesta handlar om mode, inredning, nöje, alltså ämnen som befinner sig på tryggt avstånd från statshemligheter.
Tidigare kunde det även förekomma att kinesiska journalister gjorde bra undersökande journalistik om sådant som regimen ansåg nödvändigt att ta upp. Ansåg någon myndighet att det var viktigt med exempelvis miljöproblem kunde den tillåta medier att leta upp missförhållanden som politiker sedan kunde reagera på.
Men sedan den nye presidenten Hu Jintao tillträdde för ett antal år sedan har tumskruvarna mot pressen skruvats åt. En ny lag har införts som gör det förbjudet för lokala kinesiska journalister att åka till och skriva från en annan provins utan tillstånd.
– Den nya ledningen verkar inte se medier som användbara verktyg att spåra upp problem i samhället med, säger frilansjournalisten Ola Wong, som bland annat skriver för Sydsvenskan.
Sedan några år tillbaka pågår det mindre bondeuppror runt om i Kina.Det är arga bönder som protesterar mot att deras åkermark konfiskeras utan kompensation och att fabriker förorenar deras jord.
– Man vill inte att den egna pressen ska fungera som en katalysator för missnöjet så att alla dessa små bränder i tuvor ska utveckla sig till en stor gräsbrand. Det kan vara en anledning till att det blivit svårare att bedriva grävande journalistik, säger Ola Wong.
Ulrika K Engström greps för ett år sedan då hon besökte en av de byar där bönderna protesterade. Hon satt i förhör i åtta timmar och var tvungen att lämna ifrån sig anteckningar och film.
Det begränsade svängrummet för medierna har gjort att många kinesiska journalister resignerat och blivit cyniska. Det är mycket vanligt att journalister och redaktörer tar mutor för att skriva om ett visst företag. Detta kallas för hongbao, rött kuvert. Det är vanligt att halva inkomsten kommer från dessa kuvert. Enligt Ola Wong har kinesiska journalister en hygglig lön, men de lockas att ta emot dessa röda kuvert eftersom de vill leva ett lyxigare liv än vad lönen tillåter.
– Jag frågade en fotograf om det inte är ett moraliskt problem att ta emot mutor. Hon svarade att eftersom de ändå inte får skriva sanningen på grund av politiska skäl kan de lika väl ta emot mutor. Korruptionen kommer från båda hållen, säger Ola Wong.

Nr 2 – KUBA
På andra plats på den svarta listan kommer Kuba med 23 reportrar fängslade. Under loppet av tre dagar i mars 2003 arresterades 82 regimkritiker och oberoende journalister. I dag sitter 23 journalister fängslade. En av de mer kända var Raúl Rivero som dömdes till ett långt fängelsestraff. Han släpptes för ett tag sedan av hälsoskäl och bor i dag i Madrid.
Många av journalisterna som greps hade blivit lurade av en infiltratör. Dagarna före arresteringarna ordnade USAs intressekontor – landet har inga diplomatiska förbindelser med Kuba ­– ett möte för att diskutera pressfrihet. Den som arrangerade pressträffen, Manuel David Orrio, visade sig vara en infiltratör som varit lierad med säkerhetstjänsten sedan 1992.
– I mitten av 90-talet var han med om att bilda en liten förening för oberoende journalister och hade därför koll på alla, säger Thomas Gustafsson, reporter på Aftonbladet, som under lång tid bevakat Kuba och till hösten kommer med en ny bok om landet.
Vid rättegången mot regimkritikern och journalisten Raúl Rivero var Manuel David Orrio ett av vittnena.
Oppositionen i Kuba var länge kvävd, men i början av 90-talet växte det fram en demokratirörelse. På samma gång blev det även möjligt för oberoende journalister att publicera sig i utländska medier. Genom att dollarn släpptes fri kunde de få betalt i utländsk valuta. Det var just dessa pengar som regimen tog som motiv för sitt tillslag.
– Regeringen har tolkat det som om journalisterna fick betalt av utländsk makt för att skriva ofördelaktiga nyheter om landet, säger Thomas Gustafsson.
Någon möjlighet för oberoende journalister att publicera sig inom landet finns inte. Alla medier kontrolleras av staten och i lagstiftningen står det uttryckligen att det är brottsligt att sprida uppfattningar eller uppgifter som inte är statens offentliga. Det innebär att journalister som publicerar nyheter som inte är godkända av staten uppfattas som förrädare.
