Sep 28, 2007
“Be careful of the Georgian….he seems to be driven by hate and vile” Lenin’s letter to Kamanev warning about Joseph Stalin
Throughout man kind's history, people have been led or forced to be led and governed by other people commonly called leaders. They have different forms, style of governance, personality, attitude, ambition, state of mind etc
Their action or failure to act can affect the lives of millions both inside and outside their realm of power and sphere of influence. Some leader's action and legacy still haunt and cast shadow on their countrymen way after their death. Stalin and Tito, Siad Barre and Amin are some of the prime examples .Today almost all countries and territories are led by some kind of leaders or leadership. They can have different forms and names. Some are different only in names but quite similar in their way of leadership. Some leaders are quite visionary and loved by many still some are mysterious and of questionable character and state of mind. Few are really funny to the casual observer. The Midget they call dear leader, great leader, beloved father, undestructable comrade etc (the man has thousands of other titles), Kim Jong ILL of North Korea, is a good icon of depravity or fun to those who are fascinated with political farce and travesty.
The purpose of this article is not to comment or scrutinize on the leaders of the world. That would be a mammoth task which requires a huge amount of time and know-how. But I want to say something about two leaders whom I knew and experience well. I want to say a bit about these two individuals who happen to be leaders and their character and the effect it had on me and others .I want to write about these two leaders and their deed and what happens to millions of my countrymen and women, my neighbors and the world at large.
Let me begin from the leader of my country Eritrea, Isaias Afeworki. For many people this name denotes wretchedness and misery, terror and unimaginable repression. The lives of countless people have been scarred for ever largely because of the unbelievably reckless actions of Mr. Afewerki. The name Isaias Afewerki and Eritrea have been intertwined for almost 4 decades now. In fact the term” leader” doesn’t suitably describe Isaias’ style of leadership and who really he is. An absolute despot with more power than many Monarchs, he is the main reason behind all the recent tragedies of Eritreans and their neighbors. A very intelligent person with vindictive mentality, a man of immense energy with vile against his fellow Eritreans, and others, Isaias will be remembered as the fastest destroyer of a nation and its dreams. A charismatic person with high command of several languages, Isaias is one of the few people in history with no moral compass whatsoever. Like Stalin and Saddam the primary motive behind Isaias’ action is hate and insecurity. Many politicians, diplomats, foreign and local observers are baffled by this bizarre personality of Isaias. So far no one explains the rational if any, behind all this psychosis. Isaias Afewerki is one of the extraordinary people who love abyss and hate normalcy.
It is incorrect to put the Eritrean leader with the league of dictators and other autocrats currently or in history. There are clear explanations and even scientific reasoning for all the fanatical and unstable leaders of the past and nowadays. From Romania’s Dracula dictator Ceausescu to all the tyrants of Say, Haiti one can find some cogent and some kind of philosophy behind all the recklessness. Some of them were destroying their homeland ,while they think they are building or forging new society or social order .They were (are) led by some kind of principle, vision or goals, however twisted or unreal as it may be. From Mengistu Hailemariam’s vision of communist Ethiopia, to Castro’s Cuba, one can find some kind of raison d’être and even defend some of the action behind the “action” or the dream however wrong it may be. But there is none what so ever in Isaias and his leadership. Is Isaias a communist? Is he a fundamentalist? What is Isaias’ philosophy or guiding principle? Is he supremacist? Is he fascist? Is he Eritrean ultra nationalist? There is nothing to describe Isaias from the political dictionaries available in the world. The only explanation is PURE AND SIMPLE MADNESS AND HALLUCINATION at its best form!
A leader of one of the poorest nation in the world (even by African standard), dreams of changing the nation in to South Korea or Singapore overnight. Even the devil himself will have a hard time achieving this previously unheard and unseen magic. In a country without constitution and any kind of rule of law what so ever, the “man” hallucinates in to becoming Taiwanese or Korean over night! Even the strongest Cocaine or heroine will not help in becoming high to such degree. The latest hallucination is Sri Lanka (maybe Sri Lanka is a fellow African nation and we all have a responsibility to help our African Sri Lankan brothers).
The daydreams and bizarre actions of Isaias Afewerki are endless. Though it may look funny some times, it is sad to see a nation being destroyed by such reckless person. Hundreds of thousands paid in limb and life to be free and independent. Thanks To Isaias, Eritrea is now one of the worst place in earth to live by…….The only nation in Africa with out free press, the only country with out constitution, the only country with out a functioning Parliament, the only country with out annual budgetary report, the only country where you serve in the national service indefinitely …….The list is too long. The country Eritrea is full of the only country with out this, the only nation with out that! Etc
Today Tens of thousands of Eritreans fled and are still fleeing the oppressive regime of Isaias and his PFDJ thugs. Millions are living in fear and terror back home in Eritrea. The economy is in shambles and there is no hope for Eritreans under Isaias except to flee to what ever country they can. The nation is dying slowly in front of our own eyes and no one seems to care for long time Thanks to a leader whom many Eritreans used to call “wedi Afe” affectionately , Eritrea is on the waiting list to be nominated to the “prestigious” club of “NATIONS WHO SPONSOR TERRORISM! .As an Eritrean, it is excruciating to watch the daily torment of millions of my countrymen .It is also sad to see the world so oblivious for long time, though it seems now almost any one will agree as to how cruel and vicious dictator Isaias is . Many Eritreans and others like the writer of this article are puzzled and even confused by this out of the ordinary personality of Mr. Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea. Meanwhile the damage and carnage went on unabated and only God knows when all this destructive behavior will stop.
Let me come now to the other leader whose deed or fault affects other countless millions- the leader, Meles Zenawi of the Federal republic of Ethiopia, Prime Minster to be exact. As a Journalist, as a person who spent his formative years in Ethiopia and as a casual observer I have been following Ethiopian politics for some time. Meles, a former Marxist student and rebel leader is one of Africa’s most respected statesmen. Even his ardent opponents can’t help but have a high regard for Mr. Zenawi’s sheer genius and intelligence. A humble person with endless love for books (unusual for horn of Africa leaders), he is gradually transforming one of the poorest nation in the world in to one of African Economic success story. Yes there are still massive problems (both inherited from past and created by Mr. Meles’ Policies), but despite all these, Meles is of the few African Leaders with big heart and tolerance and dedication to growth and alleviation of dire poverty. Ethiopia’s history is full of greedy leaders who don’t really care for their subjects and will not hesitate to wipe even the whole nation just to stay in power. The recent history of Ethiopia is filled with blood shade and mass graves. Today things have changed dramatically, thanks to the wise and resolute leadership of Meles and the Ruling EPRDF party. Many people who came from a visit to Ethiopia, describe of massive political, social and economic change taking place in Ethiopia. Without a doubt a great deal of this is attributed to Meles Zenawi and his responsible leadership.
In today’s Ethiopia, at least people can hope! One can hope to go to colleges and Universities that have mushroomed after EPRDF’S victory in 1991.( In contrast the only University In Eritrea is on the verge of closure ,its sellout president on extended vacation somewhere in the US). Any Ethiopian can hope of launching a business or starting a career, Ethiopians are guaranteed by law of movement anywhere both inside and out side their country. An Eritrean is asked for a special pass even inside the capital city. Any Ethiopian can form and join a political party as long as it is non violent and respect the constitution of the land. Eritreans have no right what so ever and let alone forming political associations, gathering of more than three people is seen as suspicious activity by the security forces of Mr. Isaias. Ethiopians are free to follow and worship any kind of religion and faith with out fear and worry of repercussion by the establishment. A testament to the fine leadership of Mr. Meles Zenawi, millions of Ethiopians freely worship their creator without apprehension of any kind what so ever! From the peace loving Jehovah’s witnesses to the unity seeking Bahais, Muslims to Jews, Ethiopia and Ethiopians are under unprecedented freedom of religion in their history. Meanwhile Eritrean men and women of faith are under the most difficult times in the history of religion. Thousands of people have been arrested, tortured, killed simply because they refused to renounce their God and worship Isaias the modern day Pharaoh. Eritrean dungeons are full of believers and their cry for justice. Atheist Isaias has waged war on Almighty God and his people and just like many before him he will be thrown in to the dustbin of history soon. One can list many illustrations about the hellish life Eritreans are leading under Demagogue Isaias and the many amenities Ethiopians take for granted.
In today’s Eritrea, people are not comparing Isaias with Meles as there is no similarity what so ever but in strange irony of things many Eritreans are longing for the good old days of Mengistu Hailemariam (yes that is true!). Many will tell you either privately or openly-“KABZIS DERGI YIHAYISH ABEY NABEY”. Meaning, “Derg is much better than this regime” As my Eritrean friend said the other day, “Mengistu is mother Theresa when compared with the callous Isaias”.
History will render its judgment on Isaias and Meles. Eritreans have already rendered their judgment on their “killer-son” leader. Many Eritreans begun to awake and realize how horrible things are in Eritrea. They are beginning to denounce the leader who is the source of the entire calamity that befall on little Eritrea. A lot of Eritreans are cursing the unstable leader who made their land a farmer without a farm, teacher without a student, a merchant without a shop and above all the most disturbing of all, mothers without children. Thousands of young Eritreans have perished in many of the adventurous wars and invasions of Isaias. Many innocent souls have died just to satisfy the megalomaniac lust for power and prestige of tyrant Isasias Afewerki. In one of the most cruel and sadistic acts of history, Eritrean mothers are told to dance and ululate because their children have died for the glory and clout of Isaias. Today the world seems to grasp the whole picture of life and tragedy taking place in Eritrea. Many passionate supporters of Isaias have now realized how evil and manipulative he is. I only hope and pray it is not too late and the whole nation is salvageable.
Saturday, September 29, 2007
Friday, September 21, 2007
Friday, September 14, 2007
URGENT APPEAL TO:Department of state
The Honorable Dr. Jendayi Frazer,
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington DC
Madam Secretary,
I am writing to you, not representing any political organization, but in my personal capacity, as a concerned American citizen of Eritrean origin. You will remember me, expressing grave concerns about the regime’s record of human rights violations and doubts about the possibility of a change of heart on the part of President Isaias Afwerki regarding the demands for democratic transition and observance of human rights. He has proved that he is not capable of change along those directions, and the victims of his detention centers and torture chambers provide ample evidence for this conclusion.
I have followed your thinking on the tragic situation in my homeland, including your latest remarks that sanctions are being considered as an option. From what I understand of your policy pronouncements so far, it seems that the basic rationale is that imposition of sanctions will induce change in the behavior of President’s Isaias in regard to his involvement in Somalia. His regime’s destabilizing activities in the Horn of Africa region is defined as an act of terrorism. What about the terrorism the regime has been perpetrating on its own population? Would that be forgotten if, for the sake of argument, Isaias decides to play by the rules of the game and stopped helping terrorist groups in Somalia and elsewhere?
As you are aware, the Eritrean government under President Isaias Afwerki has been committing serious violations of human rights over the past few years. At the risk of telling you what you already know, I must mention the fact that several appeals have been made by both Eritrean nationals and members of the international community addressing the following:
1. President Isaias ordered the arrest of many citizens, including former Ministers and generals of the national army. The detainees have been held incommunicado for six years, without charge. No one knows where they are, no lawyer or medical doctor of their choice can see them; their families are not allowed to visit them. Every time attempts are made to inquire into the reason for their arrest, the President and his spokesmen say that they committed acts of treason and sabotage without adducing evidence to support the claim. If there were any element of truth in the charge, the detainees would have been rushed to court and indicted immediately. Meanwhile the regime periodically unleashes a systematic hate campaign against them in order to have them condemned in the “court of public opinion.” But the public is not convinced of their guilt; far from it. Hence the decision of the government in not bringing them to court.
2. President Isaias has frustrated the democratic will of the people by suspending the implementation of the Constitution, using “the war with the Weyane” (Current Ethiopian government) and a “Weyane threat” as an excuse. With the suspension of the Constitution, the President has instituted an undeclared military government. All the civil rights guaranteed under the Constitution have been jettisoned, and the President rules by decree, using a captive “Parliament” to rubberstamp his decrees. And he dismissed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for pointing out that there was undue interference of the executive branch in judicial matters.
3. President Isiaias abolished the Private Newspapers that had made a promising beginning. He also arrested all their editors and principal reporters.
4. President Isaias has suppressed religious freedon and illegally deposed the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church.
5. In the most destructive move, the unelected President instituted a “national service” ordering an entire generation of Eritreans (the nation’s future) to be placed in military camps and trenches for an indefinite period of time. This is a most disruptive measure that is costing the nation immeasurably in wasted lives and squandered opportunities; hundreds of thousands of young p people (male and female) who could use their time to study and help their families and otherwise participate in the productive effort of a country have been forced to conditions of servitude without recourse and relief thus becoming demoralized. This we consider as an attack on our nation’s future. Thousands of youth have fled to neighboring countries, and beyond, at immense risk to their life. Indeed many have perished in the deserts of Libya and drowned at sea.
6. Being desperate for foreign exchange, the government has been confiscating hard currency brought by visiting members of their family who live in the Diaspora. The government has also been selling public land including to its bond-holders when the latter demanded the return of their money upon the maturation of the bond issued during the 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia. Such is its desperation, which has been aggravating its draconian measures and continued violation of human rights.
In view of the above, and considering the arrogant rejection by the government of Mr. Isaias Afwerki to all appeals, we have no alternative but to insist on requisite measures to sanction this lawless government. Without prejudice to your right to take or recommend sanctions that your government considers appropriate, I urge that the following measures be taken against the government of President Isaias Afwerki by the government of the United States:
1. A diplomatic boycott on President Isaias Afwerki and members of his cabinet of Ministers and other high-ranking members of his government, including refusal to issue visas.
2. Suspension of development aid, pending the implementation of the Constitution, the reinstatement of the Free Press and the release of all political prisoners.
3. Prohibition of all investments by American companies in Eritrea.
4. Causing the freezing of Eritrean assets in foreign banks.
5. Diplomatic campaign in support of the above-mentioned steps, especially in the European Union and its member governments.
I am confident that you will give this matter the attention it deserves. .
Respectfully,
Bereket Habte Selassie (Distinguished Professor)
The University of North Carolina, at Chapel Hill.
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington DC
Madam Secretary,
I am writing to you, not representing any political organization, but in my personal capacity, as a concerned American citizen of Eritrean origin. You will remember me, expressing grave concerns about the regime’s record of human rights violations and doubts about the possibility of a change of heart on the part of President Isaias Afwerki regarding the demands for democratic transition and observance of human rights. He has proved that he is not capable of change along those directions, and the victims of his detention centers and torture chambers provide ample evidence for this conclusion.
I have followed your thinking on the tragic situation in my homeland, including your latest remarks that sanctions are being considered as an option. From what I understand of your policy pronouncements so far, it seems that the basic rationale is that imposition of sanctions will induce change in the behavior of President’s Isaias in regard to his involvement in Somalia. His regime’s destabilizing activities in the Horn of Africa region is defined as an act of terrorism. What about the terrorism the regime has been perpetrating on its own population? Would that be forgotten if, for the sake of argument, Isaias decides to play by the rules of the game and stopped helping terrorist groups in Somalia and elsewhere?
As you are aware, the Eritrean government under President Isaias Afwerki has been committing serious violations of human rights over the past few years. At the risk of telling you what you already know, I must mention the fact that several appeals have been made by both Eritrean nationals and members of the international community addressing the following:
1. President Isaias ordered the arrest of many citizens, including former Ministers and generals of the national army. The detainees have been held incommunicado for six years, without charge. No one knows where they are, no lawyer or medical doctor of their choice can see them; their families are not allowed to visit them. Every time attempts are made to inquire into the reason for their arrest, the President and his spokesmen say that they committed acts of treason and sabotage without adducing evidence to support the claim. If there were any element of truth in the charge, the detainees would have been rushed to court and indicted immediately. Meanwhile the regime periodically unleashes a systematic hate campaign against them in order to have them condemned in the “court of public opinion.” But the public is not convinced of their guilt; far from it. Hence the decision of the government in not bringing them to court.
2. President Isaias has frustrated the democratic will of the people by suspending the implementation of the Constitution, using “the war with the Weyane” (Current Ethiopian government) and a “Weyane threat” as an excuse. With the suspension of the Constitution, the President has instituted an undeclared military government. All the civil rights guaranteed under the Constitution have been jettisoned, and the President rules by decree, using a captive “Parliament” to rubberstamp his decrees. And he dismissed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for pointing out that there was undue interference of the executive branch in judicial matters.
3. President Isiaias abolished the Private Newspapers that had made a promising beginning. He also arrested all their editors and principal reporters.
4. President Isaias has suppressed religious freedon and illegally deposed the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church.
5. In the most destructive move, the unelected President instituted a “national service” ordering an entire generation of Eritreans (the nation’s future) to be placed in military camps and trenches for an indefinite period of time. This is a most disruptive measure that is costing the nation immeasurably in wasted lives and squandered opportunities; hundreds of thousands of young p people (male and female) who could use their time to study and help their families and otherwise participate in the productive effort of a country have been forced to conditions of servitude without recourse and relief thus becoming demoralized. This we consider as an attack on our nation’s future. Thousands of youth have fled to neighboring countries, and beyond, at immense risk to their life. Indeed many have perished in the deserts of Libya and drowned at sea.
6. Being desperate for foreign exchange, the government has been confiscating hard currency brought by visiting members of their family who live in the Diaspora. The government has also been selling public land including to its bond-holders when the latter demanded the return of their money upon the maturation of the bond issued during the 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia. Such is its desperation, which has been aggravating its draconian measures and continued violation of human rights.
In view of the above, and considering the arrogant rejection by the government of Mr. Isaias Afwerki to all appeals, we have no alternative but to insist on requisite measures to sanction this lawless government. Without prejudice to your right to take or recommend sanctions that your government considers appropriate, I urge that the following measures be taken against the government of President Isaias Afwerki by the government of the United States:
1. A diplomatic boycott on President Isaias Afwerki and members of his cabinet of Ministers and other high-ranking members of his government, including refusal to issue visas.
2. Suspension of development aid, pending the implementation of the Constitution, the reinstatement of the Free Press and the release of all political prisoners.
3. Prohibition of all investments by American companies in Eritrea.
4. Causing the freezing of Eritrean assets in foreign banks.
5. Diplomatic campaign in support of the above-mentioned steps, especially in the European Union and its member governments.
I am confident that you will give this matter the attention it deserves. .
Respectfully,
Bereket Habte Selassie (Distinguished Professor)
The University of North Carolina, at Chapel Hill.