– Lagstiftningen gör att det är väldigt svårt att jobba som journalist. Du får helt enkelt inte verka utanför regimen. I Kuba använder man inte tortyr, man dödar inte journalister. I stället dödar man pressen, säger Thomas Gustafsson.

Nr 3 – ETIOPIEN
I Etiopien sitter 18 journalister bakom galler sedan oroligheter och gatudemonstrationer i november förra året. Etiopisk polis hindrade flera tidningar att komma ut, gjorde razzior mot redaktioner, konfiskerade datorer, dokument och annat material.

Nr 4 – ERITREA
I grannlandet Eritrea är för tillfället 13 journalister fängslade. De flesta har inte fått några anklagelser riktade mot sig eller någon rättegång. En av dem är den svenske medborgaren Dawit Isaak som sitter fängslad sedan 2001. En omfattande kampanj har förts i Sverige för att få Dawit Isaak frigiven där bland annat Journalistförbundet och Tidningsutgivarna demonstrerat och uppvaktat den eritreanska ambassaden i Stockholm och krävt att Isaak ska friges. Eritreas ambassadör har hotat med att flytta ambassaden till Norge på grund av de ihärdiga protesterna. Hösten 2005 trodde många att Dawit Isaak skulle friges. Han släpptes ur fängelset. Regimen backade sedan och förklarade att han endast hade fått lämna fängelset för medicinsk vård.
Hans kollega Khaled Abdu tror att det kommer att ta mycket lång tid innan Dawit Isaak släpps, mycket längre än vad regeringen i Sverige och stödföreningar tror.
– Om Dawit blir fri skulle även de and­ra journalisterna släppas. Det skulle inte finnas någon anledning för regimen att hålla de andra journalisterna. Nu är det en fråga om prestige. Regimen är stolt över att den inte låter sig påverkas av väst, säger Khaled Abdul.
Khaled Abdu lyckades fly landet innan massarresteringarna mot oberoende medier inleddes. Han visste att någonting var i görningen. Han hade redan arresterats fem gånger på grund av sitt arbete som chefredaktör på den oberoende tidningen Adma. Regimen var dock upptagen med kriget mot Etiopien 1996-1997 och hade inte tid att slå ned mot oppositionen.
I dag bor Khaled Abdu i Sverige och är en av initiativtagarna till en nybildad förening för de 20-25 eritreanska journalister som flytt landet och arbetar för pressfrihet i Eritrea. Huvudkontoret ska ligga i Sverige.
Orsaken till arresteringarna av journalisterna var enligt Khaled Abdu att regimen ville tysta den politiska rörelse som började växa fram på 90-talet och som krävde politiska reformer i landet. Dessa politiker fick ingen möjlighet att föra fram sin kritik i de statligt kontrollerade medierna så de vände sig till de oberoende.
– Politikerna förde fram kraftig kritik och därför ville regimen hämnas på dessa politiker. När de oppositionella skulle arresteras visste regimen att de oberoende medierna skulle skriva om detta, så den arresterade även journalister och stängde tidningarna. Sedan anklagade regimen journalisterna för förräderi, att det var en konspiration mellan oppositionella politiker, grannländer och journalister, säger Khaled Abdul.
Ingen av de journalister som sitter i fängelse har fått någon rättegång.
– En dag kanske de släpper dig fri. Om du frågar varför du en gång greps, blir du arresterad på nytt.
Han är pessimistisk inför framtiden och tror inte att någon skulle våga starta en ny oberoende tidning i dag eftersom det inte finns någon lag i Eritrea som skyddar det fria ordet.
– För att det ska råda pressfrihet måste det finnas en grundlag. I dag finns det inte en sådan. Vi har elastiska lagar som regimen ändrar efter hur det passar den. Först när Eritrea blir ett demokratiskt land vågar någon starta en oberoende tidning, säger Khaled Abdu

Göteborg: Dawit Isaaks kollega på yttrandefrihetsseminarium

Han misshandlades och torterades under ett års tid för att ha skrivit i en fri tidning i Eritrea. Nu befinner sig journalisten Semret Seyoum i Sverige. Hans kollega Dawit Isaak är dock fortfarande samvetsfånge. Den 3 maj är FN: s pressfrihetsdag. Dagen innan anordnades ett yttrandefrihetsseminarium på Världskulturmuseet i Göteborg. Utrikesdepartementet kom inte på grund av den tysta diplomatin med Eritrea.