Saturday, September 08, 2007
ዘበነ ዓገብ
Friday, 07 September 2007
ዘበነ ዓገብ
ዘበነ ዓገብ ዶ በጺሕካ
ትማሊ ዓገብ ዝበሉኻ ዊሒጥካ
ብትዕቢት ትምክሕቲ ከምዘይተዛረብካ
ዝናዓቕካዮ ህዝቢ ሓገዙ ኣድልዩካ
ኣበይ እሞ ሕጂ ከድሕነካ
ጭራ ነብሪ እንዲኻ ዓትዒትካ
ጫማ ኣግፊሕካ ጠፊኡካ ዕቅንካ
ኣተርክሶ ጭሕምኻ ተማሃር ካብ ብጾትካ::
ጉድ እኮ ኢና ክንሰምዕ
ዓገብ ንዝበሎ ዘጥፍእ ዝበልዕ
ምልኪ ንምዕቃብ ብሃገር ዝጣላዕ
ክንዲ ዝስተር መሊሱ ይቕላዕ
ንብዓት ሓርገጽ ዘይፈልጥ ሪኢናዮ ክነብዕ::
ናቱስ ከኣ ደሓን ንስልጣኑ
ገደደ ናይቶም ንዕኡ ዝኣምኑ
ዝበሎም ክገብሩ ማይ ዝሓቕኑ
ናብ ዘይሰምዖም ደብሪ ዝደኑ::
ሓባል መጠመቲኣ ከም ትኩሓል
ዝጸቕጠካ እምኒ ንምንታይ ትፍንቕል
ትማሊ ከይዘራእካ ሎሚ ክትጉልጉል
ፍረ ትምክሕትኻ ሃየ በል ተቐበል::
ኻልድ ዓብዱ
ዮንሾቢንግ, ስዊድን
06/09/2007
ዘበነ ዓገብ
ዘበነ ዓገብ ዶ በጺሕካ
ትማሊ ዓገብ ዝበሉኻ ዊሒጥካ
ብትዕቢት ትምክሕቲ ከምዘይተዛረብካ
ዝናዓቕካዮ ህዝቢ ሓገዙ ኣድልዩካ
ኣበይ እሞ ሕጂ ከድሕነካ
ጭራ ነብሪ እንዲኻ ዓትዒትካ
ጫማ ኣግፊሕካ ጠፊኡካ ዕቅንካ
ኣተርክሶ ጭሕምኻ ተማሃር ካብ ብጾትካ::
ጉድ እኮ ኢና ክንሰምዕ
ዓገብ ንዝበሎ ዘጥፍእ ዝበልዕ
ምልኪ ንምዕቃብ ብሃገር ዝጣላዕ
ክንዲ ዝስተር መሊሱ ይቕላዕ
ንብዓት ሓርገጽ ዘይፈልጥ ሪኢናዮ ክነብዕ::
ናቱስ ከኣ ደሓን ንስልጣኑ
ገደደ ናይቶም ንዕኡ ዝኣምኑ
ዝበሎም ክገብሩ ማይ ዝሓቕኑ
ናብ ዘይሰምዖም ደብሪ ዝደኑ::
ሓባል መጠመቲኣ ከም ትኩሓል
ዝጸቕጠካ እምኒ ንምንታይ ትፍንቕል
ትማሊ ከይዘራእካ ሎሚ ክትጉልጉል
ፍረ ትምክሕትኻ ሃየ በል ተቐበል::
ኻልድ ዓብዱ
ዮንሾቢንግ, ስዊድን
06/09/2007
(Eritrea and Terrorism) Terrorism: in the Nature of the PFDJ
Terrorism: in the Nature of the PFDJ
05 Sep, 2007
Yosief Ghebrhiwet
(Eritrea and Terrorism)
If one is to understand the nature of terrorism that the Isayas regime sponsors, one has to primarily look at the nature of the PFDJ itself, especially those factors that make it unique among terrorism sponsoring organizations; for, in this case, the nature of the problem recommends its own solution. Two factors are often mentioned as to why the Eritrean state ought to be included in the state sponsors of terrorism list: for conducting domestic terrorism against its own people and for sponsoring regional terrorism. But there is a third one we haven’t looked so far: it is in the nature of PFDJ to conduct its affairs through confrontation only; as a dysfunctional entity, it knows no other way to relate itself to others. In assessing PFDJ’s “personality”, one has to look at its behavioral past, the principle that guides that behavior and the way it translates that principle on the ground.
The brand of terrorism that PFDJ espouses cannot be seen differently from the nature of PFDJ itself. First, the only “ideology” that explains almost every action that this organization has taken since its inception (as Shaebia) – that of “vulgar pragmatism” – also happens to explain best its brand of terrorism. Second, the “terrorism variable” permeates and dominates almost every aspect of decision taken in its domestic, regional and foreign policies as no other variable does; that is, the terrorism policy has attained an overarching status. And third, the terrorism we are witnessing today simply happens to be the logical extension of its confrontational past, where it used to get things done through force only. Although aspects of these three factors are to be found among the terrorism-sponsoring states, it is only in the Eritrean case that they converge in their unadulterated forms. Lets now look at these three factors in detail.
Vulgar pragmatism at work
Shaebia’s overarching “principle,” one that guides it in whatever it does, has been its vulgar pragmatism. The vulgar twist in its pragmatism is explained by the fact that it is guided by NO other higher economic, social, political, ideological or moral principle. The single objective of this pragmatism always remains the same: “Self-preservation of the regime above everything else!” The means of achieving this objective is: “Whatever it takes!” The only inhibiting question that it asks in pursuing its objective is: “Can I get away with it?” And particularly now, at a time when the PFDJ believes that the only “weapon of choice” it has for enforcing its domestic, regional and foreign policies is terrorism, this “pragmatic” choice turns out to be a fait accompli.
Among the terrorism-sponsoring states, what commonly holds true is that they at least share the “cause” of the terrorist groups they sponsor, be it religious fundamentalism, ethnicism or communism. That is not the case with Eritrea. True to its vulgar pragmatism, the Isayas regime’s terrorism policy has no “higher” religious, racial, ethnic, political, humanitarian or ideological principle that guides it. When it supports the Islamic fundamentalists in Somalia, it is not because it shares their religious zealotry. When it supports the South Sudanese, it is not because it sympathizes with them in their racial grievances (against the Arabs in the North). When it supports disgruntled Tigray elements, it is not because of ethnic solidarity. When it supports the Darfur cause, it is not because of the humanitarian disaster that has been unfolding in that region. When it supports many “democratic” elements from Ethiopia, it is not because it shares their concern for democracy. A good evidence that it doesn’t give a damn about the “causes” of these rebel groups is the fact that at the moment anyone of them fails to fit in its calculation of the survival game it pursues ruthlessly, it drops it nonchalantly with no qualms at all; the Sudanese story is a case in point.
The fact that the terrorism policy of the Isayas regime has an enduring pragmatic twist shouldn’t be confused for it being less pernicious than the ideologically driven ones, for it is precisely the lack of a higher guiding principle that makes it an enduring and ubiquitous phenomenon in whatever it does. It is probably instructional to notice that, odd as it may seem, there is something central to what they do that terrorism-sponsoring states and terrorism-fighting states share in common: an appeal to a higher cause. The former appeal to their fundamentalist ideologies for guidance. The latter appeal to liberal democracy for motivation to fight back. In the hands of the principle-less Shaebia though, terrorism becomes an extension of its confrontational past, a pragmatic tool of choice. And as such, while it keeps dropping one “cause” and adopting another, what remains invariable is the tool itself: terrorism. It is a habit instilled in it through decades of confrontation, one that it cannot wean itself out of, short of its final demise. In short, terrorism has become part of what it is, something that it cannot hold apart from itself.
The PFDJ’s confrontational past
There is something foolhardy, yet consistent, about PFDJ’s confrontational past in that it fails to discriminate among its “enemies,” irrespective of their weaknesses or strengths. It adopts the same confrontational stance in solving its “problems” against defenseless individuals (the elderly mediators, parents of deserters, handicapped veterans, etc.), influential foreign diplomats (ex: Ambassador Bandini), indispensable NGOs (ex: USAID), international media (BBC, Reuters, etc.) prestigious world institutions (Red Cross, UN, etc.) giant neighboring countries (Yemen, Sudan and Ethiopia) and mighty world powers (US and EU). In enforcing its domestic terrorism policy, it puts helpless elderly mediators and aging parents of deserters and draft dodgers behind bars. In pursuing its regional policy, it picks fights with all the neighboring countries and turns itself into a hub of all types of disgruntled elements. In enforcing its confrontational foreign policy, it bullies the UN (constraining their movement, shutting off their information outlets, selectively expelling their staff, etc.), harasses NGOs (constraining their activity, possessing their vehicles, expelling them out of the country, etc.) and antagonizes foreign diplomats (expels Ambassador Bandini, arrests American embassy employees, constrains the movements of Western diplomats, etc.). There is not a single major case in its past, where this organization (as PFDJ or as Shaebia) has solved its problem through peaceful means only. If this is not a well-established behavior of a dysfunctional entity whose confrontation-oriented worldview drives it to solve all of its perceived problems through confrontation only, nothing is. Thus, the Isayas regime’s excursion into easily identifiable form of terrorism (identifiable by the world body) is simply a logical extension of its confrontational past.
On first impression, it seems that this well established track of confrontational past of the regime goes against the pragmatism we are attributing to it, however vulgar it may be. But this needn’t be so, for Shaebia’s pragmatism has no inbuilt mechanism that warns it of impeding disaster. Its corrective mechanism works only after the fact; the only time it becomes aware of danger is when it is in the midst of it. It doesn’t allow itself any margin of error in whatever it does. It lacks eyes that warn it of an impeding wall ahead of it; the only way it would come to know about it is by bashing its head on it. The history of its mieda past is full of such wailing walls. That is why Shaebia’s history is a history of repeatedly coming back from the edge of disasters. And this phenomenon, instead of instilling caution in its behavior, has created a false sense of invincibility. The belief that it would eventually come out of any danger triumphant is the primary stuff out of which the true believers’ “Book of Miracles” is made. Now, it seems it has jumped into a quicksand where, unlike a wall, no bouncing back is ever possible.
Terrorism as a state policy
As a central policy for its survival, the PFDJ has been using terrorism as its main and only card in pursuing its domestic, regional and foreign policies. This record is unmatched by any other state sponsor of terror. Except for North Korea, none treats its own people the way the PFDJ does. And when it comes to outside its territory, North Korea’s terrorist threats have no bite at all.
In its domestic policy, the PFDJ gets things done through terror only. No consultations or legal proceedings are ever taken. If it wants land, it grabs it without any compensation. If an enterprise suddenly becomes profitable, it monopolizes it by bankrupting the “competing” merchants or businessmen. If it wants recruits for its army, it conducts giffa. If it wants to build a road, it uses slave labor. If it wants to stop desertion, it takes parents hostage. If it doesn’t like a religion, it throws its members into prison. That is how the government “communicates” with its subjects; it doesn’t know any better. That is how it is; violence is in its very nature.
The terror under which the Eritrean masses have been living is aptly summed up by a commentator by the name of Sereke who describes the nation as “the biggest open prison in the world.” That renders statements like “There are tens of thousands of prisoners in Eritrea” an understatement. To comprehend the labyrinthine prison system in Eritrea, think of a Warsai recently released from a prison, only to end up in “agelglot,” a huge prison in the wilderness, where hundreds of thousands of adults are quarantined for years without end. And if by any chance he succeeds in escaping from this hell-hole of never-ending slavery, he ends up somewhere in Eritrea where he has to remain hidden in fear – sometimes for years – until he either makes it to the neighboring countries or is fetched back by PFDJ authorities to repeat the same cycle of horror (if he is lucky). Probably, it is this state of a “prison within a prison within a prison” that describes the domestic terrorism in Eritrea the most. Imagine this system as being made of three concentric circles, one embedded in the other. In the outermost circle, we find four million inmates (the whole Eritrean population); in the middle circle, we finds the hundreds of thousands inmates (those in the military service); and in the inner most circle, we find the tens of thousands officially recognized prisoners. The misery index of a citizen is measured by how deep into this system of concentric circles he finds himself in.
PFDJ conducts its regional policy with the same ruthlessness and “pragmatism”. Eritrea’s neighbors (for instance, unlike North Korea's neighbors) are very susceptible to terrorism for various reasons. Ethnic, clan, religious, regional, racial and political strife is to be found in the region in abundance. With a willingness to arm, train and amply provide disgruntled elements, it is easy to exploit simmering antagonisms that have been there for decades and turn them into full blown confrontations. And that is what Eritrea has been doing; it has turned itself into a haven for all types of terrorists that are stocking the neighborhood. There is almost no armed movement in the region that at one time or another has not been supported by the regime. The despot’s intrusive hands are to be traced in all the recent terrorist undertakings in the region, including the hostage taking of the British and Ethiopian subjects in Afar and the on-going war in Somalia. Whatever the despot wants to achieve in the region is done through terrorism only; he cannot think of any other peaceful means to conduct his regional policy.
PFDJ’s confrontational foreign policy defines the relationship that it has had with three foreign entities that have been playing essential roles in the nation’s short history: NGOs, the UN and US (and EU). NGOs have played a vital role in staving off one disaster after another, beginning from Shaebia’s days in mieda to the border war; in the process, saving hundreds of thousands of lives from starvation. The UN, with its heavy presence in the TSZ, has been the sole guarantor of peace in the region for seven years; without its presence, we would have undergone many rounds of war by now. And the US and EU are two indispensable world powers who have helped the young nation economically more any other country in the world. Yet, in every single case, confrontation has been the only mode of communication that the dysfunctional government uses. Now there are no NGOs in the country; almost all of them have been expelled. It has also been abusing the UN from day one, as if it is some kind of foreign occupation force. And when it comes to the US, it has been stoking the embassy for years before it turned into a full blown opponent of American policy in the region.
The case of Sudan contains elements from the three terrorism policies mentioned above: domestic, regional and foreign. So lets take a closer look at it.
Blackmailing Sudan
The Sudanese case is a good example of how terrorism has evolved into the sole means through which the Isayas regime conducts its regional policy, one that is inextricably tied with its domestic and foreign policies. And not incidentally, the despot’s vulgar pragmatism seems to inform all the “diplomatic” maneuvers he takes in every turn of events.
Eritrea’s ever-gyrating relation with Sudan is a reflection of how the Isayas regime has been using the terrorism card “pragmatically,” for pragmatism demands that one be in accord with the varying, unfolding events. A few years back, the Asmara regime was the main supporter of all the rebel movements in South, East and West Sudan. With the peace agreement in South Sudan and with the newly found oil-wealth in the country, the Asmara regime realized that its chances of destabilizing Sudan to the extent it had aspired was getting slimmer by the day. Besides, the tension on its Ethiopian border was getting worse. So the despot decided to abruptly switch alliance, and dropped the “Darfur cause” and “convinced” the Eastern rebels to sit down at the peace table. After that, he became an ardent supporter of Sudan in the Darfur case, to the point of officially opposing “the UN interference in Sudan’s internal affair”.
The despot’s peace overtures to Sudan by no means indicate a change of heart in his terrorism policy. To the contrary, his professed eschewal of terrorism against Sudan is meant to pave the way for three other forms of terrorism, all dictated by changing times. First of all, in the case of Sudan itself, the tyrant has not abandoned terrorism as a weapon; he has only SUSPENDED it. It still exists in its potent form as a THREAT. He has left his options open by retaining an amiable relationship with most of the former rebel groups, in case he will need them sometime in the future. Eritrea’s dogged insistence to sit on the peace table – as a primary peace broker – in all the peace settlements that relate to Sudan is designed to keep its contact and influence with the rebel groups alive. The Sudanese government (another rogue state) realizes that it is being blackmailed. But at this point in time, with the ongoing conflict in Darfur and with all the fragile peace agreements still pending, it cannot afford to antagonize the Asmara regime. The Sudanese are no fools; they are only biding their time. And with their newly found wealth, it won’t be long before they turn the tables to their favor. For now though, they cannot but do Isayas’ bidding.
By successfully blackmailing Sudan, the despot has paved the way for two other forms of terrorism. One has to do with the domestic one. The Sudanese government has not only denied all opposition forces a foothold in its territory, it is also making life difficult for the Eritrean refugees; round-ups and threats of deportation have become daily reality to many of the refugees. It also gives a blind eye when the Eritrean army pursues deserters deep into its territory; and consequently, the military feels comfortable in ruthlessly implementing its shoot-at-sight policy on the Sudanese border. One of the main objectives that Isayas had in mind when he made peace with Sudan was to stem the flow of deserters, an alarming phenomenon that has been depleting the army at a fast rate (according to UNCHR, since 2003, more than 20 thousand refugees has made it to Sudan). Since Sudan has been the favorite destination for most of the escapees, that the despot saw a dividend in his rapprochement with the Sudanese government is only understandable. We could then easily see how regional terrorism (in its blackmail form) is used to foster domestic terrorism, which in turn would be used to extend the lifespan of the regime.
The other dividend that Isayas foresaw in the rapprochement was a safe passage to Ethiopia, one that would be used to transport all types of ethnic rebel movements that he has been grooming. With the TSZ spanning all along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border and with heavy militarization on both sides of the border, it has become next to impossible for Eritrea-based rebels to infiltrate Ethiopia through Eritrean territory. As soon as the Asmara regime made peace with Sudan, it began in earnest to transport these rebel elements through the Sudanese route. Given the long ragged borderline that Sudan shares with Ethiopia, this indeed makes strategic sense. The Sudanese are furious, but they have been giving it a blind eye for fear of jeopardizing the fragile peace treaties they had so laboriously clobbered together recently.
And last, we can even see how the tyrant is exploiting the situation in Sudan to conduct his foreign policy. His ambivalent stand on the Darfur conflict, supporting Sudan in its stand against the UN and the US while leaving his options with the rebel groups open, is an effort to make himself indispensable in the region; his message being that without him, the US would find it very difficult to make any peace agreement hold. In other words, he is attempting to blackmail the US into siding with him (at least, in not siding with Ethiopia), foolish as this endeavor may seem.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been to show that terrorism is in the nature of PFDJ. To talk about the PFDJ is to talk about its confrontational past, its vulgar pragmatism and its confrontational policy. First, in Shaebia’s past, there isn’t a single case where it has resolved a crisis through peaceful means; that, by itself, talks volumes. Second, the only “ideology” that this organization has been beholden to is that of vulgar pragmatism, where the end – the regime’s survival – justifies the means. And third, its domestic, regional and foreign policies are all conducted through terrorism, be it in its active or latent form.
If the above characterization of the PFDJ is true, the idea that it could be talked into changing its behavior is naïve. It is true when the despot has been cornered with his back on the wall; he is known to have momentarily relented, but only to revert back to his old confrontational habit once the pressure is lifted off him. That is to say, no weight should be given to his word, even if he is willing to suspend his activities in Somalia. He won’t rest until he finds ways of circumventing whatever restrictions are put on him.
We know that the US is currently considering to put Eritrea in the state sponsors of terror list. This article has been written with one single objective in mind: that, in its assessment, the US should pay enough attention to the dysfunctional nature of the PFDJ. It is not for nothing that one’s criminal records are always brought up in matters of importance, be in court or in employment. Similarly, PFDJ’s past, how it conducts its business and the ideology that guides its behavior are as good as anything in predicting its behavior in the future. This is an organization beyond redemption, and it should be treated as such.
05 Sep, 2007
Yosief Ghebrhiwet
(Eritrea and Terrorism)
If one is to understand the nature of terrorism that the Isayas regime sponsors, one has to primarily look at the nature of the PFDJ itself, especially those factors that make it unique among terrorism sponsoring organizations; for, in this case, the nature of the problem recommends its own solution. Two factors are often mentioned as to why the Eritrean state ought to be included in the state sponsors of terrorism list: for conducting domestic terrorism against its own people and for sponsoring regional terrorism. But there is a third one we haven’t looked so far: it is in the nature of PFDJ to conduct its affairs through confrontation only; as a dysfunctional entity, it knows no other way to relate itself to others. In assessing PFDJ’s “personality”, one has to look at its behavioral past, the principle that guides that behavior and the way it translates that principle on the ground.