Semret Seyoum grundade den eritreanska tidningen Setit, som Isaak var delägare i. När regeringen i Eritrea gjorde tillslaget mot den fria pressen 2001 arresterades både Semret Seyoum och Dawit Isaak. Utan att få veta varför blev dock Semret Seyoum frisläppt ett år senare. Han lyckades ta sig över gränsen till Sudan och kom sedan till Sverige med hjälp av Unicef.Semret Seyoum deltog, liksom Dawit Isaaks bror Esayas Isak, journalisten och 2003 års Human Rights Watch-pristagare, Khaled Abdu och författaren och statsvetaren Johan Karlsson på en temadag om yttrandefrihet på Världskulturmuseet i Göteborg den 2 maj. Dagen anordnades av Amnesty.De diskuterade bland annat om det finns en möjlighet för Dawit Isaak att bli frisläppt på samma sätt som Semret Seyoum.
– Det är en oberäknelig regim som bara ger falskt hopp, menade Khaled Abdu och syftade på att Dawit Isaak blev frisläppt i tre dagar 2005, men fängslades igen."Svensk media glömmer hela situationen"Khaled Abdu kritiserade även svensk medias fokusering kring Dawit Isaak.– Man får inte glömma att det finns fler eritreaner som är fängslade, sa Khaled Abdu. Varför skulle de frisläppa Dawit Isaak men inte de andra? Svensk media fokuserar på Dawit, men hela situationen glöms bort.Enligt panelen finns det idag tusentals eritreanska samvetsfångar.Vad kan då göras för att Dawit Isaak och andra fängslade journalister ska bli fria?
Dawit Isaaks bror, Esayas Isak, menade att den bästa metoden är om Sveriges utrikesminister åker till Eritrea.
– Den tysta diplomatin som Sveriges regering använt sig av har ju inte fungerat. Man kan fråga sig varför vi inte sätter hårt mot hårt istället? Vi borde skicka utrikesministern. Vi är nu inne på den fjärde sedan Dawit blev fängslad. Ingen av dem har åkt till Eritrea!– Carl Bildt borde åka, helst imorn! UD säger att om vi skickar vår utrikesminister och Eritrea ändå inte agerar så har vi använt det sista kortet. Men journalister har dött i fängelset, och Dawit som var helt frisk innan har fått hjärtproblem, det börjar bli dags nu.UD kom inte på grund av tyst diplomatiKhaled Abdu höll med om att den tysta diplomatin inte fungerar.– För mig är det bara ett skäl att inte låta kritikerna komma till tals. Vi får inte veta något om vad de gör. Och inget händer.Enligt en av kvällens arrangörer berättade att Utrikesdepartementet (UD) var inbjudna till seminariet.– Men de avböjde på grund av den tysta diplomatin.– Det brukar vara Eritreas ambassadör som tackar nej till såna här tillställningar, jämförde Johan Karlsson.
Cecilia Wigström (fp), ordförande i den tvärpolitiska riksdagsgruppen för Dawit Isaak, satt i publiken och berättade att hon ska diskutera frågan med Carl Bildt på tisdag.– Jag kommer bland annat ta upp frågan om att EU bör frysa biståndet till Eritrea.Esayas Isak tror inte att oppositionen i Eritrea har möjlighet att stoppa regeringen utan att trycket måste komma just utifrån.– Även exileritreaner är rädda att agera eftersom vi har släkt kvar i landet, men trycket måste komma från omvärlden. Vi måste pressa UD och sprida budskapet!
Elin Schwartz

Back to ‘Tribouli’

“Libyan and Eritrean military and security observers have been deployed at the border between Sudan and Chad, scene of recent clashes, a Libyan mediator said on Thursday.”

Sudan Tribune
Apr. 12, 2007

PFDJ seems to be following a well-defined pattern, retracing the Italian colonial period,
An Italian colony develops its own distinct identity then eventually becomes independent, then
PFDJ rebuilt Italian-era railroad system, then
PFDJ tried to rebuild Italian-era dams, roads and farms, then
Introduced PFDJ version of Italian Articollo Diece [No Eritrean nationalism allowed], then
Prohibited natives from walking on Kombishtato (thru Giffa for Slavery Campaign), then
Invaded Ethiopia (Per Border Commission and accepted by PFDJ) as Italians did in 1935, then
Invaded Somalia (albeit clandestinely) as Italians did, then
Sent its troops through ‘tribouli’ to Sudan/Chad border (Alright, the Italians stopped in Libya)
Moreover,
Italians were the last Europeans colonizers to scramble for Africa. PFDJ is trying to become the new kid on the block scrambling to become the new power broker,
PIA is telling us that we are too ‘tribalists’. Instead, we will be told to shed our cultures and traditions – symbols of tribalism - and to only speak Italian, to act like Italians and to celebrate Italian holidays (thus two new years, etc…).