The brand of terrorism that PFDJ espouses cannot be seen differently from the nature of PFDJ itself. First, the only “ideology” that explains almost every action that this organization has taken since its inception (as Shaebia) – that of “vulgar pragmatism” – also happens to explain best its brand of terrorism. Second, the “terrorism variable” permeates and dominates almost every aspect of decision taken in its domestic, regional and foreign policies as no other variable does; that is, the terrorism policy has attained an overarching status. And third, the terrorism we are witnessing today simply happens to be the logical extension of its confrontational past, where it used to get things done through force only. Although aspects of these three factors are to be found among the terrorism-sponsoring states, it is only in the Eritrean case that they converge in their unadulterated forms. Lets now look at these three factors in detail.
Vulgar pragmatism at work
Shaebia’s overarching “principle,” one that guides it in whatever it does, has been its vulgar pragmatism. The vulgar twist in its pragmatism is explained by the fact that it is guided by NO other higher economic, social, political, ideological or moral principle. The single objective of this pragmatism always remains the same: “Self-preservation of the regime above everything else!” The means of achieving this objective is: “Whatever it takes!” The only inhibiting question that it asks in pursuing its objective is: “Can I get away with it?” And particularly now, at a time when the PFDJ believes that the only “weapon of choice” it has for enforcing its domestic, regional and foreign policies is terrorism, this “pragmatic” choice turns out to be a fait accompli.
Among the terrorism-sponsoring states, what commonly holds true is that they at least share the “cause” of the terrorist groups they sponsor, be it religious fundamentalism, ethnicism or communism. That is not the case with Eritrea. True to its vulgar pragmatism, the Isayas regime’s terrorism policy has no “higher” religious, racial, ethnic, political, humanitarian or ideological principle that guides it. When it supports the Islamic fundamentalists in Somalia, it is not because it shares their religious zealotry. When it supports the South Sudanese, it is not because it sympathizes with them in their racial grievances (against the Arabs in the North). When it supports disgruntled Tigray elements, it is not because of ethnic solidarity. When it supports the Darfur cause, it is not because of the humanitarian disaster that has been unfolding in that region. When it supports many “democratic” elements from Ethiopia, it is not because it shares their concern for democracy. A good evidence that it doesn’t give a damn about the “causes” of these rebel groups is the fact that at the moment anyone of them fails to fit in its calculation of the survival game it pursues ruthlessly, it drops it nonchalantly with no qualms at all; the Sudanese story is a case in point.
The fact that the terrorism policy of the Isayas regime has an enduring pragmatic twist shouldn’t be confused for it being less pernicious than the ideologically driven ones, for it is precisely the lack of a higher guiding principle that makes it an enduring and ubiquitous phenomenon in whatever it does. It is probably instructional to notice that, odd as it may seem, there is something central to what they do that terrorism-sponsoring states and terrorism-fighting states share in common: an appeal to a higher cause. The former appeal to their fundamentalist ideologies for guidance. The latter appeal to liberal democracy for motivation to fight back. In the hands of the principle-less Shaebia though, terrorism becomes an extension of its confrontational past, a pragmatic tool of choice. And as such, while it keeps dropping one “cause” and adopting another, what remains invariable is the tool itself: terrorism. It is a habit instilled in it through decades of confrontation, one that it cannot wean itself out of, short of its final demise. In short, terrorism has become part of what it is, something that it cannot hold apart from itself.
The PFDJ’s confrontational past
There is something foolhardy, yet consistent, about PFDJ’s confrontational past in that it fails to discriminate among its “enemies,” irrespective of their weaknesses or strengths. It adopts the same confrontational stance in solving its “problems” against defenseless individuals (the elderly mediators, parents of deserters, handicapped veterans, etc.), influential foreign diplomats (ex: Ambassador Bandini), indispensable NGOs (ex: USAID), international media (BBC, Reuters, etc.) prestigious world institutions (Red Cross, UN, etc.) giant neighboring countries (Yemen, Sudan and Ethiopia) and mighty world powers (US and EU). In enforcing its domestic terrorism policy, it puts helpless elderly mediators and aging parents of deserters and draft dodgers behind bars. In pursuing its regional policy, it picks fights with all the neighboring countries and turns itself into a hub of all types of disgruntled elements. In enforcing its confrontational foreign policy, it bullies the UN (constraining their movement, shutting off their information outlets, selectively expelling their staff, etc.), harasses NGOs (constraining their activity, possessing their vehicles, expelling them out of the country, etc.) and antagonizes foreign diplomats (expels Ambassador Bandini, arrests American embassy employees, constrains the movements of Western diplomats, etc.). There is not a single major case in its past, where this organization (as PFDJ or as Shaebia) has solved its problem through peaceful means only. If this is not a well-established behavior of a dysfunctional entity whose confrontation-oriented worldview drives it to solve all of its perceived problems through confrontation only, nothing is. Thus, the Isayas regime’s excursion into easily identifiable form of terrorism (identifiable by the world body) is simply a logical extension of its confrontational past.
On first impression, it seems that this well established track of confrontational past of the regime goes against the pragmatism we are attributing to it, however vulgar it may be. But this needn’t be so, for Shaebia’s pragmatism has no inbuilt mechanism that warns it of impeding disaster. Its corrective mechanism works only after the fact; the only time it becomes aware of danger is when it is in the midst of it. It doesn’t allow itself any margin of error in whatever it does. It lacks eyes that warn it of an impeding wall ahead of it; the only way it would come to know about it is by bashing its head on it. The history of its mieda past is full of such wailing walls. That is why Shaebia’s history is a history of repeatedly coming back from the edge of disasters. And this phenomenon, instead of instilling caution in its behavior, has created a false sense of invincibility. The belief that it would eventually come out of any danger triumphant is the primary stuff out of which the true believers’ “Book of Miracles” is made. Now, it seems it has jumped into a quicksand where, unlike a wall, no bouncing back is ever possible.
Terrorism as a state policy
As a central policy for its survival, the PFDJ has been using terrorism as its main and only card in pursuing its domestic, regional and foreign policies. This record is unmatched by any other state sponsor of terror. Except for North Korea, none treats its own people the way the PFDJ does. And when it comes to outside its territory, North Korea’s terrorist threats have no bite at all.
In its domestic policy, the PFDJ gets things done through terror only. No consultations or legal proceedings are ever taken. If it wants land, it grabs it without any compensation. If an enterprise suddenly becomes profitable, it monopolizes it by bankrupting the “competing” merchants or businessmen. If it wants recruits for its army, it conducts giffa. If it wants to build a road, it uses slave labor. If it wants to stop desertion, it takes parents hostage. If it doesn’t like a religion, it throws its members into prison. That is how the government “communicates” with its subjects; it doesn’t know any better. That is how it is; violence is in its very nature.
The terror under which the Eritrean masses have been living is aptly summed up by a commentator by the name of Sereke who describes the nation as “the biggest open prison in the world.” That renders statements like “There are tens of thousands of prisoners in Eritrea” an understatement. To comprehend the labyrinthine prison system in Eritrea, think of a Warsai recently released from a prison, only to end up in “agelglot,” a huge prison in the wilderness, where hundreds of thousands of adults are quarantined for years without end. And if by any chance he succeeds in escaping from this hell-hole of never-ending slavery, he ends up somewhere in Eritrea where he has to remain hidden in fear – sometimes for years – until he either makes it to the neighboring countries or is fetched back by PFDJ authorities to repeat the same cycle of horror (if he is lucky). Probably, it is this state of a “prison within a prison within a prison” that describes the domestic terrorism in Eritrea the most. Imagine this system as being made of three concentric circles, one embedded in the other. In the outermost circle, we find four million inmates (the whole Eritrean population); in the middle circle, we finds the hundreds of thousands inmates (those in the military service); and in the inner most circle, we find the tens of thousands officially recognized prisoners. The misery index of a citizen is measured by how deep into this system of concentric circles he finds himself in.
PFDJ conducts its regional policy with the same ruthlessness and “pragmatism”. Eritrea’s neighbors (for instance, unlike North Korea's neighbors) are very susceptible to terrorism for various reasons. Ethnic, clan, religious, regional, racial and political strife is to be found in the region in abundance. With a willingness to arm, train and amply provide disgruntled elements, it is easy to exploit simmering antagonisms that have been there for decades and turn them into full blown confrontations. And that is what Eritrea has been doing; it has turned itself into a haven for all types of terrorists that are stocking the neighborhood. There is almost no armed movement in the region that at one time or another has not been supported by the regime. The despot’s intrusive hands are to be traced in all the recent terrorist undertakings in the region, including the hostage taking of the British and Ethiopian subjects in Afar and the on-going war in Somalia. Whatever the despot wants to achieve in the region is done through terrorism only; he cannot think of any other peaceful means to conduct his regional policy.
PFDJ’s confrontational foreign policy defines the relationship that it has had with three foreign entities that have been playing essential roles in the nation’s short history: NGOs, the UN and US (and EU). NGOs have played a vital role in staving off one disaster after another, beginning from Shaebia’s days in mieda to the border war; in the process, saving hundreds of thousands of lives from starvation. The UN, with its heavy presence in the TSZ, has been the sole guarantor of peace in the region for seven years; without its presence, we would have undergone many rounds of war by now. And the US and EU are two indispensable world powers who have helped the young nation economically more any other country in the world. Yet, in every single case, confrontation has been the only mode of communication that the dysfunctional government uses. Now there are no NGOs in the country; almost all of them have been expelled. It has also been abusing the UN from day one, as if it is some kind of foreign occupation force. And when it comes to the US, it has been stoking the embassy for years before it turned into a full blown opponent of American policy in the region.
The case of Sudan contains elements from the three terrorism policies mentioned above: domestic, regional and foreign. So lets take a closer look at it.
Blackmailing Sudan
The Sudanese case is a good example of how terrorism has evolved into the sole means through which the Isayas regime conducts its regional policy, one that is inextricably tied with its domestic and foreign policies. And not incidentally, the despot’s vulgar pragmatism seems to inform all the “diplomatic” maneuvers he takes in every turn of events.
Eritrea’s ever-gyrating relation with Sudan is a reflection of how the Isayas regime has been using the terrorism card “pragmatically,” for pragmatism demands that one be in accord with the varying, unfolding events. A few years back, the Asmara regime was the main supporter of all the rebel movements in South, East and West Sudan. With the peace agreement in South Sudan and with the newly found oil-wealth in the country, the Asmara regime realized that its chances of destabilizing Sudan to the extent it had aspired was getting slimmer by the day. Besides, the tension on its Ethiopian border was getting worse. So the despot decided to abruptly switch alliance, and dropped the “Darfur cause” and “convinced” the Eastern rebels to sit down at the peace table. After that, he became an ardent supporter of Sudan in the Darfur case, to the point of officially opposing “the UN interference in Sudan’s internal affair”.
The despot’s peace overtures to Sudan by no means indicate a change of heart in his terrorism policy. To the contrary, his professed eschewal of terrorism against Sudan is meant to pave the way for three other forms of terrorism, all dictated by changing times. First of all, in the case of Sudan itself, the tyrant has not abandoned terrorism as a weapon; he has only SUSPENDED it. It still exists in its potent form as a THREAT. He has left his options open by retaining an amiable relationship with most of the former rebel groups, in case he will need them sometime in the future. Eritrea’s dogged insistence to sit on the peace table – as a primary peace broker – in all the peace settlements that relate to Sudan is designed to keep its contact and influence with the rebel groups alive. The Sudanese government (another rogue state) realizes that it is being blackmailed. But at this point in time, with the ongoing conflict in Darfur and with all the fragile peace agreements still pending, it cannot afford to antagonize the Asmara regime. The Sudanese are no fools; they are only biding their time. And with their newly found wealth, it won’t be long before they turn the tables to their favor. For now though, they cannot but do Isayas’ bidding.
By successfully blackmailing Sudan, the despot has paved the way for two other forms of terrorism. One has to do with the domestic one. The Sudanese government has not only denied all opposition forces a foothold in its territory, it is also making life difficult for the Eritrean refugees; round-ups and threats of deportation have become daily reality to many of the refugees. It also gives a blind eye when the Eritrean army pursues deserters deep into its territory; and consequently, the military feels comfortable in ruthlessly implementing its shoot-at-sight policy on the Sudanese border. One of the main objectives that Isayas had in mind when he made peace with Sudan was to stem the flow of deserters, an alarming phenomenon that has been depleting the army at a fast rate (according to UNCHR, since 2003, more than 20 thousand refugees has made it to Sudan). Since Sudan has been the favorite destination for most of the escapees, that the despot saw a dividend in his rapprochement with the Sudanese government is only understandable. We could then easily see how regional terrorism (in its blackmail form) is used to foster domestic terrorism, which in turn would be used to extend the lifespan of the regime.
The other dividend that Isayas foresaw in the rapprochement was a safe passage to Ethiopia, one that would be used to transport all types of ethnic rebel movements that he has been grooming. With the TSZ spanning all along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border and with heavy militarization on both sides of the border, it has become next to impossible for Eritrea-based rebels to infiltrate Ethiopia through Eritrean territory. As soon as the Asmara regime made peace with Sudan, it began in earnest to transport these rebel elements through the Sudanese route. Given the long ragged borderline that Sudan shares with Ethiopia, this indeed makes strategic sense. The Sudanese are furious, but they have been giving it a blind eye for fear of jeopardizing the fragile peace treaties they had so laboriously clobbered together recently.
And last, we can even see how the tyrant is exploiting the situation in Sudan to conduct his foreign policy. His ambivalent stand on the Darfur conflict, supporting Sudan in its stand against the UN and the US while leaving his options with the rebel groups open, is an effort to make himself indispensable in the region; his message being that without him, the US would find it very difficult to make any peace agreement hold. In other words, he is attempting to blackmail the US into siding with him (at least, in not siding with Ethiopia), foolish as this endeavor may seem.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been to show that terrorism is in the nature of PFDJ. To talk about the PFDJ is to talk about its confrontational past, its vulgar pragmatism and its confrontational policy. First, in Shaebia’s past, there isn’t a single case where it has resolved a crisis through peaceful means; that, by itself, talks volumes. Second, the only “ideology” that this organization has been beholden to is that of vulgar pragmatism, where the end – the regime’s survival – justifies the means. And third, its domestic, regional and foreign policies are all conducted through terrorism, be it in its active or latent form.
If the above characterization of the PFDJ is true, the idea that it could be talked into changing its behavior is naïve. It is true when the despot has been cornered with his back on the wall; he is known to have momentarily relented, but only to revert back to his old confrontational habit once the pressure is lifted off him. That is to say, no weight should be given to his word, even if he is willing to suspend his activities in Somalia. He won’t rest until he finds ways of circumventing whatever restrictions are put on him.
We know that the US is currently considering to put Eritrea in the state sponsors of terror list. This article has been written with one single objective in mind: that, in its assessment, the US should pay enough attention to the dysfunctional nature of the PFDJ. It is not for nothing that one’s criminal records are always brought up in matters of importance, be in court or in employment. Similarly, PFDJ’s past, how it conducts its business and the ideology that guides its behavior are as good as anything in predicting its behavior in the future. This is an organization beyond redemption, and it should be treated as such.
Tuesday, August 14, 2007
State TV editor goes missing while trying to flee across border into Ethiopia
13 August 2007
State TV editor goes missing while trying to flee across border into Ethiopia
Reporters Without Borders voiced concern today about the fate of Johnny Hisabu, an editor with state-owned Eri-TV, who disappeared in late May after trying to flee across the border into Ethiopia. There are unconfirmed reports that he was arrested and has been held ever since in a detention centre in the southwestern town of Barentu.
“Forced to function as a cog in the official propaganda machine, Johnny was one of the hundreds of Eritreans who each month try to flee the hell on earth created by one of the world’s most authoritarian regimes,” the press freedom organisation said. “The regime’s only reaction to this exodus, which includes journalists and media technicians, is more cruelty and intolerance.”
Reporters Without Borders added: “It is time that President Issaias Afeworki, who portrays himself as a guarantor of national unity, realised that he has turned the country into a gigantic prison.”
Johnny has not been seen at his post in the information ministry-run team of TV editors since his departure in late May. It was around that time that Eyob Kessete, a journalist with the Amharic-language service of the public radio station Dimtsi Hafash, was arrested by border guards as he tried to cross into Ethiopia. Kessete has since been held in a prison in May Srwa, northwest of Asmara.
Johnny decided to flee to neighbouring Ethiopia in part because he is a member of the so-called “Amiche” community of Eritreans who were born or raised in Ethiopia prior to independence and because he therefore still has relatives there.
Attempts by Reporters Without Borders to locate him in the Eritrean refugee camps in Ethiopia have so far been unsuccessful. At the same time, there are unconfirmed reports that he was arrested when border guards intercepted the group of refugees he was travelling with, and that he has since been held at a detention centre in Barentu.
Reporters Without Borders has meanwhile learned that Eri-TV Arabic-language service presenter Fetiha Khaled (whose first name was previously given in error as Fathia), was transferred to a military camp near the Sudanese border following her arrest at the start of this year, and that her salary is now being paid by the defence ministry, suggesting that she was forcibly recruited into the army.
Fetiha was one of nine public media journalists arrested in a crackdown that began last November, after the defection of several prominent journalists. They were held on suspicion of staying in contact with the defectors or planning to flee the country themselves.
This group included Paulos Kidane, a journalist with the Amharic-language service of Eri-TV and radio Dimtsi Hafash, who died in still unclear circumstances in June in an attempt to flee on foot across the border into Sudan.
State TV editor goes missing while trying to flee across border into Ethiopia
Reporters Without Borders voiced concern today about the fate of Johnny Hisabu, an editor with state-owned Eri-TV, who disappeared in late May after trying to flee across the border into Ethiopia. There are unconfirmed reports that he was arrested and has been held ever since in a detention centre in the southwestern town of Barentu.
“Forced to function as a cog in the official propaganda machine, Johnny was one of the hundreds of Eritreans who each month try to flee the hell on earth created by one of the world’s most authoritarian regimes,” the press freedom organisation said. “The regime’s only reaction to this exodus, which includes journalists and media technicians, is more cruelty and intolerance.”
Reporters Without Borders added: “It is time that President Issaias Afeworki, who portrays himself as a guarantor of national unity, realised that he has turned the country into a gigantic prison.”
Johnny has not been seen at his post in the information ministry-run team of TV editors since his departure in late May. It was around that time that Eyob Kessete, a journalist with the Amharic-language service of the public radio station Dimtsi Hafash, was arrested by border guards as he tried to cross into Ethiopia. Kessete has since been held in a prison in May Srwa, northwest of Asmara.
Johnny decided to flee to neighbouring Ethiopia in part because he is a member of the so-called “Amiche” community of Eritreans who were born or raised in Ethiopia prior to independence and because he therefore still has relatives there.
Attempts by Reporters Without Borders to locate him in the Eritrean refugee camps in Ethiopia have so far been unsuccessful. At the same time, there are unconfirmed reports that he was arrested when border guards intercepted the group of refugees he was travelling with, and that he has since been held at a detention centre in Barentu.
Reporters Without Borders has meanwhile learned that Eri-TV Arabic-language service presenter Fetiha Khaled (whose first name was previously given in error as Fathia), was transferred to a military camp near the Sudanese border following her arrest at the start of this year, and that her salary is now being paid by the defence ministry, suggesting that she was forcibly recruited into the army.
Fetiha was one of nine public media journalists arrested in a crackdown that began last November, after the defection of several prominent journalists. They were held on suspicion of staying in contact with the defectors or planning to flee the country themselves.
This group included Paulos Kidane, a journalist with the Amharic-language service of Eri-TV and radio Dimtsi Hafash, who died in still unclear circumstances in June in an attempt to flee on foot across the border into Sudan.
U.S. Policy in the Horn of Africa
U.S. Policy in the Horn of Africa
James Swan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
4th International Conference on Ethiopian Development Studies
Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan
August 4, 2007
As Delivered
Good afternoon, and thank you, professor for inviting me to join you in Kalamazoo. I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss U.S. policy and engagement in the Horn of Africa. You have assembled an impressive and distinguished group of panelists for this important conference.
THE CURRENT SITUATION
As all of you know, the Horn of Africa is a rough neighborhood. At least one conflict – and frequently more – has raged in the region continuously since 1960. Inter-state conventional wars. Guerrilla-style liberation struggles. Coups. Revolutions. The Horn has seen them all.
It is also a region that has suffered historically from poor governance -- from the brutal excesses of Ethiopia’s Derg, to authoritarian one-party systems in much of the region until the 1990s, to the lawlessness of the failed state of Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre. Winner-take-all politics and violent regime change have been the norm. And this historically unstable political and security climate has been a profound impediment to economic development.
The Horn ranks near the bottom in the world – and indeed below the rest of Africa - on Human Development indicators. The region is ecologically and economically fragile. Its peoples face the challenges of overwhelming dependence on rain-fed agriculture, as regular droughts trigger cyclical famines.
Yet, despite these longstanding challenges, in most of the region we see signs of progress. Djibouti has held peaceful elections; its port has become an economic hub; and the government has become a partner in counterterrorism efforts. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government offers the best hope for peace and stability in the last 20 years. Ethiopia has made progress on democratic governance with the release of political party detainees and parliamentary discussions on electoral and media reform. Kenya, which has been spared the conflicts that have impeded the development of its neighbors, has become an economic powerhouse, has made tremendous strides to consolidate democracy, and plays a lead role in complex regional peace initiatives. Moreover, all of these countries and governments are increasingly close partners of the United States in the Horn of Africa.
The glaring exception to this favorable story is of course Eritrea, which openly abuses its population and serves as a destabilizing force in the region. I’ll come to that later.
While progress is fitful, and additional diplomatic and aid resources will be necessary to sustain success, the overall trajectory of the Horn is positive.
In keeping with Secretary Rice’s concept of Transformational Diplomacy, United States government policy in the region focuses on partnership, while promoting regional stability and security, strengthening democratic processes and institutions, fostering economic growth, expanding the scope and quality of basic services, and responding to the humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations.
The Horn is a region where Muslims and Christians coexist and intermingle, and where the cultures of ancient Ethiopia, of traditional Africa, and of the Arab-influenced coastal regions have combined in different ways to create unique national and regional identities. It is a region in which all of our Embassies and their officers are working to demonstrate our respect for different faith traditions and to promote our commitment to religious tolerance, political rights, and gender equality.
While our Embassies are the U.S. Government’s principal platforms for promoting effective cooperation, governance reform and sustainable development, we also have a great asset in the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa in Djibouti. This U.S. military initiative provides a vehicle for outreach to vulnerable communities in the region and for contributing to the professionalization and effectiveness of armed forces in the Horn.
So let me now discuss current developments and some of the key U.S. interests and policies in each of the countries of the Horn.
DJIBOUTI
I’ll begin with Djibouti – which rarely gets top billing in a discussion of the Horn, but will today -- and then move clockwise through the region. Djibouti, which celebrated the 30th anniversary of its independence in June, in many ways epitomizes both the progress and the challenges we see on the Horn.
With the end of the conflict with the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) in the 1990s, and the return of the Front’s leader to Djibouti in 2000, Djibouti has moved beyond violent conflict. General elections in 1999 and 2003 were orderly and peaceful, despite a boycott by the major opposition coalition. Some opposition members are represented in local and regional councils. More needs to be done to open up political space and ensure that all citizens have a voice in government decisions. But the transition from armed combat to political competition is a positive step.
On the economic front, Djibouti remains a poor country with per capita income below $1000. Yet it has a vision for development of its key assets – its port and strategic location along major sea-transport routes. Port tonnage – which tripled after the 1998 Eritrea-Ethiopia border war which cut access to Assab – has increase 30 percent per year between 2002 and 2004 under new management of Djibouti port. And Djibouti aspires to become an international hub for transit cargo serving not only the horn of Africa hinterland, but a much wider worldwide clientele.
The United States, which has long had good relations with Djibouti, has seen this partnership further deepen in recent years. Since 2002, Djibouti has hosted the only permanent U.S. military base in sub-Saharan Africa, (CJFF-HOA)... We also value Djibouti’s diplomatic role in the region, as a bridge among other countries in the Horn and between African and Arab states.
So in Djibouti, we see a country that has ended a protracted violent conflict, begun important steps toward greater political openness, developed a vision for its economic future, and engaged in a close partnership with the United States.
SOMALIA
Now let me turn to Somalia – a country that, for all its problems, has perhaps the best opportunity in nearly two decades to overcome its status as a failed state. Somalia is a priority for the United States in Africa. U.S. policy is designed to promote stability in Somalia – including by preventing Somalia from again becoming a safehaven for terrorists, as it was under the Council of Islamic Courts – to support humanitarian and development needs, and to foster inclusive democratic institutions.
The key to Somalia’s success will be national reconciliation to ensure inclusive representation in the Transitional Federal Institutions and in the organizations that will prepare the way for election of a permanent government in 2009, as called for by the Transitional Federal Charter.
The National Reconciliation Congress, which opened in Mogadishu on July 15 and is still ongoing, provides an opportunity for all Somalis to achieve suitable representation in the TFIs and formulate a roadmap for the remainder of the transitional period, in the run-up to national elections in 2009. In support of the National Reconciliation Congress, the United States has provided financial assistance of $1.25 million, in coordination with other international donors. Our Ambassador in Nairobi and our Special Envoy for Somalia are in frequent contact with congress organizer Ali Mahdi Mohamed, with Transitional Federal Government leaders, with clan elders, with civil society leaders, and a wide array of other stakeholders to encourage support for this process.
We believe it is important for the Somali people to focus on the future, moving forward in the transitional political process as envisioned by the Charter, rather than focusing only on the current composition of the Transitional Federal Government and Institutions. While imperfect, the Transitional Federal Institutions provide a framework for achieving the objectives outlined in the Charter and the formation of representative governance institutions following the transitional process. We are steering clear from Somali politics and focusing on a clear message of inclusion and accommodation to all actors in Somalia.
To help stabilize Somalia and create conditions for national reconciliation, the United States strongly supports the African Union’s peace support mission in Somalia. The mission currently has a lead contingent of approximately 1,600 Ugandan troops deployed as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). At the beginning of the year, the United States identified $19.6 million to assist AMISOM forces. Approximately $10 million was used to provide equipment and airlift to assist the deployment of Uganda’s AMISOM contingent. Congress subsequently appropriated a further $40 million in funding to support AMISOM.
AMISOM is important not only to help create conditions for national reconciliation, but also to permit the reduction in presence of Ethiopian forces and their eventual departure. We, the Somalis, and the Ethiopians themselves recognize that an Ethiopian military presence is not a long-term solution to insecurity in Somalia. For there to be lasting security, there must be political dialogue and accommodation among Somalis, improvements in Somali government capacity, and training and deployment of a competent and respected Somali security force.
The United States is the largest bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, and has provided more than $102 million in humanitarian and development assistance this year. We also coordinate closely with other international partners diplomatically and on our international assistance programs. We were founding members of the International Contact Group on Somalia in June 2006, and also are active in the International Advisory Committee for the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC).
In short, there is an international consensus that we must seize this moment of opportunity in Somalia. The United States is a leader on both the diplomatic front and in our humanitarian and economic response.
KENYA
Next let me say just a few words about Kenya, which is not always discussed as part of the Horn of Africa, but lies on its southern edge and is an important regional player. Nairobi hosts the largest U.S. diplomatic mission in Sub-Saharan Africa, and we cooperate with the Kenyans on a wide array of both bilateral and regional programs. Our bilateral assistance program is more than $500 million in 2007. Total resource flows from the U.S. to Kenya each year from all public and private sources amount to about $1.5 billion.
Kenya’s peaceful, credible democratic elections in 2002 represented an important step on Kenya’s path to becoming a fully functional democracy. The next elections, scheduled for December 2007 offer an opportunity to consolidate those gains. The U.S. is providing election-related training to civil society organizations, political parties, and youth and women candidates, as well as supporting the work of the Electoral Commission of Kenya to ensure that these elections are free, fair, and transparent.
Kenya is beginning to enjoy the fruits of its enviable regional reputation for stability, openness, and tolerance. Economic growth has increased to more than 6 percent in recent years, as Kenya capitalizes on its role as a major regional hub. While important challenges remain – specifically in combating corruption, moving away from tribalism, and promoting gender equity – there is a palpable sense of energy and optimism among the Kenyan people. Kenya is clearly a country on the move in a positive direction.
We have worked closely with the Kenyans diplomatically on the North-South peace agreement in Sudan and on Somalia issues, through the International Contact Group as well as bilaterally. In its capacity as President of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Kenya continues to occupy a leadership role in promoting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. We look forward to continued close partnership.
ETHIOPIA
Now, Ethiopia, which has been the subject of your conference. With more than 70 million people, bordering all of the other Horn countries, Ethiopia is the giant of the region. Ethiopia is an important strategic partner for the United States in the Horn of Africa. We collaborate on a wide range of development objectives and in efforts to promote regional stability. We share a commitment to address threats by transnational extremist groups.
We are also eager to see progress in democratic institutions. As you know, the run-up to the May 2005 national elections was the most open, free, and competitive political campaign period in all of Ethiopian history. Never before had opposition candidates had so much access to coveted constituencies and the ability to convene rallies and openly campaign against ruling party opponents.
Opposition candidates’ access to the press, including state-owned and operated media, was unprecedented. Never before had the electorate seen live, televised debates between government Ministers and their opposition challengers.
Unfortunately, this spirit was lost in the contentious aftermath of the vote, in bloody confrontations in the streets, in detention of political leaders, and in strident and uncompromising positions that for too long dominated the political leadership. As we consider the democratic challenges facing Ethiopia today, we recognize that sentiment has been so bitter precisely because of the heightened expectations prompted by two decades of political reform.
With the release of 38 detainees, and anticipated release of the remaining Coalition for Unity and Democracy leadership, and anticipated release of the remaining CUD leadership, following lengthy mediation by respected elders, Ethiopia’s political leaders have committed themselves to a new collaborative relationship for the good of the country. In Addis Ababa, U.S. foreign assistance programs are bringing together leaders from across the political spectrum to address critical questions of national governance and the future of the country, build the capacity of parliament, and bolster judicial independence.
We are again seeing a cautious, yet engaged host of political parties that are committed to institutionalizing the advances of March and April 2005. That ruling and opposition parties today gather around the negotiating table to debate the relative merits of reforms of democratic institutions is extremely positive.
We must all encourage this process. As stakeholders in Ethiopia's stability, democracy, and prosperity – we urge all parties to remain engaged, so that we can regain the advances of early 2005 and build upon them for the people of Ethiopia.
Meanwhile, we continue a robust program of U.S. humanitarian and development assistance for Ethiopia. We have contributed more than $160 million in humanitarian assistance this year to help the Ethiopian people break the cycle of famine and mitigate the impact of drought and natural disasters. With over $300 million in assistance to the health care system in Ethiopia this year alone, we help ensure that clinics reach into previously underserved regions including Afar and the Ogaden.
With respect to the Ogaden, we are concerned that insecurity and impediments to commercial sales of commodities put the population of this fragile region at further risk. We are currently working with the government to ensure that humanitarian assistance and the more important commercial shipments can flow to the Ogaden. We note that rains have been relatively good this year, which should ease the economic hardship faced by the pastoralist population.
In conflict-prone areas, U.S. programs bring together representatives from diverse communities during periods of calm, in order to build bridges of understanding and prevent potential conflicts from erupting. We are working with local administrations to build their capacity to govern for the people and to promote transparency. We are working with the Ethiopian military to transform that organization into a professional and apolitical defense force for the nation. The challenges are many, but the objectives merit the tremendous scope of the resources, time, and commitment that we have focused on them. We are confident that through partnership with local stakeholders, together we will contribute to making Ethiopia more secure, more democratic, and more prosperous for the next generation.
A STEP BACKWARD: ERITREA
Now, let me turn to Eritrea. While the rest of the Horn of Africa is making political, economic, and social advances and seizing opportunities -- albeit with periodic important setbacks -- the opposite is true for Eritrea.
Eritrea has experienced economic decline and a lack of freedoms, for the press and political expression. There is widespread and arbitrary conscription. The government has worked to destabilize its neighbors, including Ethiopia and Somalia.
Given the American penchant for supporting the underdog, it is disheartening to see what has become of Eritrea in the 14 years since it gained independence and produced a praiseworthy constitution. President Isaias Afwerki has become increasingly tyrannical and megalomaniacal. He has actively sought to destabilize the Horn, fueling regional insurgencies and supporting groups affiliated with terrorists.
Eritrean Government policies have also choked the Eritrean economy and consolidated political power among a small cadre of cronies, who are distinguished only by their unwavering loyalty to the President.
The government has actively blocked humanitarian assistance from international donors. It initiated the border war with Ethiopia that cost tens of thousands of lives.
The Eritrean Government has fabricated a national mythology by demonizing neighboring Ethiopia, for the central purpose of garnering complete compliance with his autocratic domestic policies. By channeling Eritreans' patriotism into hostility toward Ethiopia, the government ensures that [it] can rule as it likes, without public opposition. Democracy and economic opportunity remain purely theoretical concepts for the people of Eritrea.
As you know, the reality is atrocious. Youth are sent to camps for indoctrination. Citizens in the prime of their lives are forced into national service; anyone who refuses is beaten. If you flee, your family is imprisoned. Those who fail to espouse officially sanctioned opinions languish in metal shipping containers.
As in the former Soviet Union, the Eritrean government controls both the message and the medium. There are no opposition political parties, no non-governmental organizations, no private media. Any senior government official who dares to speak out puts himself at risk. The brave individuals known as the G-15, who challenged Eritrea's path back in the spring of 2001, are missing.
Elsewhere in the region, Eritrea has chosen to support extremist elements, including the al-Qaida affiliated al Shabaab militia in Somalia, in an effort to undermine the political process. While the rest of the region and the international community have united behind a common strategy for achieving lasting peace and stability in Somalia, Eritrea has opted to support terrorists and spoilers while encouraging continued violence. There is no justification for such actions. The ruling cabal is – to our great regret -- leading Eritrea along the path toward increased domestic repression and hardship, and regional and international isolation.
BOUNDARY DISPUTE
Since the border dispute with Ethiopia serves as the pretext for Eritrea’s domestic authoritarianism, let me say a final few words about how the U.S. sees this issue. This impasse has been a long-festering flashpoint between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and it is of course symptomatic of deeper divisions between the two countries.
The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) issued its delimitation decision in 2002. Yet, the two parties have still not cooperated on demarcation of the boundary. Both appear comfortable with the status quo. Ethiopia avoids painful domestic political decisions, while Eritrea uses the unresolved issue to goad Ethiopia and deflect attention from a deteriorating domestic situation.
The United States government fully supports the “final and binding” decisions of the EEBC and has consistently called on both parties to cooperate with the EEBC and meet their commitments in the Algiers Agreements. We work closely with the other Witnesses to the Algiers Agreements -- including Algeria, the African Union, the European Union, and the United Nations -- and other interested governments.
The level of urgency has increased, as the situation has recently deteriorated. Both parties remain wedded to their positions and may have hardened them. Eritrea has moved about 4,000 troops along with supporting artillery and armor into the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), a buffer zone between the parties, and restricted the activities of UNMEE, a UN peacekeeping force. Eritrea maintains a further 120,000 troops in the vicinity, while Ethiopia has deployed about 100,000 troops along the border.
We believe it is essential for the parties to discuss directly how to implement a workable boundary regime, consistent with the decisions of the EEBC, and to address the fundamental issues that divide them. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has offered to engage the parties, and we support his initiative. The Ethiopian Government has agreed to participate in this initiative, and we urge the Eritrean government to do so as well. We will continue our efforts and support those of others to resolve this issue and remove one flash point in an already unstable region and bring the parties closer to a normalized relationship.
So, in conclusion, this is a tough neighborhood, economically fragile, with a history of violent conflict and of uncompromising politics. Huge challenges remain. Yet, overall, there is reason to be hopeful about the Horn. Progress may not be uniform, but with the exception of Eritrea, we are working in partnership with local governments toward a more peaceful and prosperous Horn of Africa.
Thank you again for inviting me to join you today, and I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.
Released on August 9, 2007
James Swan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
4th International Conference on Ethiopian Development Studies
Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan
August 4, 2007
As Delivered
Good afternoon, and thank you, professor for inviting me to join you in Kalamazoo. I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss U.S. policy and engagement in the Horn of Africa. You have assembled an impressive and distinguished group of panelists for this important conference.
THE CURRENT SITUATION
As all of you know, the Horn of Africa is a rough neighborhood. At least one conflict – and frequently more – has raged in the region continuously since 1960. Inter-state conventional wars. Guerrilla-style liberation struggles. Coups. Revolutions. The Horn has seen them all.
It is also a region that has suffered historically from poor governance -- from the brutal excesses of Ethiopia’s Derg, to authoritarian one-party systems in much of the region until the 1990s, to the lawlessness of the failed state of Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre. Winner-take-all politics and violent regime change have been the norm. And this historically unstable political and security climate has been a profound impediment to economic development.
The Horn ranks near the bottom in the world – and indeed below the rest of Africa - on Human Development indicators. The region is ecologically and economically fragile. Its peoples face the challenges of overwhelming dependence on rain-fed agriculture, as regular droughts trigger cyclical famines.
Yet, despite these longstanding challenges, in most of the region we see signs of progress. Djibouti has held peaceful elections; its port has become an economic hub; and the government has become a partner in counterterrorism efforts. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government offers the best hope for peace and stability in the last 20 years. Ethiopia has made progress on democratic governance with the release of political party detainees and parliamentary discussions on electoral and media reform. Kenya, which has been spared the conflicts that have impeded the development of its neighbors, has become an economic powerhouse, has made tremendous strides to consolidate democracy, and plays a lead role in complex regional peace initiatives. Moreover, all of these countries and governments are increasingly close partners of the United States in the Horn of Africa.
The glaring exception to this favorable story is of course Eritrea, which openly abuses its population and serves as a destabilizing force in the region. I’ll come to that later.
While progress is fitful, and additional diplomatic and aid resources will be necessary to sustain success, the overall trajectory of the Horn is positive.
In keeping with Secretary Rice’s concept of Transformational Diplomacy, United States government policy in the region focuses on partnership, while promoting regional stability and security, strengthening democratic processes and institutions, fostering economic growth, expanding the scope and quality of basic services, and responding to the humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations.
The Horn is a region where Muslims and Christians coexist and intermingle, and where the cultures of ancient Ethiopia, of traditional Africa, and of the Arab-influenced coastal regions have combined in different ways to create unique national and regional identities. It is a region in which all of our Embassies and their officers are working to demonstrate our respect for different faith traditions and to promote our commitment to religious tolerance, political rights, and gender equality.
While our Embassies are the U.S. Government’s principal platforms for promoting effective cooperation, governance reform and sustainable development, we also have a great asset in the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa in Djibouti. This U.S. military initiative provides a vehicle for outreach to vulnerable communities in the region and for contributing to the professionalization and effectiveness of armed forces in the Horn.
So let me now discuss current developments and some of the key U.S. interests and policies in each of the countries of the Horn.