Is this why PIA makes such frequent trips to Italy without even being invited?
Hail the Black Caesar!
He shall fight tribalism!
He shall fight religionists!
He shall fight regionalists! [Including the entire horn]
He shall fight the Goliaths of the World!
He shall build a great nation/region single-handedly!
Then he shall call himself – the “Visionary”, a demigod!
He shall rule the Horn from Roma … piccola!
II. CONSTITUTION & MULTIPARTY SYSTEM
As critically important constitution is, there is an overemphasis in our discussions of this issue. Although a constitution can be complex at a theoretical level, at a practical level, the options available to formulators are limited.
In my view, there are many other critical issues that we must equally address in order to cross the critical periods immediately after the collapse of the regime. If we are to embark on multi-party democracy within a short period after the collapse of the regime, there are zillions of other issues that we should discuss and debate in order to begin to understand the challenges we face. One among many issues is multiparty laws. I assure my readers that this issue itself can occupy us for the next decade. It will probably be the single most important issue that will define how we evolve into a stable nation.
THE CONSTITUTION
Simon M. Weldehaimanot’s paper titled “Ten years old yet not born: The Status of Eritrean Constitution” is an excellent paper on this topic, Mr. S. Younis’ article and Mr. Weldehaimanot’s reply are excellent discussions on the Constitution. Mr. Weldehaimanot addresses both the general theoretical issues as well as the historical developments of the 1997 Constitution. There was also a conference honoring Prof. Bereket Habteselassie at the University of North Carolina where discussions addressed various topics on constitution. I hope that their papers will be made available to the general public [as has Mr. Younis]. These are the types of issues we should equally address as we expose the regime’s atrocious acts.
Constitution contains the principles that govern a society and that laws emanate from these principles. Constitution is generally composed of the following,
Rights & Freedoms (see below)
+
System of Government (see below)
=
CONSTITUTION
[Note: A constitution may contain other particular and explicit principles or values that may be catered to a specific nation]
Rights & Freedoms
Although much can be written on this issue, it is suffice to say that these rights and freedoms are mostly universally shared. One can copy UN’s Declaration of Human Rights or any other countries’ Bill of Rights and Freedoms and apply them to Eritrea.
It should also be noted that rights and freedoms emanate from natural laws, and shouldn’t be viewed as privileges handed down by benevolent politicians. “Rights” might be referred to as the “rights to life, liberty and property”.
“Freedom” might be referred to as “Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly and Freedom of Conscious …”
Possibly, the one challenge that needs to be addressed is how to address minority and group rights. A constitution is better left to address the broader principles of minority and group rights rather than to promulgate laws.
System of Government
We have to separate “system” and “government”.
“Government”: has three primary functions, first is administration, second is promulgation of laws, and third is policy formulation.
Government Administration:
Ø Who is primarily responsible for government administration? It should be civil service.
Ø What is the primary function of elected representatives in government administration? It is oversight over civil service.
Ø Implication 1: regardless of who is elected into government, government administration should be allowed to function relatively independently and that administrative changes should be introduced in gradual manner only. Civil service should be highly unionized to counter political power and interference.
Ø Implication 2: Proliferation of political parties is viewed as creating upheaval in government administration. As long as there is strong civil service, the negative impact of proliferation of political parties can be highly mitigated. What can be done to create a strong civil service? Not much, but the task will be made more difficult the longer PFDJ is allowed to destroy Eritrea.
Promulgation of laws:
Ø This is the primary of function of government (legislative body). Society means people living together; and to live together they need laws.
Ø Promulgating laws might be the most challenging and contentious aspect of government, esp. in multiethnic, multi-regional and multi-religious nation.
Ø In a fast-paced and quickly changing world, laws must be enacted, modified, changed and rescinded quickly. Legislators must remain actively abreast of various issues.
Ø At the same time, quickly changing laws reflecting quickly changing realties and world shouldn’t cause uncertainties.
Policy Formulation:
Ø Policies include on health, education (social), defense, foreign relations, economic, etc…
Ø Political party forming government usually formulates these policies,
Ø However, there shouldn’t be wide fluctuations in policies from one government to the next. There must be a system that tapers wide fluctuations in policies. This may include strong civil service (esp. for social programs), strong private sector (esp. for economic policies) and strong civic associations (esp. on other general national interests)
“System”: suggests “checks and balances” to ensure power isn’t usurped to the detriment of individual rights and freedoms. “Checks and balances” are discussed in my article “Blueprint for Democratic Eritrea”. “System” also suggests a mechanism by which ethnical, religious and regional minorities’ rights is protected.