DJIBOUTI
I’ll begin with Djibouti – which rarely gets top billing in a discussion of the Horn, but will today -- and then move clockwise through the region. Djibouti, which celebrated the 30th anniversary of its independence in June, in many ways epitomizes both the progress and the challenges we see on the Horn.
With the end of the conflict with the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) in the 1990s, and the return of the Front’s leader to Djibouti in 2000, Djibouti has moved beyond violent conflict. General elections in 1999 and 2003 were orderly and peaceful, despite a boycott by the major opposition coalition. Some opposition members are represented in local and regional councils. More needs to be done to open up political space and ensure that all citizens have a voice in government decisions. But the transition from armed combat to political competition is a positive step.
On the economic front, Djibouti remains a poor country with per capita income below $1000. Yet it has a vision for development of its key assets – its port and strategic location along major sea-transport routes. Port tonnage – which tripled after the 1998 Eritrea-Ethiopia border war which cut access to Assab – has increase 30 percent per year between 2002 and 2004 under new management of Djibouti port. And Djibouti aspires to become an international hub for transit cargo serving not only the horn of Africa hinterland, but a much wider worldwide clientele.
The United States, which has long had good relations with Djibouti, has seen this partnership further deepen in recent years. Since 2002, Djibouti has hosted the only permanent U.S. military base in sub-Saharan Africa, (CJFF-HOA)... We also value Djibouti’s diplomatic role in the region, as a bridge among other countries in the Horn and between African and Arab states.
So in Djibouti, we see a country that has ended a protracted violent conflict, begun important steps toward greater political openness, developed a vision for its economic future, and engaged in a close partnership with the United States.
SOMALIA
Now let me turn to Somalia – a country that, for all its problems, has perhaps the best opportunity in nearly two decades to overcome its status as a failed state. Somalia is a priority for the United States in Africa. U.S. policy is designed to promote stability in Somalia – including by preventing Somalia from again becoming a safehaven for terrorists, as it was under the Council of Islamic Courts – to support humanitarian and development needs, and to foster inclusive democratic institutions.
The key to Somalia’s success will be national reconciliation to ensure inclusive representation in the Transitional Federal Institutions and in the organizations that will prepare the way for election of a permanent government in 2009, as called for by the Transitional Federal Charter.
The National Reconciliation Congress, which opened in Mogadishu on July 15 and is still ongoing, provides an opportunity for all Somalis to achieve suitable representation in the TFIs and formulate a roadmap for the remainder of the transitional period, in the run-up to national elections in 2009. In support of the National Reconciliation Congress, the United States has provided financial assistance of $1.25 million, in coordination with other international donors. Our Ambassador in Nairobi and our Special Envoy for Somalia are in frequent contact with congress organizer Ali Mahdi Mohamed, with Transitional Federal Government leaders, with clan elders, with civil society leaders, and a wide array of other stakeholders to encourage support for this process.
We believe it is important for the Somali people to focus on the future, moving forward in the transitional political process as envisioned by the Charter, rather than focusing only on the current composition of the Transitional Federal Government and Institutions. While imperfect, the Transitional Federal Institutions provide a framework for achieving the objectives outlined in the Charter and the formation of representative governance institutions following the transitional process. We are steering clear from Somali politics and focusing on a clear message of inclusion and accommodation to all actors in Somalia.
To help stabilize Somalia and create conditions for national reconciliation, the United States strongly supports the African Union’s peace support mission in Somalia. The mission currently has a lead contingent of approximately 1,600 Ugandan troops deployed as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). At the beginning of the year, the United States identified $19.6 million to assist AMISOM forces. Approximately $10 million was used to provide equipment and airlift to assist the deployment of Uganda’s AMISOM contingent. Congress subsequently appropriated a further $40 million in funding to support AMISOM.
AMISOM is important not only to help create conditions for national reconciliation, but also to permit the reduction in presence of Ethiopian forces and their eventual departure. We, the Somalis, and the Ethiopians themselves recognize that an Ethiopian military presence is not a long-term solution to insecurity in Somalia. For there to be lasting security, there must be political dialogue and accommodation among Somalis, improvements in Somali government capacity, and training and deployment of a competent and respected Somali security force.
The United States is the largest bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, and has provided more than $102 million in humanitarian and development assistance this year. We also coordinate closely with other international partners diplomatically and on our international assistance programs. We were founding members of the International Contact Group on Somalia in June 2006, and also are active in the International Advisory Committee for the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC).
In short, there is an international consensus that we must seize this moment of opportunity in Somalia. The United States is a leader on both the diplomatic front and in our humanitarian and economic response.
KENYA
Next let me say just a few words about Kenya, which is not always discussed as part of the Horn of Africa, but lies on its southern edge and is an important regional player. Nairobi hosts the largest U.S. diplomatic mission in Sub-Saharan Africa, and we cooperate with the Kenyans on a wide array of both bilateral and regional programs. Our bilateral assistance program is more than $500 million in 2007. Total resource flows from the U.S. to Kenya each year from all public and private sources amount to about $1.5 billion.
Kenya’s peaceful, credible democratic elections in 2002 represented an important step on Kenya’s path to becoming a fully functional democracy. The next elections, scheduled for December 2007 offer an opportunity to consolidate those gains. The U.S. is providing election-related training to civil society organizations, political parties, and youth and women candidates, as well as supporting the work of the Electoral Commission of Kenya to ensure that these elections are free, fair, and transparent.
Kenya is beginning to enjoy the fruits of its enviable regional reputation for stability, openness, and tolerance. Economic growth has increased to more than 6 percent in recent years, as Kenya capitalizes on its role as a major regional hub. While important challenges remain – specifically in combating corruption, moving away from tribalism, and promoting gender equity – there is a palpable sense of energy and optimism among the Kenyan people. Kenya is clearly a country on the move in a positive direction.
We have worked closely with the Kenyans diplomatically on the North-South peace agreement in Sudan and on Somalia issues, through the International Contact Group as well as bilaterally. In its capacity as President of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Kenya continues to occupy a leadership role in promoting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. We look forward to continued close partnership.
ETHIOPIA
Now, Ethiopia, which has been the subject of your conference. With more than 70 million people, bordering all of the other Horn countries, Ethiopia is the giant of the region. Ethiopia is an important strategic partner for the United States in the Horn of Africa. We collaborate on a wide range of development objectives and in efforts to promote regional stability. We share a commitment to address threats by transnational extremist groups.
We are also eager to see progress in democratic institutions. As you know, the run-up to the May 2005 national elections was the most open, free, and competitive political campaign period in all of Ethiopian history. Never before had opposition candidates had so much access to coveted constituencies and the ability to convene rallies and openly campaign against ruling party opponents.
Opposition candidates’ access to the press, including state-owned and operated media, was unprecedented. Never before had the electorate seen live, televised debates between government Ministers and their opposition challengers.
Unfortunately, this spirit was lost in the contentious aftermath of the vote, in bloody confrontations in the streets, in detention of political leaders, and in strident and uncompromising positions that for too long dominated the political leadership. As we consider the democratic challenges facing Ethiopia today, we recognize that sentiment has been so bitter precisely because of the heightened expectations prompted by two decades of political reform.
With the release of 38 detainees, and anticipated release of the remaining Coalition for Unity and Democracy leadership, and anticipated release of the remaining CUD leadership, following lengthy mediation by respected elders, Ethiopia’s political leaders have committed themselves to a new collaborative relationship for the good of the country. In Addis Ababa, U.S. foreign assistance programs are bringing together leaders from across the political spectrum to address critical questions of national governance and the future of the country, build the capacity of parliament, and bolster judicial independence.
We are again seeing a cautious, yet engaged host of political parties that are committed to institutionalizing the advances of March and April 2005. That ruling and opposition parties today gather around the negotiating table to debate the relative merits of reforms of democratic institutions is extremely positive.
We must all encourage this process. As stakeholders in Ethiopia's stability, democracy, and prosperity – we urge all parties to remain engaged, so that we can regain the advances of early 2005 and build upon them for the people of Ethiopia.
Meanwhile, we continue a robust program of U.S. humanitarian and development assistance for Ethiopia. We have contributed more than $160 million in humanitarian assistance this year to help the Ethiopian people break the cycle of famine and mitigate the impact of drought and natural disasters. With over $300 million in assistance to the health care system in Ethiopia this year alone, we help ensure that clinics reach into previously underserved regions including Afar and the Ogaden.
With respect to the Ogaden, we are concerned that insecurity and impediments to commercial sales of commodities put the population of this fragile region at further risk. We are currently working with the government to ensure that humanitarian assistance and the more important commercial shipments can flow to the Ogaden. We note that rains have been relatively good this year, which should ease the economic hardship faced by the pastoralist population.
In conflict-prone areas, U.S. programs bring together representatives from diverse communities during periods of calm, in order to build bridges of understanding and prevent potential conflicts from erupting. We are working with local administrations to build their capacity to govern for the people and to promote transparency. We are working with the Ethiopian military to transform that organization into a professional and apolitical defense force for the nation. The challenges are many, but the objectives merit the tremendous scope of the resources, time, and commitment that we have focused on them. We are confident that through partnership with local stakeholders, together we will contribute to making Ethiopia more secure, more democratic, and more prosperous for the next generation.
A STEP BACKWARD: ERITREA
Now, let me turn to Eritrea. While the rest of the Horn of Africa is making political, economic, and social advances and seizing opportunities -- albeit with periodic important setbacks -- the opposite is true for Eritrea.
Eritrea has experienced economic decline and a lack of freedoms, for the press and political expression. There is widespread and arbitrary conscription. The government has worked to destabilize its neighbors, including Ethiopia and Somalia.
Given the American penchant for supporting the underdog, it is disheartening to see what has become of Eritrea in the 14 years since it gained independence and produced a praiseworthy constitution. President Isaias Afwerki has become increasingly tyrannical and megalomaniacal. He has actively sought to destabilize the Horn, fueling regional insurgencies and supporting groups affiliated with terrorists.
Eritrean Government policies have also choked the Eritrean economy and consolidated political power among a small cadre of cronies, who are distinguished only by their unwavering loyalty to the President.
The government has actively blocked humanitarian assistance from international donors. It initiated the border war with Ethiopia that cost tens of thousands of lives.
The Eritrean Government has fabricated a national mythology by demonizing neighboring Ethiopia, for the central purpose of garnering complete compliance with his autocratic domestic policies. By channeling Eritreans' patriotism into hostility toward Ethiopia, the government ensures that [it] can rule as it likes, without public opposition. Democracy and economic opportunity remain purely theoretical concepts for the people of Eritrea.
As you know, the reality is atrocious. Youth are sent to camps for indoctrination. Citizens in the prime of their lives are forced into national service; anyone who refuses is beaten. If you flee, your family is imprisoned. Those who fail to espouse officially sanctioned opinions languish in metal shipping containers.
As in the former Soviet Union, the Eritrean government controls both the message and the medium. There are no opposition political parties, no non-governmental organizations, no private media. Any senior government official who dares to speak out puts himself at risk. The brave individuals known as the G-15, who challenged Eritrea's path back in the spring of 2001, are missing.
Elsewhere in the region, Eritrea has chosen to support extremist elements, including the al-Qaida affiliated al Shabaab militia in Somalia, in an effort to undermine the political process. While the rest of the region and the international community have united behind a common strategy for achieving lasting peace and stability in Somalia, Eritrea has opted to support terrorists and spoilers while encouraging continued violence. There is no justification for such actions. The ruling cabal is – to our great regret -- leading Eritrea along the path toward increased domestic repression and hardship, and regional and international isolation.
BOUNDARY DISPUTE
Since the border dispute with Ethiopia serves as the pretext for Eritrea’s domestic authoritarianism, let me say a final few words about how the U.S. sees this issue. This impasse has been a long-festering flashpoint between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and it is of course symptomatic of deeper divisions between the two countries.
The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) issued its delimitation decision in 2002. Yet, the two parties have still not cooperated on demarcation of the boundary. Both appear comfortable with the status quo. Ethiopia avoids painful domestic political decisions, while Eritrea uses the unresolved issue to goad Ethiopia and deflect attention from a deteriorating domestic situation.
The United States government fully supports the “final and binding” decisions of the EEBC and has consistently called on both parties to cooperate with the EEBC and meet their commitments in the Algiers Agreements. We work closely with the other Witnesses to the Algiers Agreements -- including Algeria, the African Union, the European Union, and the United Nations -- and other interested governments.
The level of urgency has increased, as the situation has recently deteriorated. Both parties remain wedded to their positions and may have hardened them. Eritrea has moved about 4,000 troops along with supporting artillery and armor into the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), a buffer zone between the parties, and restricted the activities of UNMEE, a UN peacekeeping force. Eritrea maintains a further 120,000 troops in the vicinity, while Ethiopia has deployed about 100,000 troops along the border.
We believe it is essential for the parties to discuss directly how to implement a workable boundary regime, consistent with the decisions of the EEBC, and to address the fundamental issues that divide them. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has offered to engage the parties, and we support his initiative. The Ethiopian Government has agreed to participate in this initiative, and we urge the Eritrean government to do so as well. We will continue our efforts and support those of others to resolve this issue and remove one flash point in an already unstable region and bring the parties closer to a normalized relationship.
So, in conclusion, this is a tough neighborhood, economically fragile, with a history of violent conflict and of uncompromising politics. Huge challenges remain. Yet, overall, there is reason to be hopeful about the Horn. Progress may not be uniform, but with the exception of Eritrea, we are working in partnership with local governments toward a more peaceful and prosperous Horn of Africa.
Thank you again for inviting me to join you today, and I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.
Released on August 9, 2007
Wednesday, May 16, 2007
Regeringens tysta diplomati kritiseras
2 maj 2007
Den tysta diplomatin som den svenska regeringen använt sig av för att få Dawit Isaak frigiven måste överges. Om det tycktes alla deltagare vara överens på det seminarium om yttrandefrihet som Amnesty arrangerade i Göteborg den 2 maj.
- Nu har det gått över två tusen dagar utan att Dawit släppts fri. Regeringens taktik fungerar uppenbarligen inte, sa Dawits bror Esayas Isaak.
Temat på seminariet på Världskulturmuseet i Göteborg var yttrandefrihet. En person fick under hela seminariet agera symbol för kampen för det fria ordet. Ett stort porträtt på Dawit Isaak hängde på väggen bakom seminariedeltagarna, och alla uppmanade till engagemang för journalisten Dawit Isaak som suttit fängslad i Eritrea sedan september 2001.
Representanter från utrikesdepartementet hade blivit inbjudna att tala om sin strategi för att få Dawit Isaak fri, men avböjt.
– De kör tydligen med tyst diplomati hela vägen. Det är ungefär som Eritreas regering brukar göra, sa Johan Karlsson, författare till boken ”Dawit och rättvisan” och en av dagens moderatorer.
Först ut att tala var representanter från Amnesty, Björn Tunbäck, journalist och styrelsemedlem i Reportrar utan gränser, Björn Linell från Svenska PEN-klubben och Göteborgs-Postens kulturchef Gabriel Byström. Gabriel Byström sa att den svenska diplomatin har misslyckats.
– Carl Bildt verkar tycka om att flyga. Han borde ta ett plan ned till Eritrea istället för att bara jobba med denna fråga hemifrån.
Björn Tunbäck sa att alla inblandade organisationer måste fortsätta kämpa så länge Dawit sitter fängslad och alla fyra uppmanade åhörarna att skapa opinion.
- Det låter gammeldags och romantiserat att den mest effektiva metoden är att väcka opinion, men så är det, sa Björn Linell.
Även då frågan om varför det tog så lång tid för svenska medier att uppmärksamma Dawits fall diskuterades var tonläget kritiskt. Björn Tunbäck menade att Dawit sannolikt inte anses vara svensk i allas ögon och Björn Linell sa kort att det beror på ”rasism och okunnighet”.
Allra mest negativa till UD:s arbete var ändå Dawits bror Esayas Isaak och de två eritreanska exiljournalisterna Khaled Abdu och Semret Seyoum.
– Vi i stödföreningen för Dawit har rätt god kontakt med UD. Men så länge han inte friges måste vi fortsätta att kritisera deras arbete, sa Esayas Isaak.
På frågan vad de önskar att UD ska göra istället för att förhandla i det tysta svarade även Esayas Isaak att Carl Bildt borde arbeta för Dawit på plats i Eritrea. Han sa också att regeringen inte kan vänta alltför länge med detta eftersom Dawit nu är sjuk och inte får den vård han behöver i fängelset. Khaled Abdu sa att man bör använda sig av alla tänkbara kanaler för att få till en frigivning. Han nämnde EU och FN och sa att det överhuvudtaget borde arbetas mycket mer aggressivt.
Esayas Isaak berättade att många regeringsvänliga eritreaner både i Sverige och i Eritrea anklagar Dawit-kampanjens deltagare för att sprida falska rykten.
– Den onda armen räcker ända hit till Göteborg, sa han.
Semret Seyoum sammanfattade seminariedeltagarnas budskap då frågan kring vad gemene man kan göra väcktes.
– Vi ska inte vara tysta. Vi ska höras så mycket det bara går, sa han.
Maria Sonnerby /RUG
Den tysta diplomatin som den svenska regeringen använt sig av för att få Dawit Isaak frigiven måste överges. Om det tycktes alla deltagare vara överens på det seminarium om yttrandefrihet som Amnesty arrangerade i Göteborg den 2 maj.
- Nu har det gått över två tusen dagar utan att Dawit släppts fri. Regeringens taktik fungerar uppenbarligen inte, sa Dawits bror Esayas Isaak.
Temat på seminariet på Världskulturmuseet i Göteborg var yttrandefrihet. En person fick under hela seminariet agera symbol för kampen för det fria ordet. Ett stort porträtt på Dawit Isaak hängde på väggen bakom seminariedeltagarna, och alla uppmanade till engagemang för journalisten Dawit Isaak som suttit fängslad i Eritrea sedan september 2001.
Representanter från utrikesdepartementet hade blivit inbjudna att tala om sin strategi för att få Dawit Isaak fri, men avböjt.
– De kör tydligen med tyst diplomati hela vägen. Det är ungefär som Eritreas regering brukar göra, sa Johan Karlsson, författare till boken ”Dawit och rättvisan” och en av dagens moderatorer.
Först ut att tala var representanter från Amnesty, Björn Tunbäck, journalist och styrelsemedlem i Reportrar utan gränser, Björn Linell från Svenska PEN-klubben och Göteborgs-Postens kulturchef Gabriel Byström. Gabriel Byström sa att den svenska diplomatin har misslyckats.
– Carl Bildt verkar tycka om att flyga. Han borde ta ett plan ned till Eritrea istället för att bara jobba med denna fråga hemifrån.
Björn Tunbäck sa att alla inblandade organisationer måste fortsätta kämpa så länge Dawit sitter fängslad och alla fyra uppmanade åhörarna att skapa opinion.
- Det låter gammeldags och romantiserat att den mest effektiva metoden är att väcka opinion, men så är det, sa Björn Linell.
Även då frågan om varför det tog så lång tid för svenska medier att uppmärksamma Dawits fall diskuterades var tonläget kritiskt. Björn Tunbäck menade att Dawit sannolikt inte anses vara svensk i allas ögon och Björn Linell sa kort att det beror på ”rasism och okunnighet”.
Allra mest negativa till UD:s arbete var ändå Dawits bror Esayas Isaak och de två eritreanska exiljournalisterna Khaled Abdu och Semret Seyoum.
– Vi i stödföreningen för Dawit har rätt god kontakt med UD. Men så länge han inte friges måste vi fortsätta att kritisera deras arbete, sa Esayas Isaak.