“System” suggests a structure to achieve a certain objective. Structure has a degree of permanency, at least over short period of time. The question is, would the public be allowed to debate over, for instance, “federalism” vs. “unitary system” and propose the preferable system? Most likely, the perimeters for a system of government are set by a certain select group.
Although a nation may import a “system”, customizing a “system” for a specific society is a trial-and-error process. The starting point is a universally accepted “system” of the three pillars of government: judiciary, legislative and executive.
“System of Government” = a mechanism to control government while doing its job. The most important control is to forestall government from encroaching on “Rights & Freedoms”.
Recommendation for discussions: Instead of just wrangling over whether the 1997 Constitution making process was inclusive or not, we should,
Discuss the shortcomings of the 1997 Constitution with the view of amending it in the future,
We need wider discussions and competent leadership capable of implementing the necessary government structural reforms [“systems”] to make the Constitution work. Instituting “system” is technical in nature and requires competent leadership to undertake these structural reforms.
For instance, I have concerns over the following articles in the constitution for now,
1. Article 26 Limitation Upon Fundamental Rights and Freedoms: I believe that this article weakens the rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution. If Eritrea had a strong and independent judiciary system, Constitutional judges could have been relied upon to balance between rights & freedoms and political issues. Without strong judiciary, the constitution must be made to err on the side of caution and enshrine unequivocal protections of rights and freedoms. Moreover strong private media and civic associations are needed to control government.
2. Article 34 Chairman of the National Assembly: The constitution must unequivocally state that the President can not also be chairman of the national assembly.
3. Article 41 Election and Term of Office of the President: My concern is that without an automatic mechanism for electing a president, political wrangling within the national assembly may result in presidential vacancy for days, if not for weeks. Members of national assembly will have incentives to play a ‘hold-out’ game in order to extract the maximum benefit from presidential candidates. Instead, similar to some countries’ presidential elections, say, 30 days after [national] election for national assembly, there would be a mandatory election [in the national assembly] for presidency. If no candidate garners simple majority, there would be a second round election within 10 days after the first election among only the top two vote-getters for presidency. One may argue that the national assembly can formulate its own election rules to address such concerns. However, enshrining it into the constitution gives the process greater importance.
4. Article 36 Rules of Procedure in the National Assembly: There should be mandatory requirements to hold at least one session in each calendar year or any other period not exceeding 365 days after the first session. In the 1997 Constitution, the only requirement is to hold the first session within one month after national election. Otherwise the executive may coerce members of the national assembly not to hold sessions.
A mature political system can enshrine only the general principles and allow the political institutions to formulate laws, rules and regulations to address various issues. In emerging democracy, esp. one at its infancy, may require higher degree of protections enshrined within the constitution, which then can be rescinded if deemed unnecessary or too restrictive once a higher level of political maturity is achieved or strong judicial system, including Constitutional Court, is established.
While on this topic, some say that “national security” or “sovereignty” comes before “Constitution”. But what they don’t understand or conveniently forget is that “Constitution” encompasses “national security” and “sovereignty”. Only a law-abiding nation is able to address is internal and external challenges. Without constitution, surely a nation will continue to face national security challenges.
MULTIPARTY LAWS
What is the function of a multiparty system?
National leaders who attain power through democratic processes should have many limitations to their powers. Being elected into government isn’t a carte-blanche to experiment with one’s beliefs on various issues. The governing party won’t (and shouldn’t) have the power to easily tinker with the followings,
Constitution: the governing party shouldn’t have the power to change the constitution without wider public participation,
Administration: should be largely left to the civil service,
Laws: there should be committee hearings, white papers, etc… before promulgating laws.
Policies: concerned individuals and groups should be consulted before formulating policies. Civil service should be heavily involved in formulating policies.
The most important function of multiparty system is to allow the general population to kick out the incumbent political party in government. Voters aren’t necessarily electing the opposition into government, but showing disapproval of incumbent government’s performance. The ideal government is where faces change but laws and policies remain stable or change gradually. When one party remains in power for extended period, corruption and nepotism shall surely follow. Opposition parties must understand that they may not necessarily be elected to implement their social experimentation but just to revamp accountability and transparency. A casual observation of politics shows that the first act of any opposition party elected into government is to expose the previous government’s political abuses in order to boost its own image. This is healthy politics.
Proliferation of political parties
PIA and opposition camp alike express their concerns of the proliferations of political parties. The first question is, ‘why should we be concerned about the proliferation of political parties’? The concern might be that political parties may engage in divisive propaganda, or that divided national assembly wouldn’t be able to lead the country by promulgating laws or electing national leader. If we can articulate the problems caused by the proliferations of political parties, we may be able to formulate rules that may discourage unwanted political dynamics.
In my view, Min. Sheriffo’s 2001 draft multiparty law is well-thought out. This law requires parties to have national reach (Article 6) which limits the proliferation of political parties. Naturally, national elections won’t be limited to candidates affiliated to political parties, but individuals will run as independents. In order to encourage individual candidates to join political parties, and political parties to extend their geographic and demographic reach, various types of formulas may be used, for instance,
Parties with elected members from 5 or more administrative regions - Nfa 80/vote per year
Parties with elected members from 4 administrative regions - Nfa 60/vote per year
Parties with elected members from 3 administrative regions - Nfa 40/vote per year
Parties with elected members from 2 administrative regions - Nfa 20/vote per year
Parties & individuals with elected members from 2 administrative regions Nfa 10/vote per year
Vote means number of individual citizens’ votes cast in favor of party, and doesn’t mean per member elected.
Per vote payments would be made to the parties for administrative and campaigning purposes. Every system has its advantages and disadvantages. Their must be a system that encourages political individuals and parties to work and campaign beyond their immediate reach. Voters also must be inculcated that they can better advance their interests by affiliating themselves with better organized political parties than an independent politician.
Note: Sheriffo’s multiparty law requires the founders of a party to have wider representation across Eritrea [Refer to Article 6]. But this doesn’t necessarily mean that these parties would have elected representatives across Eritrea.
For emphasis, let me reiterate that multiple political parties are needed to replace the governing party in form but not in substance. “Absolute power corrupts absolutely”. A change of government should be viewed as just changing faces, but all policies should remain the same or changes introduced in gradual manner. Nobody wants a big swing in national policies every time a new or opposing political party wins power. This creates uncertainties with grave consequences. Hopefully, in their ambitions to reach power, the competing political parties will expose each other’s sins only.
III. Political Agenda [Manifesto]
We are asked to support the opposition camp, yet we have no clue what might be served by the opposition camp if they were to jump into the helm in post-PFDJ Eritrea. In order to expedite the downfall of PFDJ while simultaneously addressing the public’s apprehensions for the immediate periods following the downfall of PFDJ, strong and decisive parties or groups of parties should draft a clear political manifesto, [not just we are democrats manifesto, but to address specific issues]
1) There will be no political witch-hunt. Top government and PFDJ leaders will be relieved of their positions and will receive pension payments commensurate with cost of living.
2) All middle- and lower-tiered government officials will retain their positions and housings. However, if housings were obtained by evicting ordinary Eritreans without “proper” due process of law, restitution will effected.
3) There will be no immunity from criminal persecution for those engaged in gross human rights violations. Regardless of the next government’s decision on persecutions, ordinary citizens won’t be prevented from pursuing civil actions to rectify illegal acts committed against them.
4) Pension rights will be conferred on all government employees.
5) PFDJ business organizations will be transferred to a trust under government oversight. No PFDJ business venture employees shall lose their jobs. Winding down these business ventures shall be made in the most prudent manner, balancing the interests of the employees and the need to reinvigorate the private sector.
6) Warsais will be compensated for their forced labors. Their years in national service will count towards their government pensions.
7) Such compensations will extend to those who fled from national service, but based on actual service plus a separate formula for years in exile in neighboring countries or AWOLed.
8) Demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of Warsais are the next government’s top priority.
9) Employment creation shall be the top economic priority to absorb Warsais, lest they become a hotbed of political instability.
10) There will no longer be a mandatory national service requirement for women.
11) There will be a full review and public debates on the advantages and disadvantages national service program itself in view of our experiences of the last decade.
12) Implementation of the 1997 Constitution [with necessary proposed amendments, which will remain subject to future approvals but amendments used in practice]
13) All Eritreans are free to exercise their God-given rights and freedoms including freedom of speech (including establishing public media) and freedom to assemble (including establishing any forms of peaceful organizations). Failure to promulgate “Press Laws” or any others shouldn’t be used to suspend citizens’ rights or freedoms.
14) Land reform is critical for jump-starting the economy, which is needed to absorb demobilized national servicemen. Housing projects commenced under PFDJ shall continue but compensations for land use, slavery labor and other factors will be addressed in a comprehensive manner. Those who benefited under PFDJ have moral and legal obligations to compensate all other Eritreans whose rights were deprived through PFDJ’s illegal acts.