På frågan vad de önskar att UD ska göra istället för att förhandla i det tysta svarade även Esayas Isaak att Carl Bildt borde arbeta för Dawit på plats i Eritrea. Han sa också att regeringen inte kan vänta alltför länge med detta eftersom Dawit nu är sjuk och inte får den vård han behöver i fängelset. Khaled Abdu sa att man bör använda sig av alla tänkbara kanaler för att få till en frigivning. Han nämnde EU och FN och sa att det överhuvudtaget borde arbetas mycket mer aggressivt.
Esayas Isaak berättade att många regeringsvänliga eritreaner både i Sverige och i Eritrea anklagar Dawit-kampanjens deltagare för att sprida falska rykten.
– Den onda armen räcker ända hit till Göteborg, sa han.
Semret Seyoum sammanfattade seminariedeltagarnas budskap då frågan kring vad gemene man kan göra väcktes.
– Vi ska inte vara tysta. Vi ska höras så mycket det bara går, sa han.
Maria Sonnerby /RUG
Monday, May 14, 2007
Germany's funding of journalism training for Eritrea's state-controlled media
Committee to Protect Journalists
330 Seventh Avenue, New York, NY 10001 USA Phone: (212) 4651004 Fax: (212) 4659568 Web: www.cpj.org E-Mail: mkeita@cpj.org
New York, May 14, 2007—In a letter to the German government, the Committee to Protect Journalists today noted with concern Germany's funding of journalism training for Eritrea's state-controlled media while the country's independent press is shut down and more than a dozen publishers and editors are imprisoned. CPJ called on Germany to use its diplomatic influence to ensure that Eritrean journalists are allowed to practice their profession freely within international standards, and to insist that Eritrean authorities account for imprisoned journalists now jailed incommunicado.
May 14, 2007
The Honorable Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul
Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development
C/o German Embassy to the United States
4645 Reservoir Road, NW, Washington DC 20007-1998
Via facsimile: (202) 298-4249
Dear Minister Wieczorek-Zeul:
The Committee to Protect Journalists notes that the German government has decided to fund the training of journalists working for Eritrea’s state-controlled media while the nation’s independent press remains shut down and more than a dozen publishers and editors continue to be held incommunicado, many since September 2001.
We welcome Germany’s interest in media development in Eritrea. However, we are deeply troubled by the Eritrean government’s ongoing repression of independent media. We hope that Germany will use its diplomatic influence to ensure that the Eritrean authorities account for the jailed journalists, including Swedish citizen and Eritrean national Dawit Isaac, co-owner of the defunct private weekly Setit. We are especially concerned because reliable reports indicate that some of these journalists, including Setit’s award-winning editor Fesshaye Yohannes, may have died in prison.
On April 16, the Deutsche-Welle Akademie (DW-Akademie), an agency whose international journalism training program is funded by your ministry, launched a journalism course to train staff of the Eritrean Information Ministry, according to the state Tigrina-language daily Haddas Eritrea. The training is part of a three-year cooperation agreement signed in December 2006 between DW-Akademie and the Eritrean Information Ministry, according to Haddas Eritrea.
While we are convinced that the DW-Akademie trainees are receiving world-class journalism training, we fear that they will not be able to faithfully exercise their profession since the Eritrean government effectively banned independent journalism in September 2001, and continues to subject the remaining state-controlled journalists to arbitrary imprisonment and threats of reprisals against their families.
Eritrea remains the only nation in sub-Saharan Africa without any independent media outlet. One week after September 11, 2001, the government of President Isaias Afewerki closed all privately owned media and arrested 10 independent journalists, according to CPJ research. Authorities accused the journalists of various alleged national security violations, but they have failed to bring identifiable charges in any known court.
The crackdown came shortly after the private press had covered a split in the ruling party and provided a forum for debate on Afewerki’s autocratic rule. Setit published on September 9, 2001, a letter addressed to the government stating that “people can tolerate hunger and other problems for a long time, but they can’t tolerate the absence of good administration and justice.” The crackdown was part of a government drive to eliminate political dissent ahead of elections, scheduled for December 2001 but canceled without explanation by the government.
The jailed journalists initially had limited access to the outside world as they were first held at a police station in the capital, Asmara, where they began a hunger strike on March 31, 2002. In a message smuggled from their jail, the journalists said they would refuse food until they were released or charged and given due process of law. But the government quickly transferred the journalists to secret locations.
Holding the journalists incommunicado, the government—with one exception explained below—has refused to divulge their whereabouts, their health, or even whether they are still alive. Officials at the Eritrean embassy in Washington and at the Information Ministry in Asmara have consistently failed to respond to CPJ’s inquiries seeking information. During a press conference in Brussels on May 4, the day after World Press Freedom Day, in response to a question about freedom of the press in Eritrea, Afewerki asked “what freedoms those living in South African shantytowns enjoyed?” according to Agence France-Presse. In response to another question about the fate of Isaac, Afewerki asked “why Sweden was so interested in handing out passports to Eritreans,” according to AFP. Isaac was released for a medical checkup on November 19, 2005, and allowed to phone his family and a friend in Sweden. Despite hopes that he would be freed, Isaac was returned to jail two days later with no explanation, according to CPJ sources.
In February 2007, in response to news reports that Yohannes had died in prison, presidential spokesman Yemane Gebremeskel was quoted by Voice of America as saying: “In the first place, I don’t know the person you’re talking about.” Yohannes is said to have died in detention, and his death was first reported in January 2006, according to CPJ sources. His family was not formally notified, and they were not able to recover his body for a proper burial.
Other journalists who have been held either without charge or trial or who remain in indefinite state custody as of today are editor Said Abdelkader of Admas, assistant editor Fitzum Wedi Ade, and editor-in-chief Amanuel Asrat of Zemen; journalist Saleh Aljezeeri of Eritrean State Radio, editor-in-chief Yusuf Mohamed Ali of Tsigenay; reporter Selamyinghes Beyene of Meqaleh; columnist Temesken Ghebreyesus of Keste Debena; editor-in-chief Mattewos Habteab and assistant editor Dawit Habtemichael of Meqaleh; assistant editor Medhanie Haile of Keste Debena; founder and manager Zemenfes Haile and reporter Ghebrehiwet Keleta of Tsigenay; Hamid Mohammed Said of the Eritrean State Television; and freelance photographer and former director of the Eritrean State Television Seyoum Tsehaye, according to CPJ research. Credible but unconfirmed reports in September 2006 said that Abdelkader, Ali and Haile had died in prison.
CPJ research shows that Eritrea was the world’s third leading jailer of journalists in 2006; those in custody included at least eight state media journalists who were detained for several weeks in late 2006. The government did not explain the 2006 crackdown, but sources said it was designed to intimidate state media workers after several colleagues had fled the country.
The government’s monopoly on domestic media, the fear of reprisal among prisoners’ families, and tight restrictions on the movement of all foreigners led CPJ in 2006 to name Eritrea as one of the 10 most censored countries in the world.
With freedom of thought and expression brutally suppressed in Eritrea, we are deeply concerned that the local journalists the German government is funding to train will not be able to exercise their profession within international ethical standards. We therefore call on you to use all your diplomatic influence to obtain guarantees from the Eritrean authorities that the journalists will be able to work freely and without fear of reprisal. We also call on you to insist that the Eritrean government lift its ban on the private press, that it fully account for those journalists who have died in prison, and that it to immediately release all journalists who have been jailed without charge or trial simply for exercising their right to free expression.
We thank you for your attention, and we look forward to your response.
Sincerely,
Joel Simon
Executive Director
CC:
H.E. Thomas Matussek, German Ambassador to the United States
H.E. Klaus Scharioth, German Ambassador to the United States
H.E. Gunnar Lund, Ambassador of Sweden to the United States
The Honorable Karin Kortmann, Parliamentary State Secretary
Günter Nooke, Federal Government Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid
The Honorable Dr. Herta Däubler-Gmelin, Chair of the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Assistance of the German Bundestag
The Honorable Thilo Hoppe, Chair of the Committee on Economic Cooperation and Development (AwZ) of the German Bundestag
The Honorable Cecilia Magnusson, Chair of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Parliament
H.E. Alexander Beckman, Ambassador of Germany to Eritrea
Gerda Meuer, Director of the Deutsche-Welle Akademie
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy
Louis Michel, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid
The Honorable Hélène Flautre, Chair of the Subcommittee on Human Rights of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
Faith Pansy Tlakula, African Commission Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression in Africa
Reine Alapini-Gansou, African Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders
Mogens Schmidt, Deputy Assistant Director-General, Freedom of Expression and Democracy Unit, UNESCO
American Society of Newspaper Editors
Amnesty International
Article 19 (United Kingdom)
Artikel 19 (The Netherlands)
Canadian Journalists for Free Expression
Freedom Forum
Freedom House
Human Rights Watch
Index on Censorship
International Center for Journalists
International Federation of Journalists
International PEN
International Press Institute
Michael G. Kozak, United States Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
The Newspaper Guild
The North American Broadcasters Association
Overseas Press Club
Reporters Sans Frontières
The Society of Professional Journalists
World Association of Newspapers
World Press Freedom Committee
330 Seventh Avenue, New York, NY 10001 USA Phone: (212) 4651004 Fax: (212) 4659568 Web: www.cpj.org E-Mail: mkeita@cpj.org
New York, May 14, 2007—In a letter to the German government, the Committee to Protect Journalists today noted with concern Germany's funding of journalism training for Eritrea's state-controlled media while the country's independent press is shut down and more than a dozen publishers and editors are imprisoned. CPJ called on Germany to use its diplomatic influence to ensure that Eritrean journalists are allowed to practice their profession freely within international standards, and to insist that Eritrean authorities account for imprisoned journalists now jailed incommunicado.
May 14, 2007
The Honorable Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul
Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development
C/o German Embassy to the United States
4645 Reservoir Road, NW, Washington DC 20007-1998
Via facsimile: (202) 298-4249
Dear Minister Wieczorek-Zeul:
The Committee to Protect Journalists notes that the German government has decided to fund the training of journalists working for Eritrea’s state-controlled media while the nation’s independent press remains shut down and more than a dozen publishers and editors continue to be held incommunicado, many since September 2001.
We welcome Germany’s interest in media development in Eritrea. However, we are deeply troubled by the Eritrean government’s ongoing repression of independent media. We hope that Germany will use its diplomatic influence to ensure that the Eritrean authorities account for the jailed journalists, including Swedish citizen and Eritrean national Dawit Isaac, co-owner of the defunct private weekly Setit. We are especially concerned because reliable reports indicate that some of these journalists, including Setit’s award-winning editor Fesshaye Yohannes, may have died in prison.
On April 16, the Deutsche-Welle Akademie (DW-Akademie), an agency whose international journalism training program is funded by your ministry, launched a journalism course to train staff of the Eritrean Information Ministry, according to the state Tigrina-language daily Haddas Eritrea. The training is part of a three-year cooperation agreement signed in December 2006 between DW-Akademie and the Eritrean Information Ministry, according to Haddas Eritrea.
While we are convinced that the DW-Akademie trainees are receiving world-class journalism training, we fear that they will not be able to faithfully exercise their profession since the Eritrean government effectively banned independent journalism in September 2001, and continues to subject the remaining state-controlled journalists to arbitrary imprisonment and threats of reprisals against their families.
Eritrea remains the only nation in sub-Saharan Africa without any independent media outlet. One week after September 11, 2001, the government of President Isaias Afewerki closed all privately owned media and arrested 10 independent journalists, according to CPJ research. Authorities accused the journalists of various alleged national security violations, but they have failed to bring identifiable charges in any known court.
The crackdown came shortly after the private press had covered a split in the ruling party and provided a forum for debate on Afewerki’s autocratic rule. Setit published on September 9, 2001, a letter addressed to the government stating that “people can tolerate hunger and other problems for a long time, but they can’t tolerate the absence of good administration and justice.” The crackdown was part of a government drive to eliminate political dissent ahead of elections, scheduled for December 2001 but canceled without explanation by the government.
The jailed journalists initially had limited access to the outside world as they were first held at a police station in the capital, Asmara, where they began a hunger strike on March 31, 2002. In a message smuggled from their jail, the journalists said they would refuse food until they were released or charged and given due process of law. But the government quickly transferred the journalists to secret locations.
Holding the journalists incommunicado, the government—with one exception explained below—has refused to divulge their whereabouts, their health, or even whether they are still alive. Officials at the Eritrean embassy in Washington and at the Information Ministry in Asmara have consistently failed to respond to CPJ’s inquiries seeking information. During a press conference in Brussels on May 4, the day after World Press Freedom Day, in response to a question about freedom of the press in Eritrea, Afewerki asked “what freedoms those living in South African shantytowns enjoyed?” according to Agence France-Presse. In response to another question about the fate of Isaac, Afewerki asked “why Sweden was so interested in handing out passports to Eritreans,” according to AFP. Isaac was released for a medical checkup on November 19, 2005, and allowed to phone his family and a friend in Sweden. Despite hopes that he would be freed, Isaac was returned to jail two days later with no explanation, according to CPJ sources.
In February 2007, in response to news reports that Yohannes had died in prison, presidential spokesman Yemane Gebremeskel was quoted by Voice of America as saying: “In the first place, I don’t know the person you’re talking about.” Yohannes is said to have died in detention, and his death was first reported in January 2006, according to CPJ sources. His family was not formally notified, and they were not able to recover his body for a proper burial.
Other journalists who have been held either without charge or trial or who remain in indefinite state custody as of today are editor Said Abdelkader of Admas, assistant editor Fitzum Wedi Ade, and editor-in-chief Amanuel Asrat of Zemen; journalist Saleh Aljezeeri of Eritrean State Radio, editor-in-chief Yusuf Mohamed Ali of Tsigenay; reporter Selamyinghes Beyene of Meqaleh; columnist Temesken Ghebreyesus of Keste Debena; editor-in-chief Mattewos Habteab and assistant editor Dawit Habtemichael of Meqaleh; assistant editor Medhanie Haile of Keste Debena; founder and manager Zemenfes Haile and reporter Ghebrehiwet Keleta of Tsigenay; Hamid Mohammed Said of the Eritrean State Television; and freelance photographer and former director of the Eritrean State Television Seyoum Tsehaye, according to CPJ research. Credible but unconfirmed reports in September 2006 said that Abdelkader, Ali and Haile had died in prison.
CPJ research shows that Eritrea was the world’s third leading jailer of journalists in 2006; those in custody included at least eight state media journalists who were detained for several weeks in late 2006. The government did not explain the 2006 crackdown, but sources said it was designed to intimidate state media workers after several colleagues had fled the country.
The government’s monopoly on domestic media, the fear of reprisal among prisoners’ families, and tight restrictions on the movement of all foreigners led CPJ in 2006 to name Eritrea as one of the 10 most censored countries in the world.
With freedom of thought and expression brutally suppressed in Eritrea, we are deeply concerned that the local journalists the German government is funding to train will not be able to exercise their profession within international ethical standards. We therefore call on you to use all your diplomatic influence to obtain guarantees from the Eritrean authorities that the journalists will be able to work freely and without fear of reprisal. We also call on you to insist that the Eritrean government lift its ban on the private press, that it fully account for those journalists who have died in prison, and that it to immediately release all journalists who have been jailed without charge or trial simply for exercising their right to free expression.
We thank you for your attention, and we look forward to your response.
Sincerely,
Joel Simon
Executive Director
CC:
H.E. Thomas Matussek, German Ambassador to the United States
H.E. Klaus Scharioth, German Ambassador to the United States
H.E. Gunnar Lund, Ambassador of Sweden to the United States
The Honorable Karin Kortmann, Parliamentary State Secretary
Günter Nooke, Federal Government Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid
The Honorable Dr. Herta Däubler-Gmelin, Chair of the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Assistance of the German Bundestag
The Honorable Thilo Hoppe, Chair of the Committee on Economic Cooperation and Development (AwZ) of the German Bundestag
The Honorable Cecilia Magnusson, Chair of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Parliament
H.E. Alexander Beckman, Ambassador of Germany to Eritrea
Gerda Meuer, Director of the Deutsche-Welle Akademie
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy
Louis Michel, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid
The Honorable Hélène Flautre, Chair of the Subcommittee on Human Rights of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
Faith Pansy Tlakula, African Commission Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression in Africa
Reine Alapini-Gansou, African Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders
Mogens Schmidt, Deputy Assistant Director-General, Freedom of Expression and Democracy Unit, UNESCO
American Society of Newspaper Editors
Amnesty International
Article 19 (United Kingdom)
Artikel 19 (The Netherlands)
Canadian Journalists for Free Expression
Freedom Forum
Freedom House
Human Rights Watch
Index on Censorship
International Center for Journalists
International Federation of Journalists
International PEN
International Press Institute
Michael G. Kozak, United States Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
The Newspaper Guild
The North American Broadcasters Association
Overseas Press Club
Reporters Sans Frontières
The Society of Professional Journalists
World Association of Newspapers
World Press Freedom Committee
Wednesday, May 09, 2007
European Union’s Double Standard
PIA’s recent visit to Brussels for talks with EU’s development commissioner Louis Michel raises a number of moral and legal responsibilities EU must bear in mind in its pursuit of undefined relations with a repressive regime.
It should be clear from the outset that whatever EU may do to entertain PIA won’t change the fundamental questions occupying Eritrea and the horn in general. Complicated issues can’t be addressed through wishy-washy policies. It can’t be lost with EU and its development commissioner that the Somali issue is being complicated due to the stalemate over Eritrean-Ethiopian border demarcation process. Without EU’s firm position over the border demarcation process, which may bring it into conflict with the US policy in the region, EU’s wishy-washy position over secondary issues won’t yield any results. If EU’s commissioner wants to be seen as ‘doing something’ in the region to justify his job, he must equally examine his and his organization’s legal and moral obligations to take account of the deteriorating human rights and social conditions brought about through unrestrained dictatorship in Eritrea.
We should reject EU’s ‘flavor of the month’ politics. EU can’t say, ‘Oh, it is September so let EU parliamentarians write a letter to the Eritrean leader asking for their release. Oh, it is May so let us invite PIA and pat him on the back. Oh, it is …’ Instead, the issues and questions that should be posed to EU are the followings,
EU parliamentarians are fully aware of the plights of Eritrean parliamentarians and yet have done nothing to secure their release. In fact, by writing their annual ritual one-page protest letter to PIA, inadvertently, EU parliamentarians are exposing their moral and legal obligations over their failures to address the gross human rights violations in Eritrea. By writing these protest letters, EU parliamentarians can no longer claim ignorance over the plight of the Eritrean parliamentarians and the overall human rights situation in Eritrea.
Amnesty International, CPJ, Religious organizations and many other human rights organizations have well documented the systematic and gross human rights violations in Eritrea. The EU commissioner and his colleagues can not possibly claim ignorance over the human rights conditions in Eritrea.
From Mr. Bandini to EU’s current Ambassador to Eritrea, Mr. Geert Heikens, have expressed their unequivocal understanding of the PIA regime as unabashed dictatorship, not only flaunting its disrespect for the rule-of-law in Eritrea but even breaching legal agreements with its donors. At a time when Mr. Geert Heikens and other analysts were expecting EU to ask for redress over this breach, instead EU is proceeding by promising to provide additional humanitarian assistance.
Barely few months ago, Eritrean Anti-tyranny Global Solidarity delivered a petition signed by 5,000 Eritreans asking for help in addressing the gross violations of human rights in Eritrea. Among a number of requests, one request was for banning High Eritrean government officials from traveling to the West. EU and its development commissioner seem oblivious to the requests of Eritrean people.