15) Reversing the social and moral deteriorations during the PFDJ regime will be addressed through the education and other systems.
16) Immediately address the socio-economic issues facing the countryside.
17) Immediately engage in face-to-face meeting with the Ethiopian government to rescind the “Declaration of War”, to redeploy troops away from the border areas and to gradually begin restoring diplomatic ties. This will include allowing Ethiopia access to use the Ports of Asseb and Massawa. Simultaneously, begin confidence building measures that will gradually bring the border dispute to its logical conclusion.
Stability first (not exceeding three months), then build.
We should reject, destroy first (“sur betekh”), then build.
We need leadership that is bold, confident and decisive enough to articulate issues and vision. We should be apprehensive of a leadership that is only able to amend two provisions in its Charter in two years. We would have expected them to amend the two and to formulate a manifesto and political platform. The G-15 publicly proposed a whole slew of political, economic and social reforms. They didn’t just state we envision a rich democratic Eritrea where private sector becomes the economic engine while government delivers “A-1” health system. Instead, the G-15 brought out detailed reform proposals on specific issues. Why are we in Diaspora afraid to articulate our vision in such detailed way? I am sure many have greater expectations from the latest structure within the opposition camp.
IV. Building Organizations & Managing Organizational Conflicts
All organic forms undergo through the same phases,
a. Inception
b. Growth
c. Maturity
d. Decline (demise)
As human beings undergo through these phases, everything that emanates from humans also undergoes through the same phases. These include human ideas and organizations. Some organizations disappear due to their rigidity; while other organizations survive by adopting changing ideas. However, changing organizations will end up transforming themselves so much that what connect the old organization with the new organization are simply a name and a certain tradition.
[Inception] Political, religious, or other organizations start from ideas that people get attracted to. At the beginning, new ideas are promoted by young and energetic individuals working almost independently from each other. What connects them is only an idea.
[Growth] At certain stage, memberships and followers of the new idea begin to grow requiring an organization to manage memberships. Hence an organization is born.
[Maturity] By nature an organization is a means to manage membership, and is not primarily designed to adapt to new ideas and to changing realities. Organizations discourage individual innovativeness, individual initiatives, and creativity, because their primary concern is ‘control’ over people. Organizations by nature attempt to maintain the status quo, thus bringing them into natural conflicts with laws of nature – change – change brought about the phases humans must undergo naturally.
[Decline] By laws of nature, organizations ultimately face two choices – change or disappear. Some organizations can incorporate change in “continuous” basis. These are the learning organizations that will dominate in whatever endeavor they engage in. Other organizations will learn but only at a point of extinction. However, by refusing to change on timely basis, they may cause tremendous damage and might be overtaken by the learning organizations. Organizations that refuse to change will disappear either through loss of membership, loss of business or through dire means.
How do mature organizations avoid decline, or maintain their mature phase, or even be able to revert to growth? We will leave this to future discussions.
V. The “Truth”
Suffice to say that no one knows what the “truth” is in life. Yet, that word gets thrown around so nonchalantly that it creates the wrong beliefs. Some may say that there is “scientific truth”. But ultimately, the “truth” is beyond our understanding. If we understood the “truth”, we would have unlocked the ultimate knowledge that has alluded man for millenniums.
In the meantime, our warped ideas about our own definitions of “truth” is used to propagate our self-righteousness, which in turn leads to intolerance and even to engage in atrocious acts against other human beings in the name of our “truth”.
For us weaklings, the only “truth” is a “personal truth”, which is to live at peace with oneself, with those around us [our society], and beyond that with nature.
VI. Latest episode within the Orthodox Church
We have to carefully study what PFDJ is trying to do by meddling in the affairs of this church. In order to analyze this we must examine two things, PFDJ’s “acts” versus its “intentions”,
1) PFDJ’s “Act”: is to use Yoftahe Dimitrios to create schism within the Church. PFDJ’s act is to remove the Patriarch and illegally install another Patriarch. But the Patriarch was forced to accept all of PFDJ’s demands including 1) close down the “reform” churches 2) hand over all donations 3) send “excess” priests and deacons to Sawa. The Patriarch may not be an immediate threat to the regime. So why relentlessly pursue the Patriarch.
2) PFDJ’s “Intention”: can be summarized as yet another effort to create schism among the population designed to forestall any possible public uprising or protest by fomenting mistrust and bitterness.
How do we react?
1) If people react to PFDJ’s “Acts”, then we will fall right into the very trap set by PFDJ. A large segment of the public may react not only against the regime but also against those who capitulated to the government’s pressures. For PFDJ, this is mission accomplished – more division – and keeps creating more schisms among the public.
2) If people react to PFDJ’s “Intentions”, then people should forgive the misled Eritreans and keep [as much as possible] their close relationships with those who capitulated. People should expose the regime’s efforts but people wouldn’t be judgmental towards their fellow countrymen. People should remain conciliatory with those who are misled.
Our campaigns should be to react to PFDJ’s “intentions” rather than to its “acts”.
VII. Game of Politics
Public life is never easy. Those who choose life of politics must learn to accept the occupational hazards. If politicians’ egos can’t absorb a degree of public ridicule, innuendo, second-guessing and even mud-slinging then they are in the wrong business. If they see themselves as half-monks and half-politicians, then they will muddle their roles in the political system. If one wants to be a monk, then join a monastery. If one wants to be a politician, then be a good politician.
Starting from this writer, to other political writers to our politicians, we are too sensitive to engage in healthy politics. We want to engage in politics at varying degrees, yet we don’t know how to handle it. We want to be perfectly civil in our political engagements to a level of Puritanism and yet feel the need to play the underhanded game in order to win.
In general our politics is too naïve, and we are poor losers. A nation’s greatness is determined not by its great men but by its graceful losers, who in the end win for themselves and their nations. A typical interview by an Eritrean opposition goes like this, “I don’t personally believe in talking about an individual or an organization within the opposition camp, and besides we should focus our campaign against the regime but let me tell you about this individual and organization that nobody knows about but which I have personal experience from 30 years ago…” so the politician violates his own declared beliefs or principles at the beginning of the sentence. To me, this is a lack of genuineness in one’s declared beliefs. These types of politicians automatically lose their credibility.
Role of Analysts: Every Eritrean has the right to become a “political analyst”. However, an analysis is less than genuine if it relies on the benefits of hindsight. For instance, to say that had G-15 acted in certain ways in 2001, they would have had better success is totally incorrect. We have no idea where any other alternative reform movement strategy in 2001 would have led us. Speculating about the future is totally fair.
We have a long way in shifting our political culture.
Similarly, people advocate for violent means to counter the regime. They argue that the regime is becoming increasingly repressive and thus must “do something”. These people are analyzing the “acts” but not the “intentions”.
The first question they should ask themselves is, “why is the regime being so repressive – and getting worse by the day”? The regime is resorting to this act because something is itching it very hard. It needs somebody or something that will scratch its itch. Those who advocate for violent means are reacting to PFDJ’s acts.
Instead, we should allow what is currently itching PFDJ, apparently very hard, should continue to itch it without any relief. We shouldn’t allow PFDJ’s intention of making us to scratch its itch.
VIII. Conflict with Ethiopia
"Ceterum censeo: Carthago Delenda Est," Marcus Porcius Cato “The Elder” [PIA substitutes Ethiopia]
There is much speculation as to what the next phase will be in the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict. People are perfectly within their rights to speculate what should have happened in 2000 or 2001, or what could happen if there is renewed fighting. However, I hope they don’t take their speculations too seriously.
The outcome of any war is unpredictable, other than the sure loss of lives and properties. This is the dilemma for the two antagonists,
a. For PMMZ: PIA’s aggressive politics is undermining PMMZ, but launching a war against PIA will give PIA the specter of a political win.
b. For PIA: PIA is fully cornered and is itching for war against PMMZ. But launching war against PMMZ will have no hard military objectives, and instead will rally the Ethiopians while the world will condemn PIA for commencing a second conflict with Ethiopia. This may lead to embargoes, and even possibly being hauled into International Criminal Court.
In the end, the side that launches the war will lose the war – not necessarily militarily but definitely politically, precipitating a collapse of the regime that started the war.
Plastering oneself on Al-jazeera summoning the forces of destruction to find another cause, or hoping to scrounge for pennies that may sustain a liberation front but can’t nearly keep a nation afloat, PFDJ’s fate won’t change. The end of the tragic chapter of Eritrean story is near its end – only a matter of few weeks.
The next chapter will require a significant shift in political culture, organizational capacity and our understanding of the big picture – the ability to put together a jigsaw puzzle called democracy. One shouldn’t get too excited because one found the corner puzzle – there are other 499 pieces to go.
“Haba’e Quslu, Haba’e Fewsu!”
Berhan Hagos
April 28, 2007