In reality, EU is playing double standards. The Council of European Union Decision 2002/148/EC imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe because “European Union considers that democratic principles are still not upheld in Zimbabwe and that no significant progress has been achieved by your country’s government in the five fields …” What are the five fields?
End of politically motivated violence,
Free and fair elections,
Freedom of the media
Independence of the judiciary
End of illegal occupations of farms.
The sanctions include “the Council also issued travel bans and a freezing of funds and other financial assets for Mugabe and 19 of his colleagues, who were deemed guilty of serious violations of human rights, freedom of opinion, and freedom of association and peaceful assembly in Zimbabwe. The EU was keen to emphasize that the sanctions imposed are designed to affect only those against whom they are imposed, and should not penalize the “ordinary citizens” of Zimbabwe.”
The question that should be posed to EU is whether their diplomatic acts are simply wishy-washy politics or acts based on certain principles. If EU’s acts are guided by certain principles, ‘what is good for the goose is good for the gander’, thus what is good for President Mugabe is good for PIA. In fact, most Eritreans and various international human rights organizations would say that President Mugabe’s treatment of its political opposition is infinitely more humane that PIA’s treatment of its political opposition. Recently, President Mugabe beat up two opposition leaders and yet the opposition leaders were free afterwards to speak to the world media and to seek medical treatment in South Africa and return to Zimbabwe. It can’t be lost with the development commissioner the most inhumane treatment our opposition and prisoners-of-conscious are receiving.
The purpose of this article or any of my other articles isn’t to engage in political debate with those we disagree. If we reduce our discussions to simply political debates, the ones with sticks and money would probably win every time. Political debates are grey areas. As activists, our role is to convert those political debates into moral and legal questions. By doing so, we force the wishy-washy domestic and foreign political players to take unequivocal position on certain fundamental principles.
Thus, our question to the EU development commissioner and EU in general should be,
1. What are the principles applied to deal with different dictators? If EU is leaning hard on those dictators that affect its organizational interests directly and softly on those dictators that don’t affect its organizational interests directly, then EU doesn’t have principles but is playing politics to pursue its own socio-economic and political interests at the expense of certain fundamental principles. The answer to this question has wider ramifications. For instance, the International Criminal Court (ICC) which is the brainchild of the European governments, would lose its credibility if EU is perceived as playing politics to advance its own interests. ICC’s credibility doesn’t emanate from the court itself but the world’s general perceptions towards European governments and EU themselves.
2. According to Mr. Heikens, Eritrea is responsible for restitutions on donated food ‘deemed’ sold to Eritreans. Instead of rectifying this issue, if EU donates more food and PIA continues with his unpunished behavior, who will be ultimately responsible for breach of contract? My fellow readers, you know what wishy-washy donors do, they will continue donating food to the regime although fully aware that the regime is breaching food donation contracts, and then when a democratic government is elected, wishy-washy donors begin flexing their muscles on the democratic government threatening to withhold funding unless the democratic government compensates the donors for breach of contracts under the ousted dictators. This has been donor’s curse for Africa. Instead, EU should withhold any humanitarian assistance until PIA has made restitutions, and then proceed with providing additional humanitarian assistance. If EU fails to enforce its contracts immediately, future Eritrean governments have no moral or legal obligations to compensate for contract breaches committed under previous regimes.
3. If EU decides to resume providing development assistance, the EU development commissioner should be made fully aware that he and his organization are stepping into legal liability. Donors have legal responsibilities to ensure that their project assistances are implemented according to certain human rights codes and worker safety standards. EU can’t extend financial assistance for development projects and pretend or assume that its assistance is being implemented in accordance with EU’s own, and not PFDJ’s, labor and work standards. For instance, if EU provides financial, material or expertise assistance for drinking water project somewhere in Eritrea and if PIA uses slave labor to undertake that project, does EU bear responsibility for the use or condoning the use of slave labor? Absolutely! EU can’t claim ignorance over this issue because the use of slave labor is well documented by international human rights organizations. EU can’t use PIA’s definitions to determine if slave labor is being used in Eritrea. EU has legal obligations to define slave labor according to its own social, legal and political standards. If EU provides as much as one cent for development assistance, EU becomes legally liable for the use of slave labor. We have to make sure that the development commissioner is fully aware of the implications, and more importantly, that we will pursue this issue.
It is not lost with anyone that EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe because white farmers are involved. The British government leaned on the EU, and voila EU imposed a sanction. EU’s indirect statement is that black parliamentarians and tens of thousands of innocent Eritreans in PFDJ Dungeons are expendable. This is condescending attitude. But as black Africans, and especially as Eritreans, we should always remember that our traditional African societies have lived under advanced social standards and harmony, and rule of law for centuries while Gauls, Vikings were jumping around from one tree-to-another, and their Roman kin were slaughtering and enslaving their own and the rest of the world. The various dynasties from China to Russia to Europe created the most miserable conditions for their own people and their subjects for centuries, while we Africans lived in relative peace for centuries. We don’t need any condescending attitude from anyone. EU must address issues based on principles, as it claims, and not simply on politics.
Opposition’s Reply?
What happened to opposition’s non-existent foreign relations? PFDJ’s diplomatic skills is somewhere between weak and belligerent. The opposition camp’s diplomatic skill is non-existent. I don’t know which one is worse. If the development commissioner had an ounce of respect for Eritrean opposition and the Eritrean public, he would have put out a statement saying that he discussed regional issues with PIA and that he raised the issue of gross human rights violations in Eritrea with PIA. This would have been an indirect acknowledgment to the Eritrean people in general and the opposition camp specifically that EU considers human rights violations as a serious issue. The fact that Mr. Louise Michel didn’t bother to raise this issue demonstrates that the organization he leads has no respect for Eritreans. The opposition camp should have quickly replied to such condescending attitude.
EDA should understand that nobody cares whether they amend their article 1 or 10 or 50. These are issues that will be addressed by the vast stakeholders in post-PFDJ Eritrea. Over two years to address a couple of articles, while in the end parting their ways, indicates that we remain severely challenged in tackling today’s issues. If EDA was addressing article 4 or 5 while actively engaged in other opposition campaigns, we would have respected their overall efforts. Whether they agree on a couple of articles on issues that can only be addressed in the future doesn’t excuse their lackluster performance today.
If we evaluate the opposition camp, the overwhelming productive opposition efforts are being exerted by non-political organizations. If we examine opposition news organizations, human rights organizations, rallies, petitions, writing campaigns and every other effort has been organized and delivered by these non-political groups, not the political organizations. It escapes me what the function of the political groups is – to amend article 4 and 5 over 10 years?
EDA’s [former] leader popping up on Al-jazeera when the news network probably had no news to broadcast a couple of years was announced to us as a major achievement. Eritrean opposition shouldn’t become news fillers for news broadcasters. Instead, Eritrean opposition must be able to persuade, and if necessary coerce, news networks to give air time to the opposition. When PIA is on Al-Jazeera one day, opposition must strive to be on Al-Jazeera the following day.
Some will say, ‘easier said than done’. Whether Al-Jazeera agrees to opposition’s request to appear on their news program is secondary. The important thing is for the opposition to do things for the sake of doing by proceeding in the following steps,
1. Soon after PIA’s appearance on Al-jazeera, the opposition should make written request to appear on Al-jazeera.
2. If Al-Jazeera doesn’t reply or give a negative reply, the opposition camp would publicize its efforts to the Eritrean public.
3. Never acquiescing to rejections, from time-to-time, the opposition camp would make persistent request to appear on their program and failing to receive a positive reply then to write articles criticizing Al-Jazeera and making sure that a copy of our request and Al-Jazeera’s replies are posted on Eritrean opposition websites. At the very least we could be nuisance and they should believe that when things change around in Eritrea, that they could be left out. No one should ever think that we are too polite because otherwise everyone will shoo us away. They will only call us when they want us, never the other way around.
The approach with EU or others would follow the same steps. Write letters requesting why Mr. Michele didn’t address the oppositions’ concerns. If the development commissioner fails to reply or gives negative reply, immediately send the same information to Eritrean opposition websites. Don’t tell the development commissioner how bad PFDJ is because he knows that already. Tell him what his moral and legal obligations are in a stern but diplomatic language. Use international rights organizations and possibly diplomats such as Mr. Bandini to personally deliver those letters to the development commissioner. When we make a lot of noise, we give more clouts to people like Mr. Bandini. The critical factor is to continually publicize our efforts.
We shouldn’t judge our efforts by end results only. Instead, our efforts are judged by simply doing something and by remaining active. Never discount the power of being just nuisance. We should learn to do something for the sake of doing something. I assure my readers that results will surely follow. If we simply convince ourselves that EU, Al-Jazeera, etc…won’t respond to us because we are insignificant, then we have failed as opposition and as aspiring leaders without even trying.
Failure is part of life. Failure isn’t about falling down, but about not getting up after falling down. Failure is about not learning from one’s mistakes. Failure is about being afraid to try new ways. The opposition camp is replete with individuals who are so sure about their views and “their truth”, yet they have served us failure after failure because they believe that political leadership is about heaping dirt on the other guy, and yet have not provided one iota of positive activism.
At the risk of deviating from my topic, let me interject one thought about shameful politics on the part of Deqebat.com. This response is partially sparked by part 13 of an interview with an elderly Eritrean politician. But in my last article (‘Back to Tribouli’), i.e. even before part 13 of the interview, I alluded to this series of interviews by complaining that these ‘politicians’ begin by stating their principles and then proceed by engaging in the worst form of rumor-mongering thus negating their principles. I included that portion because deqebat.com’s interviewee was engaged in salacious rumors about PIA’s background although claiming at the beginning of his statement that he isn’t comfortable discussing these type of issues. I find such duplicity as the most dangerous type of politics that weakens democracy. We campaign on principles and values – never on rumor mongering or irrelevant issues. The King’s Court intrigues in an age of internet must be refuted with our every ounce of our energy. It is destructive! PIA is hundred times the man deqebat is. Gen. Mesfin is one thousand times the man deqebat is. PIA is a dictator but we know from which angle he is coming. Even more dangerous are those who strive to scratch more wounds while pretending to possess wisdom and pretending to stand by certain principles. Every Eritrean with one iota of blood is Eritrean. Eritrea belongs to anyone that loves it and wants to nurture it. Eritrea doesn’t need those, even those claiming to be deqebat, who try to sow weeds and the seeds of discord. ‘Deqebat’ itself is a medieval concept. In today’s world, migration has changed the face of the world. The victor of the presidential election in France, possibly the second or third most powerful nation in the world, a couple of days ago is born from a Hungarian father who immigrated to France. Deqebat lives in Europe owning or asking to own European citizenship and yet campaigning to dispossess others of their Eritrean identity. My response to deqebat’s continuous destructive politics – at one time on religious issues, and now back to individual politics – would have been muted if deqebat wasn’t the official website of the League of Eritrean Democratic Forces (LEDF) which includes Tesfa Network and Eritrean Congress Party. If this is what LEDF considers as positive politics, then there is something major amiss in their politics. If deqebat and LEDF believe that they are engaging in ‘smart’ politics, I can assure those who are pursuing this destructive political strategy that the rest of us can be equal to the task. We don’t need to engage in destructive politics to engage deqebat but to reveal to our common readers the dangerous path deqebat is pursuing.
Dissention within EDP
In the last two-and-half years, I have tried to address every issue as I understood them. I have criticized almost every political organization. I make no exception to EDP. In writing this portion of my article, my readers should understand that I am not an insider and do not possess any more information than most of my fellow readers. However, I can’t possibly pass up an opportunity to address organizational challenges.
We have heard and read the dissenters views on certain issues. It is difficult to address issues by listening to one side only and without possessing an organization’s bylaws and resolutions passed during its congresses.
The dissention can be examined at various levels, including the overall handling of the dissent and the question of organizational rule-of-law.
Ø Organizational rule-of-law
I will start with this topic because we need only examine technical issues. Unfortunately, the dissenters haven’t quoted any specific sections in EDP organizational laws in arguing their cases. I can’t neither support nor argue against the dissenters without specific information. But one may discuss from general observations.
Even if leadership violates any of the organizational laws or provisions, there is always a mechanism for calling organizational meetings (i.e. extraordinary meeting) at each level: executive, central committee and congress. Dissenters who make up less than the minimum required to call extraordinary meeting at any level can’t force a meeting without the minimum requirements regardless of how serious the violations are.
It is understandable the frustration in gathering membership petition in Diaspora politics. The only means available to the dissenters is to propagate their views through the public medium in order to reach out to other members and to the public beyond that. Based on the number of open supporters for the dissenting views, it appears that they may not have enough votes to call extraordinary meeting.
The dissenters themselves have responsibilities to abide by the organizational laws. If they can’t garner enough votes to call extraordinary meeting, they have two choices: resign or to wait until the next congress [which I hope there is a requirement to meet on periodic basis and is not left to CC’s discretion only]. The dissenters don’t have rights to declare organizational laws as void just because they felt leadership breached an important issue. The dissenters have equal if not more legal responsibilities to ensure that their accusations are backed by facts. In general, accusers have greater legal responsibility. Failing to state the facts and possibly making false accusations is tantamount to engaging in slanderous and libelous acts. One must differentiate between dissent and slanderous statements.
The other question I have is what are the organization rules for replacing central committee members?
Ø The Subjective Analysis
Again, it is difficult to analyze on the basis of publicly available information only. The dissenters accused the Chairman of ignoring them and even engaging in deriding them. Observing our overall Eritrean attitude and poor communications skills, I may be able to deconstruct what may have led to the foul moods on both sides. The dissenting side felt deliberately excluded from an important decision on travel to Ethiopia. The dissenters may have expressed their views in strong terms to the Chairman and they may have even questioned the integrity of the Chairman and the leadership in general. The Chairman, like every other human, felt offended by the remarks and accusations and refuses to meet with them. In addition, leadership takes one step further and flushes them out.
I fully understand the dissenters’ frustrations and possibly leadership’s harsh response. I can imagine the dynamics that leads to communication breakdowns leading to ill-will. Both sides have responsibilities to engage in positive communication, but failing so, in general, leadership has a higher moral responsibility to reason out with the dissenters regardless of the dissenters’ anger which may stifle communication.
In fact, there is a political culture we must change. There is a tendency in Eritrean communities and organizations’ leaderships to believe that the general public or general membership must be kept in the dark until the last minute and only told to accept a fait-accompli. I think this is taking advantage of the good-natured behavior of most people. In the short-run, leadership may avoid internal discord, but in the medium-to- long-run it creates mistrust. Every unpleasant act we attempt to avoid now will come back to hound us in vengeance.
While adherence to organizational rule-of-law remains unequivocal, policies can change with evolving realities. What glues together the rule-of-law on one end and polices at the other end is credibility and integrity. EDP’s leadership may have followed proper procedures to address the dissenters’ issue, but what binds an organization together is not only adherence to legalities but also that efforts be made to make every member feel that he/she is included in the decision making of critical issues. EDP’s credibility would be tarnished by ‘even appearing’ to antagonize any dissenters even if leadership followed proper legal procedures to address issues. The best approach would have been for EDP to allow the dissenters to post on its own website, say, one open letter expressing their dissent over leadership’s decision over the said issue and even allowing them to petition for extraordinary meeting in the same open letter. Even better would be to respond to their dissents both on legal issue and at public relations level. These members shouldn’t be made to feel that they are expendable or that they are troublemakers for dissenting or for trying to petition. They expressed their legitimate concerns. Any dissenter who has strong feelings towards certain issues has a duty to address them. They should not have been made to contact meskerem.net or deqebat.com, which must have been very emotionally difficult for them to do so, but felt they had no other choice. If the dissenters sent their protest letters to asmarino or awate or any other independent opposition news media but they decide to suppress them, then these news organizations have failed to do their jobs. EDP, RC, ENSF or any other political organizations are not immune from criticisms. However, the news websites have to ensure that their posting guidelines are followed and to ensure that the dissenters’ messages aren’t libelous. As for EDP, if it doesn’t want to publish their protests on its own website, EDP should have arranged for asmarino, awate, nharnet or other respectable websites to post their protests. Even if the dissenters have already decided to leave the organization, they should feel that their dissents received fair treatment. Even better would have been if EDP would throw a little reception for the departing members thanking them for their services, giving them certificates of appreciation and for them to keep struggling against the regime in their ways. Deep down, EDP’s leadership may feel angry of what the dissenters may have done to it, as the dissenters feel same towards leadership, but the day we are able to swallow our pride, ego and the need for vindication, if we can overcome that feeling, then we would have won the world. We have to force our mouths to smile even when our stomach is burning. This isn’t insincerity but opening up the way for the healing process. After all, Eritrea has a very small population and everyone counts. This is not necessarily about being nice, but about being fair. We will never agree on all issues, but as long as people feel that they are treated fairly, we can attain our democracy in record time. Human courtesy and respect is above all issues. During these difficult times it won’t be political intrigues that will save Eritrea, but our unequivocal beliefs towards human respect. We can return to political mud-slinging once we have reached political stability in Eritrea. In the meantime, let everyone know that we have unshakeable respect for everyone. If any one believes that our good natured behavior is a weakness, let them cross the line and test our wrath.
EDP carries greater organizational responsibility within the opposition camp than all other opposition parties because it may have the inside track if a sudden change takes place in Eritrea. Other political organizations and individuals may have greater apprehensions towards EDP – thus the continuous political and personal attacks against it. I have supported EDP for its positions on many issues. In the last couple of years, positive developments have allowed the political views of EDP, ENSF, RC and even Mr. Adhanom’s EPM to begin merging which is very encouraging by itself. As important policies are, it is even more important to cultivate trust and credibility. Let the other parties respect your organization even if they disagree with your policies. At the end of the day, on most issues and policies, we rely on trust and credibility we place on our leaders to address many of the issues and policies than each one of us trying to drive from the backseat. In return, leadership should strive to maintain that trust through ‘good-faith’ practices.
Dissent is at the core of our democratic values. The dissenting EDP members have exercised their God-given rights to dissent and have nothing to be concerned about. I respect them for their convictions. My only advice is to be careful in making their public statements and to ensure that they have their legal facts and organizational rules correct. Otherwise they will be committing the same mistakes that they are accusing others of doing. When we dissent, we have to hold ourselves and the people we accuse to higher standards.
Berhan Hagos
May 8, 2007
It should be clear from the outset that whatever EU may do to entertain PIA won’t change the fundamental questions occupying Eritrea and the horn in general. Complicated issues can’t be addressed through wishy-washy policies. It can’t be lost with EU and its development commissioner that the Somali issue is being complicated due to the stalemate over Eritrean-Ethiopian border demarcation process. Without EU’s firm position over the border demarcation process, which may bring it into conflict with the US policy in the region, EU’s wishy-washy position over secondary issues won’t yield any results. If EU’s commissioner wants to be seen as ‘doing something’ in the region to justify his job, he must equally examine his and his organization’s legal and moral obligations to take account of the deteriorating human rights and social conditions brought about through unrestrained dictatorship in Eritrea.
We should reject EU’s ‘flavor of the month’ politics. EU can’t say, ‘Oh, it is September so let EU parliamentarians write a letter to the Eritrean leader asking for their release. Oh, it is May so let us invite PIA and pat him on the back. Oh, it is …’ Instead, the issues and questions that should be posed to EU are the followings,
EU parliamentarians are fully aware of the plights of Eritrean parliamentarians and yet have done nothing to secure their release. In fact, by writing their annual ritual one-page protest letter to PIA, inadvertently, EU parliamentarians are exposing their moral and legal obligations over their failures to address the gross human rights violations in Eritrea. By writing these protest letters, EU parliamentarians can no longer claim ignorance over the plight of the Eritrean parliamentarians and the overall human rights situation in Eritrea.
Amnesty International, CPJ, Religious organizations and many other human rights organizations have well documented the systematic and gross human rights violations in Eritrea. The EU commissioner and his colleagues can not possibly claim ignorance over the human rights conditions in Eritrea.
From Mr. Bandini to EU’s current Ambassador to Eritrea, Mr. Geert Heikens, have expressed their unequivocal understanding of the PIA regime as unabashed dictatorship, not only flaunting its disrespect for the rule-of-law in Eritrea but even breaching legal agreements with its donors. At a time when Mr. Geert Heikens and other analysts were expecting EU to ask for redress over this breach, instead EU is proceeding by promising to provide additional humanitarian assistance.
Barely few months ago, Eritrean Anti-tyranny Global Solidarity delivered a petition signed by 5,000 Eritreans asking for help in addressing the gross violations of human rights in Eritrea. Among a number of requests, one request was for banning High Eritrean government officials from traveling to the West. EU and its development commissioner seem oblivious to the requests of Eritrean people.
In reality, EU is playing double standards. The Council of European Union Decision 2002/148/EC imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe because “European Union considers that democratic principles are still not upheld in Zimbabwe and that no significant progress has been achieved by your country’s government in the five fields …” What are the five fields?
End of politically motivated violence,
Free and fair elections,
Freedom of the media
Independence of the judiciary
End of illegal occupations of farms.
The sanctions include “the Council also issued travel bans and a freezing of funds and other financial assets for Mugabe and 19 of his colleagues, who were deemed guilty of serious violations of human rights, freedom of opinion, and freedom of association and peaceful assembly in Zimbabwe. The EU was keen to emphasize that the sanctions imposed are designed to affect only those against whom they are imposed, and should not penalize the “ordinary citizens” of Zimbabwe.”
The question that should be posed to EU is whether their diplomatic acts are simply wishy-washy politics or acts based on certain principles. If EU’s acts are guided by certain principles, ‘what is good for the goose is good for the gander’, thus what is good for President Mugabe is good for PIA. In fact, most Eritreans and various international human rights organizations would say that President Mugabe’s treatment of its political opposition is infinitely more humane that PIA’s treatment of its political opposition. Recently, President Mugabe beat up two opposition leaders and yet the opposition leaders were free afterwards to speak to the world media and to seek medical treatment in South Africa and return to Zimbabwe. It can’t be lost with the development commissioner the most inhumane treatment our opposition and prisoners-of-conscious are receiving.
The purpose of this article or any of my other articles isn’t to engage in political debate with those we disagree. If we reduce our discussions to simply political debates, the ones with sticks and money would probably win every time. Political debates are grey areas. As activists, our role is to convert those political debates into moral and legal questions. By doing so, we force the wishy-washy domestic and foreign political players to take unequivocal position on certain fundamental principles.
Thus, our question to the EU development commissioner and EU in general should be,
1. What are the principles applied to deal with different dictators? If EU is leaning hard on those dictators that affect its organizational interests directly and softly on those dictators that don’t affect its organizational interests directly, then EU doesn’t have principles but is playing politics to pursue its own socio-economic and political interests at the expense of certain fundamental principles. The answer to this question has wider ramifications. For instance, the International Criminal Court (ICC) which is the brainchild of the European governments, would lose its credibility if EU is perceived as playing politics to advance its own interests. ICC’s credibility doesn’t emanate from the court itself but the world’s general perceptions towards European governments and EU themselves.
2. According to Mr. Heikens, Eritrea is responsible for restitutions on donated food ‘deemed’ sold to Eritreans. Instead of rectifying this issue, if EU donates more food and PIA continues with his unpunished behavior, who will be ultimately responsible for breach of contract? My fellow readers, you know what wishy-washy donors do, they will continue donating food to the regime although fully aware that the regime is breaching food donation contracts, and then when a democratic government is elected, wishy-washy donors begin flexing their muscles on the democratic government threatening to withhold funding unless the democratic government compensates the donors for breach of contracts under the ousted dictators. This has been donor’s curse for Africa. Instead, EU should withhold any humanitarian assistance until PIA has made restitutions, and then proceed with providing additional humanitarian assistance. If EU fails to enforce its contracts immediately, future Eritrean governments have no moral or legal obligations to compensate for contract breaches committed under previous regimes.
3. If EU decides to resume providing development assistance, the EU development commissioner should be made fully aware that he and his organization are stepping into legal liability. Donors have legal responsibilities to ensure that their project assistances are implemented according to certain human rights codes and worker safety standards. EU can’t extend financial assistance for development projects and pretend or assume that its assistance is being implemented in accordance with EU’s own, and not PFDJ’s, labor and work standards. For instance, if EU provides financial, material or expertise assistance for drinking water project somewhere in Eritrea and if PIA uses slave labor to undertake that project, does EU bear responsibility for the use or condoning the use of slave labor? Absolutely! EU can’t claim ignorance over this issue because the use of slave labor is well documented by international human rights organizations. EU can’t use PIA’s definitions to determine if slave labor is being used in Eritrea. EU has legal obligations to define slave labor according to its own social, legal and political standards. If EU provides as much as one cent for development assistance, EU becomes legally liable for the use of slave labor. We have to make sure that the development commissioner is fully aware of the implications, and more importantly, that we will pursue this issue.
It is not lost with anyone that EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe because white farmers are involved. The British government leaned on the EU, and voila EU imposed a sanction. EU’s indirect statement is that black parliamentarians and tens of thousands of innocent Eritreans in PFDJ Dungeons are expendable. This is condescending attitude. But as black Africans, and especially as Eritreans, we should always remember that our traditional African societies have lived under advanced social standards and harmony, and rule of law for centuries while Gauls, Vikings were jumping around from one tree-to-another, and their Roman kin were slaughtering and enslaving their own and the rest of the world. The various dynasties from China to Russia to Europe created the most miserable conditions for their own people and their subjects for centuries, while we Africans lived in relative peace for centuries. We don’t need any condescending attitude from anyone. EU must address issues based on principles, as it claims, and not simply on politics.
Opposition’s Reply?
What happened to opposition’s non-existent foreign relations? PFDJ’s diplomatic skills is somewhere between weak and belligerent. The opposition camp’s diplomatic skill is non-existent. I don’t know which one is worse. If the development commissioner had an ounce of respect for Eritrean opposition and the Eritrean public, he would have put out a statement saying that he discussed regional issues with PIA and that he raised the issue of gross human rights violations in Eritrea with PIA. This would have been an indirect acknowledgment to the Eritrean people in general and the opposition camp specifically that EU considers human rights violations as a serious issue. The fact that Mr. Louise Michel didn’t bother to raise this issue demonstrates that the organization he leads has no respect for Eritreans. The opposition camp should have quickly replied to such condescending attitude.
EDA should understand that nobody cares whether they amend their article 1 or 10 or 50. These are issues that will be addressed by the vast stakeholders in post-PFDJ Eritrea. Over two years to address a couple of articles, while in the end parting their ways, indicates that we remain severely challenged in tackling today’s issues. If EDA was addressing article 4 or 5 while actively engaged in other opposition campaigns, we would have respected their overall efforts. Whether they agree on a couple of articles on issues that can only be addressed in the future doesn’t excuse their lackluster performance today.
If we evaluate the opposition camp, the overwhelming productive opposition efforts are being exerted by non-political organizations. If we examine opposition news organizations, human rights organizations, rallies, petitions, writing campaigns and every other effort has been organized and delivered by these non-political groups, not the political organizations. It escapes me what the function of the political groups is – to amend article 4 and 5 over 10 years?
EDA’s [former] leader popping up on Al-jazeera when the news network probably had no news to broadcast a couple of years was announced to us as a major achievement. Eritrean opposition shouldn’t become news fillers for news broadcasters. Instead, Eritrean opposition must be able to persuade, and if necessary coerce, news networks to give air time to the opposition. When PIA is on Al-Jazeera one day, opposition must strive to be on Al-Jazeera the following day.
Some will say, ‘easier said than done’. Whether Al-Jazeera agrees to opposition’s request to appear on their news program is secondary. The important thing is for the opposition to do things for the sake of doing by proceeding in the following steps,
1. Soon after PIA’s appearance on Al-jazeera, the opposition should make written request to appear on Al-jazeera.
2. If Al-Jazeera doesn’t reply or give a negative reply, the opposition camp would publicize its efforts to the Eritrean public.
3. Never acquiescing to rejections, from time-to-time, the opposition camp would make persistent request to appear on their program and failing to receive a positive reply then to write articles criticizing Al-Jazeera and making sure that a copy of our request and Al-Jazeera’s replies are posted on Eritrean opposition websites. At the very least we could be nuisance and they should believe that when things change around in Eritrea, that they could be left out. No one should ever think that we are too polite because otherwise everyone will shoo us away. They will only call us when they want us, never the other way around.
The approach with EU or others would follow the same steps. Write letters requesting why Mr. Michele didn’t address the oppositions’ concerns. If the development commissioner fails to reply or gives negative reply, immediately send the same information to Eritrean opposition websites. Don’t tell the development commissioner how bad PFDJ is because he knows that already. Tell him what his moral and legal obligations are in a stern but diplomatic language. Use international rights organizations and possibly diplomats such as Mr. Bandini to personally deliver those letters to the development commissioner. When we make a lot of noise, we give more clouts to people like Mr. Bandini. The critical factor is to continually publicize our efforts.
We shouldn’t judge our efforts by end results only. Instead, our efforts are judged by simply doing something and by remaining active. Never discount the power of being just nuisance. We should learn to do something for the sake of doing something. I assure my readers that results will surely follow. If we simply convince ourselves that EU, Al-Jazeera, etc…won’t respond to us because we are insignificant, then we have failed as opposition and as aspiring leaders without even trying.
Failure is part of life. Failure isn’t about falling down, but about not getting up after falling down. Failure is about not learning from one’s mistakes. Failure is about being afraid to try new ways. The opposition camp is replete with individuals who are so sure about their views and “their truth”, yet they have served us failure after failure because they believe that political leadership is about heaping dirt on the other guy, and yet have not provided one iota of positive activism.
At the risk of deviating from my topic, let me interject one thought about shameful politics on the part of Deqebat.com. This response is partially sparked by part 13 of an interview with an elderly Eritrean politician. But in my last article (‘Back to Tribouli’), i.e. even before part 13 of the interview, I alluded to this series of interviews by complaining that these ‘politicians’ begin by stating their principles and then proceed by engaging in the worst form of rumor-mongering thus negating their principles. I included that portion because deqebat.com’s interviewee was engaged in salacious rumors about PIA’s background although claiming at the beginning of his statement that he isn’t comfortable discussing these type of issues. I find such duplicity as the most dangerous type of politics that weakens democracy. We campaign on principles and values – never on rumor mongering or irrelevant issues. The King’s Court intrigues in an age of internet must be refuted with our every ounce of our energy. It is destructive! PIA is hundred times the man deqebat is. Gen. Mesfin is one thousand times the man deqebat is. PIA is a dictator but we know from which angle he is coming. Even more dangerous are those who strive to scratch more wounds while pretending to possess wisdom and pretending to stand by certain principles. Every Eritrean with one iota of blood is Eritrean. Eritrea belongs to anyone that loves it and wants to nurture it. Eritrea doesn’t need those, even those claiming to be deqebat, who try to sow weeds and the seeds of discord. ‘Deqebat’ itself is a medieval concept. In today’s world, migration has changed the face of the world. The victor of the presidential election in France, possibly the second or third most powerful nation in the world, a couple of days ago is born from a Hungarian father who immigrated to France. Deqebat lives in Europe owning or asking to own European citizenship and yet campaigning to dispossess others of their Eritrean identity. My response to deqebat’s continuous destructive politics – at one time on religious issues, and now back to individual politics – would have been muted if deqebat wasn’t the official website of the League of Eritrean Democratic Forces (LEDF) which includes Tesfa Network and Eritrean Congress Party. If this is what LEDF considers as positive politics, then there is something major amiss in their politics. If deqebat and LEDF believe that they are engaging in ‘smart’ politics, I can assure those who are pursuing this destructive political strategy that the rest of us can be equal to the task. We don’t need to engage in destructive politics to engage deqebat but to reveal to our common readers the dangerous path deqebat is pursuing.
Dissention within EDP
In the last two-and-half years, I have tried to address every issue as I understood them. I have criticized almost every political organization. I make no exception to EDP. In writing this portion of my article, my readers should understand that I am not an insider and do not possess any more information than most of my fellow readers. However, I can’t possibly pass up an opportunity to address organizational challenges.
We have heard and read the dissenters views on certain issues. It is difficult to address issues by listening to one side only and without possessing an organization’s bylaws and resolutions passed during its congresses.
The dissention can be examined at various levels, including the overall handling of the dissent and the question of organizational rule-of-law.
Ø Organizational rule-of-law
I will start with this topic because we need only examine technical issues. Unfortunately, the dissenters haven’t quoted any specific sections in EDP organizational laws in arguing their cases. I can’t neither support nor argue against the dissenters without specific information. But one may discuss from general observations.
Even if leadership violates any of the organizational laws or provisions, there is always a mechanism for calling organizational meetings (i.e. extraordinary meeting) at each level: executive, central committee and congress. Dissenters who make up less than the minimum required to call extraordinary meeting at any level can’t force a meeting without the minimum requirements regardless of how serious the violations are.
It is understandable the frustration in gathering membership petition in Diaspora politics. The only means available to the dissenters is to propagate their views through the public medium in order to reach out to other members and to the public beyond that. Based on the number of open supporters for the dissenting views, it appears that they may not have enough votes to call extraordinary meeting.
The dissenters themselves have responsibilities to abide by the organizational laws. If they can’t garner enough votes to call extraordinary meeting, they have two choices: resign or to wait until the next congress [which I hope there is a requirement to meet on periodic basis and is not left to CC’s discretion only]. The dissenters don’t have rights to declare organizational laws as void just because they felt leadership breached an important issue. The dissenters have equal if not more legal responsibilities to ensure that their accusations are backed by facts. In general, accusers have greater legal responsibility. Failing to state the facts and possibly making false accusations is tantamount to engaging in slanderous and libelous acts. One must differentiate between dissent and slanderous statements.
The other question I have is what are the organization rules for replacing central committee members?
Ø The Subjective Analysis
Again, it is difficult to analyze on the basis of publicly available information only. The dissenters accused the Chairman of ignoring them and even engaging in deriding them. Observing our overall Eritrean attitude and poor communications skills, I may be able to deconstruct what may have led to the foul moods on both sides. The dissenting side felt deliberately excluded from an important decision on travel to Ethiopia. The dissenters may have expressed their views in strong terms to the Chairman and they may have even questioned the integrity of the Chairman and the leadership in general. The Chairman, like every other human, felt offended by the remarks and accusations and refuses to meet with them. In addition, leadership takes one step further and flushes them out.
I fully understand the dissenters’ frustrations and possibly leadership’s harsh response. I can imagine the dynamics that leads to communication breakdowns leading to ill-will. Both sides have responsibilities to engage in positive communication, but failing so, in general, leadership has a higher moral responsibility to reason out with the dissenters regardless of the dissenters’ anger which may stifle communication.
In fact, there is a political culture we must change. There is a tendency in Eritrean communities and organizations’ leaderships to believe that the general public or general membership must be kept in the dark until the last minute and only told to accept a fait-accompli. I think this is taking advantage of the good-natured behavior of most people. In the short-run, leadership may avoid internal discord, but in the medium-to- long-run it creates mistrust. Every unpleasant act we attempt to avoid now will come back to hound us in vengeance.
While adherence to organizational rule-of-law remains unequivocal, policies can change with evolving realities. What glues together the rule-of-law on one end and polices at the other end is credibility and integrity. EDP’s leadership may have followed proper procedures to address the dissenters’ issue, but what binds an organization together is not only adherence to legalities but also that efforts be made to make every member feel that he/she is included in the decision making of critical issues. EDP’s credibility would be tarnished by ‘even appearing’ to antagonize any dissenters even if leadership followed proper legal procedures to address issues. The best approach would have been for EDP to allow the dissenters to post on its own website, say, one open letter expressing their dissent over leadership’s decision over the said issue and even allowing them to petition for extraordinary meeting in the same open letter. Even better would be to respond to their dissents both on legal issue and at public relations level. These members shouldn’t be made to feel that they are expendable or that they are troublemakers for dissenting or for trying to petition. They expressed their legitimate concerns. Any dissenter who has strong feelings towards certain issues has a duty to address them. They should not have been made to contact meskerem.net or deqebat.com, which must have been very emotionally difficult for them to do so, but felt they had no other choice. If the dissenters sent their protest letters to asmarino or awate or any other independent opposition news media but they decide to suppress them, then these news organizations have failed to do their jobs. EDP, RC, ENSF or any other political organizations are not immune from criticisms. However, the news websites have to ensure that their posting guidelines are followed and to ensure that the dissenters’ messages aren’t libelous. As for EDP, if it doesn’t want to publish their protests on its own website, EDP should have arranged for asmarino, awate, nharnet or other respectable websites to post their protests. Even if the dissenters have already decided to leave the organization, they should feel that their dissents received fair treatment. Even better would have been if EDP would throw a little reception for the departing members thanking them for their services, giving them certificates of appreciation and for them to keep struggling against the regime in their ways. Deep down, EDP’s leadership may feel angry of what the dissenters may have done to it, as the dissenters feel same towards leadership, but the day we are able to swallow our pride, ego and the need for vindication, if we can overcome that feeling, then we would have won the world. We have to force our mouths to smile even when our stomach is burning. This isn’t insincerity but opening up the way for the healing process. After all, Eritrea has a very small population and everyone counts. This is not necessarily about being nice, but about being fair. We will never agree on all issues, but as long as people feel that they are treated fairly, we can attain our democracy in record time. Human courtesy and respect is above all issues. During these difficult times it won’t be political intrigues that will save Eritrea, but our unequivocal beliefs towards human respect. We can return to political mud-slinging once we have reached political stability in Eritrea. In the meantime, let everyone know that we have unshakeable respect for everyone. If any one believes that our good natured behavior is a weakness, let them cross the line and test our wrath.
EDP carries greater organizational responsibility within the opposition camp than all other opposition parties because it may have the inside track if a sudden change takes place in Eritrea. Other political organizations and individuals may have greater apprehensions towards EDP – thus the continuous political and personal attacks against it. I have supported EDP for its positions on many issues. In the last couple of years, positive developments have allowed the political views of EDP, ENSF, RC and even Mr. Adhanom’s EPM to begin merging which is very encouraging by itself. As important policies are, it is even more important to cultivate trust and credibility. Let the other parties respect your organization even if they disagree with your policies. At the end of the day, on most issues and policies, we rely on trust and credibility we place on our leaders to address many of the issues and policies than each one of us trying to drive from the backseat. In return, leadership should strive to maintain that trust through ‘good-faith’ practices.
Dissent is at the core of our democratic values. The dissenting EDP members have exercised their God-given rights to dissent and have nothing to be concerned about. I respect them for their convictions. My only advice is to be careful in making their public statements and to ensure that they have their legal facts and organizational rules correct. Otherwise they will be committing the same mistakes that they are accusing others of doing. When we dissent, we have to hold ourselves and the people we accuse to higher standards.
Berhan Hagos
May 8, 2007
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